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ANNETTE SCHAD-SEIFERT AND SHINGO SHIMADA 
Introduction 
In 2008 the annual conference of the German Association for Social 
Science Research on Japan (Vereinigung für sozialwissenschaftliche 
Japanforschung e.V. (VSJF)) addressed the issue of demographic 
change in Japan in comparison to the social developments of ageing in 
Germany and other member states of the European Union. The con-
ference, which was organized by Annette Schad-Seifert and Shingo 
Shimada (both at Heinrich Heine University of Duesseldorf), was held 
in Kaiserswerth, an old part of the city of Duesseldorf. Thirteen 
speakers from Germany, England, Japan and the Netherlands pre-
sented their papers in four sessions on the topics “Demographic 
Trends and Social Analysis”, “Family and Welfare Policies”, “Ageing 
Society and the Organization of Households” and “Demographic 
Change and the Economy”. More than 120 participants from different 
countries attended the conference. 
Not all papers presented at the conference are included in this volume. 
Some authors decided to publish their papers in different publications 
or have had their papers already published by the time they presented 
them at the conference. As far as possible we refer in this publication 
to the topic that was presented at the conference. 
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The first session “Demographic Trends and Social Analysis – Obser-
vations from Japan and the EU” was opened by Uta Meier-Gräwe 
(University of Giessen, Sociology and Household Economics). She 
dealt with the question of how to cope with the low fertility in Ger-
many and focused on issues of family policy. She maintained that 
although the concept of having a family and children is valued very 
much, young families tend to stay childless and the share of families 
with more than two children in Germany remains very low. According 
to Meier-Gräwe this gives evidence to the fact that family and profes-
sional career are still difficult to combine and that attitudes and expec-
tations on family and partnership diverge greatly between young 
women and men. While young women seem to aspire a gender-equal 
division of labour within the family, young men still tend to see them-
selves as the breadwinners. Due to this divergence, families stay child-
less. In her paper Meier-Gräwe tried to answer the question on how 
policy measures can positively influence families’ decision to have 
children. She pointed out that a major factor for taking up familial 
responsibilities is the possibility for both partners to continue a profes-
sional career. Furthermore, the so-called “rush hour of life” – that is 
the accumulation of familial and occupational tasks and responsibili-
ties in a very short period of an individual’s lifetime – has to be de-
compressed in order to influence birth rates positively. Meier-Gräwe 
concluded that family policy should focus on the reorganization of 
family and work by providing gender-equality in career-interruptions 
and childcare leave.1 
                                                 
1 Please refer to the German-language article by Uta Meier-Gräwe (2009): Was ist 
Familie? Warum es einer begrifflichen Neujustierung bedarf [What is family? Why do 
we need a new paradigm?]. 
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As the second speaker in the session Sawako Shirahase (University 
of Tokyo, Sociology) presented on socioeconomic inequality and 
changes in the demographic structure. Focusing on ageing and income 
inequalities in different countries, she showed that the socioeconomic 
situation of people older than 65 years is strongly connected to the 
household structure in which they are living. The demographic change 
did not only bring changes in the population structure, but also in 
household structures, which have started to show a pluralized structure. 
Societies where the elderly live in various types of households tend to 
show a larger extent of income inequality. Therefore the socioeco-
nomic situation of old people differs depending on their type of 
household. Particularly, one-person households run by elderly women 
face the most serious problems when it comes to economic well-being. 
Shirahase points out that Japan is no longer an exceptionally equal 
society and now shows many social problems such as high poverty 
among the elderly.2 
The first session was concluded by keynote speaker Florian Coul-
mas, director of the German Institute for Japanese Studies in Tokyo. 
He presented on the ageing of societies and changes in family struc-
tures with regard to happiness and individual possibilities to realize a 
happy life. According to Coulmas the pursuit of happiness discussed 
in the public dialogue in Japan is a sign for drastic social changes, 
which result in demographic change. The increasing share of older 
people and the decreasing potential for young people to find jobs with 
stable incomes directly influences personal attitudes and individual 
expectations on prosperity, meaning of life and sense of happiness. 
                                                 
2  Please refer to the Japanese-language publication by Sawako Shirahase (2009): 
Nihon no fubyōdō o kangaeru. Shōshi kōrei shakai no kokusai hikaku [Thinking about 
inequality in Japan. A comparative study of ageing societies]. 
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After being involved in a long term project on demographic change 
and Japan’s ageing society for the last years, the German Institute for 
Japanese Studies is currently also conducting a project on the chang-
ing attitudes towards happiness in rapidly ageing societies and the 
media-constructed discourse of how to achieve a happy life.3 
In the second session “Family and Welfare Policies in Japan and the 
EU” Christian Tagsold (University of Duesseldorf, Modern Japanese 
Studies) held a presentation on long-term care insurances in Germany 
and Japan. The introduction of the long-term care insurance in Japan 
has lead to controversial debates in regional areas. On the one hand 
the system was supported as a step towards more independence in 
regional policy. On the other hand some of the reforms were rejected. 
Politicians who aimed at ending the controversy tried to improve their 
understanding of the new system by collecting more expert knowledge 
on the German system, which has influenced the design of the long-
term care insurance in Japan. Tagsold’s paper illustrates how the 
German insurance system was implemented in Japan and identifies 
this process as an endeavour of contextual translation.  
Axel Klein (German Institute for Japanese Studies, Political Sci-
ence) focused on the question of political responses to low birth rates 
in Japan. Since 1990, the problem of the declining birth rate is on Ja-
pan’s political agenda and so far quite a number of countermeasures 
have been enacted to bring about an effective turn-around in the birth 
rate development, but to this day they have continued to decrease. 
Klein tried to answer the question why – despite of the failure of pre-
vious countermeasures – political actors have not enacted different, 
more effective responses to low birth rates. He came to the conclusion 
                                                 
3 Please refer to http://www.dijtokyo.org/research/happiness_in_japan. 
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that low fertility has had a low political market value and that other 
policy fields have easily concealed political responses to low birth 
rates.4 
Aya Ezawa (Leiden University, Sociology of Modern Japan) ended 
the second session with a presentation on public assistance programs 
and single mothers. Public assistance programs in Japan have been 
subject to significant restructuring in the recent years. Faced with in-
creasing numbers of families in need, policy makers have introduced 
major reforms in form of welfare-to-work policies which aim to re-
duce reliance on public assistance by promoting higher levels of em-
ployment, particularly among single mothers. Yet, as studies con-
ducted in conjunction with the implementation of these programs have 
shown, finding employment is not just a matter of will and effort. The 
majority of single mothers who are receiving public assistance have 
few qualifications and resources, making it difficult to find full-time 
employment with a living wage. In her paper, Ezawa explored the 
challenges single mothers face in finding employment and becoming 
‘independent’ from state assistance as envisioned by policy makers. 
Based on an examination of the life trajectories of single mothers, who 
have received public assistance in past and present, as well as surveys 
and data provided by welfare offices, she examined the potential im-
pact of social origins, formal and informal resources, as well as every-
day strategies of single mothers’ life trajectories and ability to move 
beyond public assistance.5 
                                                 
4 A German-language article by Axel Klein is forthcoming in the VSJF’s yearbook: 
Niedrige Fertilität als politische Herausforderung. Eine neue Perspektive auf den 
Kampf mit der Überalterung Japans [Low fertility as a political challenge. A new 
perspective on the engagement with the ageing Japan]. 
5 Please refer to Aya Ezawa (2006): How Japanese single mothers work. 
Annette Schad-Seifert and Shingo Shimada 
 
10 
The third session dealt with the “Ageing Society and the Organization 
of Households”. Maren Godzik (German Institute for Japanese Studies, 
Social Sciences) opened the session with a paper on alternative forms 
of living. The demographic change and the pluralisation of living ar-
rangements lead to a breakdown of the three-generation household 
and to the establishment of the nuclear family. Therefore, the ageing 
of the Japanese population raises the question of care for the elderly. 
Apart from numerous innovations in the mainstream welfare and 
housing policies which have already been introduced, including the 
implementation of the public long-term care insurance and sheltered 
housing or assisted living schemes, private initiatives have started to 
organize alternative forms of housing. Although their number is li-
mited, some became widely known and serve as examples not only for 
similar projects but also for public and commercial housing projects 
giving them a greater importance than the number of alternative 
projects might suggests. Godzik’s paper introduces alternative housing 
forms in Japan and categorized different types of alternative housing 
with regard to their concepts and their target groups. On the basis of 
some examples, which have been explored by Godzik partly by means 
of qualitative interviews with organizers of collective houses and co-
housing forms of living (gurūpu ribingu), she discusses the question 
whether these forms of living can be a solution for a broader segment 
of Japan’s ageing society. 
Richard Ronald (University of Amsterdam, Geography, Planning 
and International Development Studies) has examined the role of the 
housing system in the emerging divide between younger and older 
generations in Japan. While the extreme nature and impact of demo-
graphic change in Japan, with increasing longevity, declining birth 
rates and a fundamental shift in the ratio between the retired and 
Introduction 
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working populations has been well documented, the role of housing 
markets and the property sector, although having significant conse-
quences in the structure of life courses, has not been as central to de-
bates. The contention of Ronald’s paper is that, in combination with 
restructuring in employment conditions and the pension and welfare 
sector in particular, the housing system in Japan is shaping the demo-
graphic change and may be considered a driving force in the decline 
of family formation and birth rates and a major feature in socioeco-
nomic inequality between younger and older cohorts. 
The session was concluded by Akiko Oda (University of Surrey, 
Sociology) who held a presentation on care dynamics among elderly 
couples in Japan. Due to the changes and pluralisation of living ar-
rangements, elderly people increasingly have to rely on their own 
means to take care of each other’s needs. This has placed an increased 
strain on elderly women. In particular on those who have to take care 
of a disabled partner and are traditionally subjugated by power dy-
namics where the older Japanese male maintains the dominant house-
hold head (daikoku bashira) status. In order to ease the care burden, 
the Japanese Government introduced the Long Term Care Insurance 
(LTCI) scheme in 2000. However, as Oda discusses in her study, the 
elderly couples have been reluctant to accept this help and are relying 
on their own means instead. They are also put off invoking external 
care by a number of complex factors that relate to socio-economic 
issues, pragmatism, social stigma, class, and gendered norms. 
In the fourth session “Demographic Change and the Economy” Flo-
rian Kohlbacher (German Institute for Japanese Studies, Business and 
Economics) presented on the ageing workforce. According to Kohl-
bacher, Japan is the country most severely affected by the demo-
Annette Schad-Seifert and Shingo Shimada 
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graphic shift as its population is not only ageing but also shrinking, 
which results in a decrease of the country’s productive labour force. In 
this regard, the so-called “year 2007 problem”, the year when the 
Japanese baby-boomer generation entered retirement age, holds par-
ticularly severe consequences for the labour market, since the loss of 
expert knowledge and labour shortage will have a far reaching effect 
on Japan’s economy and business sector. Kohlbacher’s presentation 
provided an overview and evaluation of the “year 2007 problem” and 
the challenge of an ageing workforce and discussed the implications 
for businesses in Japan.6 
Atsuhiro Yamada (Keio University, Economy of labour) discussed 
the effectiveness of new job security measures for the older employees 
in Japan. His paper examines the amended Law for the Stabilization of 
Employment of Older Persons (LSEOP) that was enforced in 2006. 
The LSEOP requires enterprises to take one of three job security 
measures for their employees in line with the upward revision of the 
pensionable age: a) any increase in the mandatory retirement age that 
exceeds the current pensionable age; b) the introduction of continuing 
employment systems; or c) the complete abolition of mandatory re-
tirement systems. Yamada’s results suggest that a wage reduction after 
the mandatory retirement age is a key determinant of continued em-
ployment in an enterprise. Because the LSEOP does not regulate wage 
reductions, the effect of it is limited. However, his results also implied 
that this would be appropriate to avoid the distortion of labour demand, 
particularly the increase of young recruits. 
                                                 
6 Please refer to Florian Kohlbacher together with Wolfgang H. Güttel, Stefan Kon-
lechner and Beate Haltmeyer (2009): Strategies against competency obsolescence. 
The case of R&D-intensive organizations. 
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Cosima Wagner’s paper (University of Frankfurt, Japanese Stud-
ies) discusses the question whether the use of “social robots” could be 
a means to overcome the hardships of the ageing society, especially 
the decreasing number of Japan’s workforce population. A field of 
special interest is the “elderly care”-sector where an increasing num-
ber of elderly people will need support in accomplishing their daily 
tasks and to get care in the near future. As numerous studies suggest, 
very soon the “robotic nurse” or robot technology based care will not 
only be a solution for the shortage of caregivers but will also become 
an important business in the future silver market. Based on her disser-
tation project on Japan’s robot culture (to be published soon) Wag-
ner’s paper delineates the expectations and measures regarding the use 
of robot technology in the elderly care sector in Japan.  
Cornelia Storz (University of Frankfurt, Business and Economic) 
presented on the creation of markets using the example of Japan’s 
silver market. Storz concentrated on conditions under which markets 
are created. She pointed out that processes of market creation are 
complex and go beyond the simple assumption that markets simply 
“emerge”.7  
The final discussion brought about that the demographic change of 
societies is not only a problem in regards to the changing population 
structure. Rather the growing differentiation and diversification of 
households, living arrangements and ways of employment are consid-
ered to pose a challenge to the future sustainability of societies. To-
day’s industrialized societies are facing a growing polarization of in-
comes, living conditions and career options that divide people not 
                                                 
7 Please refer to Storz, Cornelia and Werner Pascha (2008): How are markets created? 
The case of Japan’s silver market. 
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only economically. In his book “Race for the Exits” the political sci-
entist Leonard Schoppa has differentiated between “voice” and “exit” 
as options for individuals, who are dissatisfied with their life options, 
either to raise their voice (“voice”) or to leave the society (“exit”). The 
increasing share of individuals who decide for the second option 
(“exit”) – either by leaving the country or by staying away from fam-
ily, employment and wealth – is considered problematic. Central to all 
studies on demographic change is the question of how societies can be 
reconstructed and be made adaptive to these changes in order to sur-
vive as solidarity communities. 
The VSJF annual conference was made possible by generous funding 
from the German Research Fund (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), 
the East Asian Foundation of the Society of Friends and Promoters of 
the Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf (Ostasien- Stiftung der Ge-
sellschaft der Freunde und Förderer der Heinrich-Heine-Universität 
Düsseldorf e.V.), the Poensgen Foundation, Düsseldorf and the City 
of Düsseldorf’s Office of Economic Development. The publication of 
the proceedings was funded by the East Asian Foundation of the So-
ciety of Friends and Promoters of the Heinrich Heine University. 
 
Introduction 
 
15 
References 
EZAWA, Aya (2006). How Japanese single mothers work. In: René HAAK 
(Ed.). Japanstudien 18, special issue on “How Japan Works”. Munich: 
Iudicium, 59−83. http://www.dijtokyo.org/articles/JS18_ezawa.pdf. 
KLEIN, Axel (forthcoming). Niedrige Fertilität als politische Herausforderung. 
Eine neue Perspektive auf den Kampf mit der Überalterung Japans [Low 
fertility as a political challenge. A new perspective on the engagement 
with the ageing Japan]. In: David CHIAVACCI and Iris WIEZCOREK (Eds.). 
Japan 2010 – Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft [Japan 2010 – Politics, 
economy and society]. 
KOHLBACHER, Florian, Wolfgang H. GÜTTEL, Stefan KONLECHNER and Bea-
te HALTMEYER (2009). Strategies against competency obsolescence. The 
case of R&D-intensive organizations. In: Florian KOHLBACHER, Wolf-
gang H. GÜTTEL and Beate HALTMEYER (Eds.). The ageing workforce 
and HRM – challenges, chances, perspectives. Special issue, Internation-
al Journal of Human Resources Development and Management 9:2/3, 
124−148. http://www.dijtokyo.org/articles/IJHRDM_saco.pdf. 
MEIER-GRÄWE, Uta (2009). Was ist Familie? Warum es einer begrifflichen 
Neujustierung bedarf [What is family? Why do we need a new para-
digm?]. Archiv 39:2, 4−14. 
SCHOPPA, Leonard (2006). Race for the exits. The unraveling of Japan’s 
system of social protection. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
SHIRAHASE, Sawako (2009). Nihon no fubyōdō o kangaeru. Shōshi kōrei 
shakai no kokusai hikaku [Thinking about inequality in Japan. A com-
parative study of ageing societies]. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai. 
STORZ, Cornelia and Werner PASCHA (Eds.) (2008). How are markets cre-
ated? The case of Japan’s silver market. Duisburg Working Papers On 
East Asian Studies 78. http://www.uni-due.de/ineast/fileadmin/publica 
tions/gruen/paper78.pdf. 

  
FLORIAN COULMAS 
The Bitter Fruits of Success 
Abstract 
Japan’s economic and social development since the end of the Pacific 
War is a story of growth and success. Life improved continuously for 
the vast majority of all Japanese. Yet, the level of life satisfaction in 
Japan, measured along the scales of the World Database of Happiness, 
is low by international comparison. The Japanese are rich, healthy and 
long-lived, but not as happy as indicators of material wellbeing would 
predict. While their life-expectancy rose, their readiness to reproduce 
declined. Over the past half century Japan’s total fertility rate (TFR) 
fell to less than one third of what it was in mid twentieth century. 
What do these two trends imply about happiness? What does Japan’s 
experience of demographic change teach us about the effects of birth-
rate and family size on happiness? Can TFR be used for measuring the 
“livability of nations”? 
 
Keywords: happiness, low fertility, social change 
Introduction 
Conventional wisdom says that children are a source of happiness. 
Economic wisdom says that children are both a cost factor and a basis 
of social security. These interpretations are not necessarily mutually 
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exclusive. This paper pursues the question of how they can be com-
bined to explain Japan’s low fertility rate. It argues that the TFR de-
cline is a response to and indication of a number of inconsistencies 
that the ageing society itself has produced. Using data of the Asia-
Barometer Survey and Cabinet Office surveys on life-style prefer-
ences, it examines the happiness-promoting effects of the family in 
general and children in particular. It also discusses the question of the 
general validity of these parameters across cultures. If there are cul-
ture-specific routes to happiness, how much do children contribute to 
happiness in Japan and other industrialized countries? 
Success 
Japan is a happy country. What better measure to support this claim is 
there than Japan’s population, which in the course of the past 160 
years quadrupled from about 33 million in 1850 to 127 million in 
2008. Population growth is a clear sign of achievement. As Livi Bacci 
put it: “Per tutta la storia dell’umanità, popolazione è stato sinonimo 
di prosperità, stabilità e sicurezza.”1 Surely, prosperity, stability and 
security are good candidates for composite factors that make for a 
good life in a happy country. Undeniable progress has been made in 
various fields. Most impressive, perhaps, is the spectacular reduction 
in infant mortality in the twentieth century. The Japanese no longer 
die during the first precarious months after birth. Already low at the 
time, the infant mortality rate dropped from 60 per 1,000 live births at 
the end of the Pacific War to 0.32 in 2000. Only Sweden and Singa-
                                                 
1 Livi Bacci, Massimo (1998): Storia minima della popolazione del mondo [A concise 
history of world population], 9. 
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pore have a similarly low rate.2 Today, the Japanese don’t start dying 
until they are well into their sixties. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Infant mortality and TFR 
Source:  Danjo kyōdō sankaku hakusho (2005): Danjo kyōdō sankaku hakusho 
[Whitepaper on equal participation of men and women]. http://www.gen 
der.go.jp/whitepaper/h17/danjyo_hp/danjyo/html/zuhyo/fig01_00_12.html 
(accessed 10 July 2010). 
As a result of these mortality reductions the Japanese population 
has grown. It doubled from 1912 to 1967, when it reached 100 million. 
And Japan has over the past half century experienced unprecedented 
life expectancy gains. At the beginning of the twentieth century, life 
expectancy at birth was 44.0 years for males and 44.8 years for fe-
males, far below levels in Western countries. At the end of the century, 
                                                 
2 Cf. UNDP – United Nations Development Program (2000) (Ed.): Human Develop-
ment Report 2000. http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2000_EN.pdf (accessed 13 
July 2010) and Statistics Bureau (2009): Statistical handbook of Japan. http://www.st 
at.go.jp/English/data/handbook/c02cont.htm (accessed 13 July 2010). 
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the Japanese topped the world list of life expectancy at 82.3 years on 
average (85.6 for women and 78.5 for men, in 2005). Around the mid-
dle of the last century, reaching the age of one hundred was a sensa-
tion.3 
 
Figure 2:  Average life expectancy: 1947–2005 
Source:  Statistics Bureau (2009): Statistical handbook of Japan. http://www.stat.go.jp/ 
English/data/handbook/c02cont.htm (accessed 13 July 2010). 
  
                                                 
3 Cf. Yanagishita, Machiko and Jack M. Guralnik (1988): Changing mortality patterns 
that led life expectancy in Japan to surpass Sweden’s: 1972−1982. 
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The centenarians counted just a few hundred. In half a century’s 
time their numbers have multiplied a hundredfold. To quote another 
figure that is indicative of Japan’s rapid population development, in 
1950 the median age was 22 years, one of the youngest in the world. 
According to current projections, it will have risen by more 120 per 
cent to 57 years a century later.4 The massive gain in life expectancy 
is irrefutable evidence of a highly successful society, and a successful 
state allowing its citizens to flourish. Longevity has traditionally been 
regarded as an indication of happiness. If this still holds true Japan 
must be a happier country now by a large measure than it was a cen-
tury ago. 
 
Figure 3:  Centenarians 1963–2008 
Source:  ILC – International Longevity Center Japan (2010): http://longevity.ilcjapan.or 
g/t_stories/index.html (accessed 20 June 2010). 
  
                                                 
4 Cf. Atoh, Makoto (2008): Japan’s population growth during the past 100 years. 
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Japan is also more prosperous today than it ever has been before. 
In 1945 Japan’s GDP per capita was less than that of the Philippines 
or Mexico, but was in the top range of all economic indexes by the 
end of the century. Politically they are living in a peaceful, stable and 
open environment largely free of coercion. Progress in education has 
been phenomenal. The Japanese have access to all the information 
they could possibly want being able to make use of it from an earlier 
age and up to a higher age than previous generations. 
Since the 1980s, Japan has consistently ranked among the top ten 
countries of all three categories of the United Nations Human Devel-
opment Index, i.e., health, education and standard of living.5 A pros-
perous, highly educated, healthy population living in a peaceful land 
without any obvious external threat – that is Japan in the first decade 
of the twenty-first century. Wouldn’t that be sufficient reason to call 
this a happy country, if countries can properly be called happy or un-
happy? And if we want to sidestep the question of happiness, surely, 
Japan’s story of the twentieth century is one of great success. 
Table 1: Population change in comparison 
Country Rate of population 65 and over Number of 
years 
 7% 10% 14% 7 – 14% 
France 1864 1943 1979 115 
Sweden 1887 1948 1972 85 
USA 1942 1972 2014 72 
Switzerland 1931 1960 1982 51 
England 1929 1946 1976 47 
Germany 1932 2942 1972 40 
Japan 1970 1985 1994 25 
                                                 
5 In 2006, Japan ranked 7th of 177 countries on the Human Development Index. 
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Of course, population growth, economic development and advance 
in education are achievements not specific to Japan, but Japan under-
went a number of developments much faster than other countries. 
Most noticeably, the velocity of social ageing was much higher in 
Japan than elsewhere. For example, whereas France took 115 years to 
double from 7 per cent to 14 per cent the population aged 65 and older, 
Japan needed just 25 years (see table 1, p. 18). 
In sum, Japan’s modern history since the Meiji era and especially 
the second half of the twentieth century is a success story, if success is 
understood in terms of population growth and national and human 
development. A deliberate and hardworking labour force, an industrial 
policy orchestrated by the Japanese government, a strong economy, 
high educational achievement and a good health care system com-
bined to create a society affording its members a very high level of 
economic and social wellbeing. 
Bitter fruits 
Can this success story go on? Was the so-called “lost decade” of the 
1990s recession only a cyclical downturn that will soon be forgotten? 
There are certain indications that this might be too optimistic a view. 
A very general reason for this is that catching up is easier than staying 
ahead of the pack. New problems arise that have no precedent calling 
for original solutions. That is so because Japan’s development has 
fundamentally changed the population structure. Its socioeconomic 
success has turned it into a hyper-aged society defined as one where 
the population aged 65 and over exceeds 21 per cent and this hyper-
aged society shrinks. In 2005, the number of death exceeded that of 
live births by a few thousand, marking the onset of population decline. 
Long-term projections vary by more than ten million. The “high” pro-
Florian Coulmas 
 
24 
jection by the National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research puts Japan’s total population in 2050 at 102 million, while 
the “low” projection anticipates just 90 million.6 However, there is 
general agreement that Japan’s population will decrease for decades. 
 
Figure 4:  Total population and projections 1950–2100 
Source:  National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2008): Popu-
lation Statistics of 2008. http://www.ipss.go.jp/p-info/e/psj2008/PSJ2008.pdf 
(accessed 28 July 2010). 
Population decline 
Is population decline a problem? This question has often been ans-
wered in the affirmative for two reasons. (1) Fewer Japanese mean 
less industrial output and less consumption and hence a shrinking 
                                                 
6 Cf. Kaneko, Ryuichi (2008): Statistical foundations of population projections, 50. 
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economy which no one can desire. (2) Fewer people and more elderly 
people mean a rising dependency ratio, which again is a burden on the 
economy threatening national wealth. 
I do not think that these are compelling arguments, because over 
the past several decades Japan’s economy has witnessed continuous 
gains in productivity which have not only offset negative economic 
developments such as rising labour costs and a rising yen, but pro-
duced real economic growth. There is no reason to doubt that further 
productivity gains are possible. As for the second point, the depend-
ency ratio is certainly a concern, but it is not as dramatic as sometimes 
assumed, because as the number of dependent elderly has risen, that of 
dependent minors has fallen. Furthermore, the good health of the 
population 60 years and older makes it possible and for many desir-
able to raise the retirement age, thereby softening the impact of the 
higher dependency ratio. 
 
Figure 5:  Changing population structure 
Source:  Statistics Bureau (2009). 
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What is more, it can be argued with some justification that popula-
tion decline has positive consequences, such as, less congestion in 
urban centres, more living space, cheaper housing, less environmental 
degrading, specialized high-quality education for fewer students and 
in general a higher quality of life. These positive aspects may be real. 
Population developments are complex happenings that are never only 
good or only bad. 
 
Figure 6:  Gross National Income and Total fertility rate 
However, population decline is a problem for different reasons. 
Two related trends come to mind. One is that for decades the actual 
number of children per family has been lower than the number 
deemed ideal for a family by women in childbearing age. For example, 
Ogawa shows that since the mid 1970s the total fertility rate has been 
consistently lower than the ideal family size.7 This means that many 
                                                 
7 Cf. Ogawa, Naohiro (2003): Japan’s changing fertility mechanisms and its policy 
responses, 90. 
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Japanese do not satisfy a fundamental desire. While children are cer-
tainly not the only source of satisfaction with one’s life, they do oc-
cupy a central position in this regard. The demographic paradox is that 
as the Japanese became richer they grew ever less prone to reproduce. 
A society that does not satisfy a basic need is suffering. 
Related to this is the trend in lifetime singles rates. From 1950 to 
2000, the ratio of unmarried men at the age of 50 rose by a factor of 
10, that of women by a factor of 5. And the trend continues. Since in 
Japan there is virtually no childbirth outside wedlock, this trend con-
tributes quite directly to fertility decline, as does the tendency to post-
pone marriage. In 1950, women were 23 when they first married, men 
25.9. By 2006, age at first marriage had risen to 28.2 and 30 years, 
respectively (see table 2, figure 8 and figure 9 p. 25−26).8 There is a 
clear correlation between marriage postponement and the falling birth 
rate. 
While acceptance of marriage continues to be high in Japan, the at-
titude towards marriage is changing. The percentage of women who 
do not intend to marry ever is steadily growing, and the purpose of 
marriage is shifting, as the traditionally strong connection between 
married life and children is eroding. In 1998, 47 per cent of the re-
spondents of a nation-wide survey denied that children were necessary 
for a happy family life, an increase of seven per cent since five years 
earlier.9  Two trends in the results of this survey were particularly 
noteworthy: (1) Older respondents rated the importance of children 
higher than younger ones, and (2) men higher than women. Fully 70 
per cent of women aged between 16 and 35 did not regard children 
important for married life. In Japan (as in Italy) women’s increased 
                                                 
8 Cf. Statistics Bureau (2009). 
9 Cf. Ölschleger, Hans Dieter (2004): Family, 375. 
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economic independence is apparently working as a disincentive to 
marriage.10 The number of women who say that they do not want to 
have children ever surpasses that of men. 30 per cent of Japanese 
women aged between 25 and 34 say that they “do not feel it necessary 
to marry”, and another 29 per cent say they “do not want to lose their 
freedom and care-freeness” (by marrying).11 Great care must be taken 
in interpreting these findings, but they would seem to suggest that the 
proportion of women who will never have children and hence the pro-
portion of childless couples is bound to grow. 
 
Figure 7:  Lifetime single rates 
Source:  National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2008). 
  
                                                 
10 Cf. Raymo, James M. and Miho Iwasawa (2008): Changing family life cycle and 
partnership transition. Gender roles and marriage patterns. 
11 Cf. MHWL – Ministry of Health and Welfare (1997): Annual report on health and 
welfare 1995−1996. Families and social security, 31. 
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Table 2:  Age of first marriage / first child 
Source: Statistics Bureau (2009). 
Age of first marriage (years) 
 1950 2005 
male 25.9 29.8 
female 23.0 28.0 
Age at first child birth 
 25.6 29.1 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Late marriage 
Source: Statistics Bureau (2009).  
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Figure 9:  Birth rate and age at first marriage 1955–2001 
Source:  Statistics Bureau (2009). 
Reduced commitment to the future 
There is a growing population who never marry and remain childless. 
During the past fifty years, the total fertility rate fell while the marital 
fertility rate remained nearly constant.12 This is indicative of a prefer-
ence for more than one child for couples who have children. Ogawa 
has calculated for a female cohort in the year 2000 that 15.9 per cent 
have one child, 36.0 per cent have two children, 14.5 per cent have 
three children and 2.8 per cent have four or more children, while 19.3 
per cent never marry and 11.5 per cent marry but remain childless. 
This implies a massive increase of the childless population as com-
pared to previous generations.13 
                                                 
12 Cf. Lützeler, Ralph (2002): The “second fertility transition” in comparative per-
spective. The impact of female employment, care services, and familism, 57. 
13 Cf. Ogawa (2003), 91. 
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Table 3: Desired and actual number of children 
Source: Kōseisho Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūsho (1977): Dainanaji shussanryoku chōsa 
hōkoku [Report on the seventh survey of the baby-boomer generation]; Statis-
tics Bureau (2009). 
Desired number of children Actual number of children 
 ideal TFR Difference 
1977 2.61 1.80 .81 
2005 2.48 1.29 1.19 
On the other hand, there has been for many years a persistent dis-
crepancy between the number of children couples consider desirable 
and the number of children actually born. This discrepancy has been 
observed ever since statistics on the desired number of children have 
been collected, in 1977. In recent years, it has grown, suggesting that 
the discrepancy not only reflects a difference between an ideal norm 
and the reality, but that an increasing number of couples feel they 
cannot fulfil their desire for children fully. In 2005, the desired num-
ber of children (2.48) was almost double the fertility rate (1.26). 
How should these findings be interpreted? Parents’ attitude to-
wards the future differs from that of non-parents. That is common-
sense knowledge. A growing percentage of the population, both mar-
ried and never married, without children have no vested interest in the 
future of society, with hitherto unknown consequences for its self-
image and sense of purpose. Lest this sounds as an overly conserva-
tive argument, let me borrow a notion proposed in this connection by 
Bertrand Russell. He speaks of the “stream of life”. 
To be happy in this world, especially when youth is past, it is necessary to feel 
oneself not merely an isolated individual whose day will soon be over, but 
part of the stream of life flowing on from the first germ to the remote and un-
known future. […] Those who have allowed their procreative impulses to be-
come atrophied have separated themselves from the stream of life.14 
                                                 
14 Russell, Bertrand (1930): The conquest of happiness, 138. 
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Russell wrote at a different time, but for a population the notion of the 
stream of life is still relevant. It must be noted, of course, that not all 
of those who remain childless in Japan today do so because they “have 
allowed their procreative impulses to become atrophied.” Many are 
hard pressed economically as neoliberal policies are taking their toll 
on a new underclass of unemployed, part-timers and working poor. 
And many perceive caring for parents and caring for children as an 
alternative. The fact remains, however, that by virtue of a declining 
fertility rate and an increasing rate of the population never married and 
childless, Japanese society is less future-oriented today than it was in 
the past. 
Culturally the growing segment of childless individuals and cou-
ples is indicative of an enormous value shift, for until recently family 
succession and the perpetuation of the “house” (ie) were cultural core 
values. Leaving descendants was a matter of passionate concern which 
among other things implied that Japan used to be a “universal mar-
riage society”. It no longer is. 
Discontents of the hyper-aged society 
The hyper-aged society has its specific discontents. Not all of them 
can be attributed to ageing, but they co-occur with ageing and charac-
terize present-day Japan. 
1. The hyper-aged society is a society with a growing population of 
isolated individuals. From 1975 to 2001 the percentage of one-
person households more than doubled from 8.6 per cent to 19.4 per 
cent and so has the number of households consisting of husband 
and wife only (rising from 13.1 per cent to 27.8 per cent). Many 
older persons aged 65 and over are living alone and dying alone. 
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According to the Tokyo Metropolitan Medical Examiner’s Office, 
the number of people who die alone increased from 3,858 in 2002 
to 4,729 in 2005.15 
2. An increasing number of people in the hyper-aged society are in 
need of help. To mention only one group, patients suffering from 
senile dementia were estimated at about 1.7 million in 2000. Their 
numbers will increase as the total population declines to twice that 
number in the near future. According to the Psychogeriatric Soci-
ety of Japan, there will be 3 million dementia patients in 2035, 
while the Nihon University Population Research Institute predicts 
an increase to 4 million as soon as 2025. More accurate figures are 
hard to come by because projections of this sort are subject to 
many variables and different definitions. However, the increasing 
incidence of dementia clearly is emerging as a major social chal-
lenge. 
3. Another worrisome characteristic of Japanese society in the 21st 
century is the growing incidence of clinical depression. According 
to an estimate by the Ministry of Health and Labour, clinical de-
pression will rise from fourth rank in 2000 to second rank in 2020 
of all diseases and thus become a major health care issue. This is of 
particular concern because depression is a major trigger of suicide. 
Suicide has many causes, social, economic and medical. No unified 
explanatory theory exists, and none will be attempted here. For 
present purposes suffice it to note that the hyper-aged society as it 
presents itself at present is one with a high incidence of suicide. 
                                                 
15 Tokyo Metropolitan Medical Examiner’s Office (2009): Heisei 21 nenhan jigyō 
gaiyō [Half year working paper of 2009], 50. http://www.fukushihoken.metro.tokyo. 
jp/kansatsu/21jigyougaiyou/files/21-55.pdf (accessed 31 July 2010). 
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Table 4: Incidence of suicide 2006 
Source:  Keisatsuchō (2007): Heisei 19 nen ni okeru jisatsu no gaiyō shiryō [2006 
Outline of suicide records]. http://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/chiiki10/h19_zisa 
tsu.pdf (accessed 20 July 2010). 
Suicides 2006: 32.155 
male: 71 % 
over 60: 35 % 
without occupation: 48 % 
Conclusion 
Why life-expectancy gains and fertility decline occur simultaneously 
is not at all clear. The former is a sign of success, but it also generates 
its own specific problems. The latter, especially when viewed against 
the unfulfilled desire for children, but also from a theoretical point of 
view concerning expanding and contracting populations, is a sign of 
failure. Success often engenders failure. In economics this seeming 
paradox is a commonplace that has given rise to a huge literature. If 
population developments can be understood in a similar vein, it is not 
just the economy, but also the social and cultural conditions and a 
changed outlook on life that have to be taken into account. From such 
a perspective Japan appears rich, old, but not altogether content. Of its 
discontents the low birth rate (1.34 in 2007) is the strongest indicator. 
To what extent the social ills that population ageing brings in its wake 
have contributed to the birth-rate decline and continue to do so is a 
question that needs further study. 
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MAREN GODZIK 
Elderly Housing in Contemporary Japan: 
Exploring Alternative Forms of Housing 
Abstract 
Shelter is one of the existential needs. How housing is organized and 
designed, however, is closely tied to the circumstances in a society, its 
culture and history. The recent demographic development in Japan, the 
growing number of elderly people and changing family structures and 
functions, the diversification of lifestyles and increasing differences in 
income, will likely lead to more diversity in housing and living ar-
rangements. Apart from numerous innovations in national welfare and 
housing policies, privately organized alternative forms of housing 
have emerged. Although their number is limited, some have achieved 
some popularity through media attention and serve as models not only 
for similar projects, but also for public and commercial housing pro-
jects, which gives them a greater importance than the number of alter-
native projects might suggest. As the alternative housing projects are 
strongly influenced by their initiators and do not follow any regula-
tions concerning their size or their organizational structure, they are 
extremely diverse, meeting ideals, preferences and needs of different 
groups of people. 
The purpose of this paper is to trace back the development of alter-
native housing forms in Japan and to categorize different types with 
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regard to their concepts and target groups. On the basis of three exam-
ples, which have been examined more closely, I try to answer the 
question whether these forms of housing could be considered a future 
option for a broader segment of the population of Japan’s ageing soci-
ety. 
Introduction 
In 2007, about one fifth of Japan’s population that consists of 27 mil-
lion people living in 16 million households was 65 years and older.1 
The ever growing number of elderly people as reflected through the 
increasing imbalance in the outlay of the population pyramid – along 
with a transformation of family structures and lifestyles – had signifi-
cant consequences for Japanese households and the housing arrange-
ments of elderly people. An increasing number of them, mostly cou-
ples, but also a growing number of singles, live in “all 65 and older” 
households.2 
This development led to serious problems, for example, an increase 
of the average age in rural areas and certain urban neighbourhoods, 
with an elderly person’s death sometimes remaining undetected for a 
long time (kodokushi) and high suicide rates among the aged.3 To cope 
with the growing number of elderly people, especially with those in 
need of care or support, several welfare policy measures have been 
                                                 
1 Cf. Kokuritsu Shakai Hoshō Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo (2006): Nihon no shōrai suikei 
jinkō. Population projections for Japan. 
2 Cf. Kōsei Rōdōshō (2006): Kokumin seikatsu kiso chōsa [Comprehensive survey of 
living conditions of the people on health and welfare], and Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku 
(2006): Heisei 15 jūtaku tochi tōkei chōsa hōkoku [Housing and land census 2003]. 
3 Cf. Nakazawa, Takumi et al. (2008): Danchi to kodokushi [“Lonely death” in hous-
ing complexes], 90, and Popp, Julius and Johannes H. Wilhelm (2009): Altern und 
Suizidalität im heutigen Japan [Ageing and suicidal tendency in present Japan], 73–93. 
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introduced over the last few years ranging from the compulsory public 
long-term care insurance to assisted living facilities.4 At the same time, 
private individuals and NPOs (non-profit-organisation) have taken 
action to create their own housing forms, which I will refer to as “al-
ternative forms of housing for the elderly”. 
Gerontologist Carol Schreter wrote that shared housing in the 
United States, which can be categorized as a specific alternative form 
of housing, is a way of citizen’s self-help.5 It can be assumed that the 
development of new forms of housing is a reaction to an insufficient 
choice of housing in Japan, too: The housing market is partly trying to 
adapt to the new situation, but mostly in the upper price segments and 
still fails to provide adequate diversity. Older citizens are not welcome 
in the regular rental market, house owners often reject elderly people 
out of fear that they could cause a fire, not pay their rent or die unno-
ticed.6 The public housing units, which have been attainable to single 
elderly people, too, since 1980,7 or other policies to improve the bar-
rier-free infrastructure of neighbourhoods and houses do not meet the 
                                                 
4 Cf. Campbell, John C. (2003): How policies differ. Long-term care insurance in 
Japan and Germany, and Imai, Kazuo (2010): Shinia kyojū no keifu to sono mirai 
[The development of senior housing and its future], 59–80. 
5 Cf. Schreter, Carol (1986): Advantages and disadvantages of shared housing, 136. 
6 That is why the government decided on a policy of implementing a registration 
system for private rental housing, whose owners agreed not to reject elderly persons. 
Refer to the website of the Foundation for Senior Citizens Housing (Koseisha jūtaku 
kaidan) at http://www.sumai-info.jp/header/21/index.html (accessed 16 January 2009) 
for the current registration state of “recommended private rental houses” (yūryō 
minkan chintai jūtaku). 
7 Some measures were taken in the public housing field already as early as in the 
middle of the 1960s (Ōumi, Kazuo (2002): Kōkyō jūtaku no saisei to atarashii yaku-
wari [The revitalization of public housing and its new role], 167). 
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current preferences and needs sufficiently.8 Alternative housing is not 
only a surrogate for political deficits however. It is also an expression 
of broader social changes and new lifestyles, which deserve further 
attention. 
The questions I want to answer in this paper are: Why have alterna-
tive forms of housing emerged in Japan? What are the motives of per-
sons who have chosen to live in alternative housing? And can alterna-
tive forms of housing be an option for a larger number of elderly peo-
ple in the population? I will approach these questions based on the 
results of my fieldwork conducted in Tokyo between 2006 and 2008. 
This paper begins with my definition of alternative housing for 
elderly people. Then some information will be given about the devel-
opment of different forms of alternative housing. Three examples will 
be presented followed by a characterization of three types of alterna-
tive housing. Next, I will try to shed some light on what people expect 
from the types of alternative housing depicted. Consequently we may 
gain some insight into what kind of persons may be potentially inter-
ested in alternative housing. I conclude with remarks on the chances 
for these forms of housing to become more popular. 
What is alternative housing for the elderly? 
Definition of alternative housing for elderly people 
The definition of alternative forms of housing for elderly persons used 
here consists of four elements. Alternative forms of housing for eld-
erly people are (1) “alternatives to institutionalization, that is nursing 
                                                 
8 Cf. Kamemoto, Kazuhiko (2004): Kōreisha to kyojū mondai [Elderly people and the 
housing problem], and Mine, Manabu (2008): Kōreisha no sumai to kea – Zen-shakai-
teki fukushi no naka no kaigo fukushi to kyojū fukushi [Care and housing welfare 
within the social welfare system], 46, 71–73. 
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homes” and, (2) “exceptions to the more common traditional housing 
arrangements”,9 (3) forms of housing that are based on certain com-
mon concepts and social interaction (in contrast to people who live in 
the same place coincidentally) and (4) housing forms especially de-
signed for elderly people or multigenerational housing aiming at el-
derly people. 
Whereas the first and second criteria refer to a more general differ-
entiation of the forms of housing (not institutional, not conventional 
family housing), the third one focuses on how life is organized. The 
first three aspects of this definition correspond to the definition used 
by the German non-profit organization Forum Gemeinschaftliches 
Wohnen e.V.10, an umbrella organization for organizations and indi-
viduals that are involved or want to promote multi-generational and 
collaborative housing projects enabling a “self determined and inde-
pendent life on a communal basis”. The fourth aspect is self-
explanatory in the context of housing of elderly people. 
Terminology used for alternative housing in Japan 
How is alternative housing referred to in the Japanese language? 
Commonly used expressions are kyōsei jūtaku, kyōsei-gata sumai, 
sanka-gata jūtaku, kyōdō kyojū and komyuniti-gata jūtaku.11  These 
                                                 
9 That is households consisting predominantly of nuclear families or other close rela-
tives, e.g. three-generation households (Eckert, J. Kevin and M.I. Murrey (1984): 
Alternative modes of living for the elderly, 96). 
10 Cf. Forum Gemeinschaftliches Wohnen e.V. official website: http://www.fgw-ev.de 
(accessed 23 April 2009). 
11 Cf. Harada, Yoko (1998): Korekutibu haujingu. Nihon ni okeru kyōdō kyojū no 
kanōsei ni tsuite [Collective housing. About the possibilities of collective housing in 
Japan], 165–166; Honma, Hirobumi (2006): Kōporatibu hōshiki de no sumai-zukuri 
[Building homes according to the cooperative housing system], 37; Koyabe, Ikuko 
(2006): Korekutibu haujingu [Collective housing], 84–100 and Okamoto, Kenjirō 
(2008): Kōreisha no kyōsei jūtaku, sono genjitsu to kadai [Communal houses for the 
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terms are not used systematically for specific ways of housing. The 
same holds true for more specific names for alternative housing forms 
like kōporatibu haujingu (cooperative housing), gurūpu ribingu 
(group living) and korekutibu haujingu12 (collective housing). At least 
in the academic field some efforts can be observed to establish defini-
tions and to use them more consistently.13 
Development of alternative forms of living in Japan 
A small number of alternative forms of housing for elderly people first 
emerged as a welfare measure in snowy and remote regions of Japan 
in the 1970s, where an unfavourable demographic development led to 
uncommon measures by the local authorities. The next important im-
pulse was the Kōbe Earthquake in 1995, after which alternative hous-
ing became a means to accommodate elderly people in differently 
organized social housing schemes in Kōbe and in the prefecture of 
Hyōgo after they lost their houses. Research on elderly people in pro-
visional housing revealed that houses with larger common space in 
                                                                                                         
elderly, current state and problems], 271–291. See also Jūtaku Netto Sōdan Shitsu 
official website: http://www.so-dan.net (accessed 23 April 2009). 
12 There is some confusion about the word “collective housing” in Japan. It is used for 
the public housing schemes established especially for elderly people as it can be found 
in Kōbe which are also referred to as koreisha-muke kōei korekutibu or shinsai fukkō 
kōei korekutibu (collectives for the elderly in social housing schemes or social hous-
ing collectives as earthquake rebuilding) on the one hand, and for (usually) multi-
generational, self-organized housing described below on the other hand (Koyabe, 
Ikuko (2004): Korekutibu haujingu de kurasō. Seijuku shakai no raifusutairu to sumai 
no sentaku [Let’s live in a collective house. Lifestyle and housing choice in a mature 
society], iii). 
13 Cf. Mine (2008), 44–45; Ōe, Moriyuki (2005): Kōreisha gurūpu ribingu no kanōsei 
to kadai [Chances and problems of “group living”], 7–10; Koyabe, Ikuko (2004): 
Korekutibu haujingu de kurasō. Seijuku shakai no raifusutairu to sumai no sentaku 
[Let’s live in a collective house. Lifestyle and housing choice in a mature society], iii–
iv, and Koyabe, Ikuko (2008): Dai san no jūtaku no taipu. Tēma: Korekutibu haujing 
[The third housing type: collective housing], 582. 
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central parts of the building led to more interaction of the residents 
and eventually to better health conditions compared to houses without 
considerable common space.14 As they were not self-organized by the 
residents or in cooperation with the residents, it could be argued that it 
is inappropriate to call them “alternative”.15 Within the context of new 
forms of housing Japanese researchers categorize these forms of hous-
ing mentioned above as pioneer types.16 
The housing concept for the social housing follows the model of 
Scandinavian communal forms of elderly housing, which were widely 
discussed in Japan in the 1990s.17 A significantly increasing number of 
alternative forms of living offering a choice to elderly people can be 
detected after the NPO law came into effect in 1998. Of similar impor-
tance was the public long-term care insurance system introduced in 
2000.18  Many alternative forms of housing are therefore organized 
with the help of or by NPOs and, in the case of care being eventually 
needed, with care provided at home within the system of the long-term 
care insurance. 
  
                                                 
14 Cf. Ishitō, Naoko and Korekutibu Ōendan (2000): Korekutibu haujingu tadaima 
funtōchū [Efforts now: collective housing], 18–23; Koyabe (2006), 92–93, and Satō, 
Yumi (1998): Kōreisha setai nado no aratana kyōdō seikatsu no keisei – korekutibu 
haujingu ni tsuite [New forms of communal living for elderly households – collective 
housing], 113. 
15 Apart from the housing schemes mentioned very few examples of privately or even 
commercially organized forms of alternative housing have been established since the 
middle of the 1980s. They were usually built to meet specific needs (Sasaki, Shinko 
(2004): Kōreiki gurūpu ribingu no kōteki kōkyū ni kansuru kenkyū. [Study on the 
public supply of group living projects for the elderly], 7). 
16 Cf. Sasaki, Shinko (2004): Kōreiki gurūpu ribingu no kōteki kōkyū ni kansuru 
kenkyū. [Study on the public supply of group living projects for the elderly]. 
17 Cf. Sasaki (2004), 13–14. For an overview see e.g. Koyabe, Ikuko (1997): Kore-
kutibu haujingu no susume [Encouragement for collective housing]. 
18 Cf. Sasaki (2004), 7–12. 
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Three case studies 
To get an idea of what alternative forms of housing can look like three 
different types are presented in the following sections. It should be 
taken into account, however, that there is no common form for alterna-
tive housing. Although some common features can surely be found, 
they are organized with regards to the ideas of the organizers and 
needs of the residents. 
Example A: CoCo Shōnandai 
Probably the most well-known and well-documented example of an 
alternative form of housing exclusively for elderly people is the CoCo 
Shōnandai in Fujisawa. It was founded in 1999 by Saijō Setsuko (aged 
80), who is one of the residents herself.19 At the time the planning 
process began, the NPO law and the long-term care insurance were 
not yet introduced and Saijō, who was politically active on the mu-
nicipal level, designed a concept of housing allowing her to grow old 
together with others in familiar surroundings. The result was a house 
of barrier free design for 10 persons aged 65 or older. Each of the 
residents has a 25 square meters room of themselves, complete with 
kitchen and sanitary facilities. A large room on each of the two floors 
serve as common space.20 The motto of CoCo Shōnandai is jiritsu to 
kyōsei (independence and living together or “symbiosis”)21; Saijō her-
                                                 
19 The information that is given in this section is – if not otherwise stated – based on a 
visit to CoCo Shōnandai on 18 April 2008, where I had the opportunity to talk with 
two representatives of the NPO, and, though briefly, with Saijō Setsuko. 
20 Currently the common space on the basement floor is mainly used as an office by 
the NPO. 
21 Cf. Saijō, Setsuko (2000): 10 nin 10 shoku no niji māchi. Kōreisha gurūpu ribingu 
“CoCo shōnandai” [The rainbow march of 10 very different people. Group living for 
elderly people “CoCo Shōnandai”], 15, and Saijō, Setsuko (2007): Suminareta machi 
de ie de owaritai. Zaitaku tāminaru kea no aru kurashi. Zoku Kōreisha gurūpu ribingu 
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self, for example, is still busy giving speeches and writing books. 
Many people living at CoCo Shōnandai are active (the average age 
being a little over 80), while others are in need of care. Rules concern-
ing their daily life are made by the residents themselves. They de-
scribe their group as a family (kazoku) with conflicts occurring but 
also being solved on their own. CoCo Shōnandai is supported by an 
NPO (CoCo Shōnan, with Saijō-san being the chairwomen of the 
NPO), which organizes help when needed and which tries to promote 
integration into the neighbourhood. The later being one of the impor-
tant aims as Saijō states in her writing.22 Apart from the core task of 
supporting the residents23 the NPO is also involved in giving advice to 
elderly people in the neighbourhood and a project has been started to 
search for similar forms of housing in Japan and to provide informa-
tion if new projects are to be launched.24 
Talking to the organizers, CoCo Shōnandai gave the impression of 
balancing the private and communal life well. The residents pursue 
their own lives and help each other when needed. CoCo Shōnandai, 
therefore, differs from a regular household as well as from a home for 
the elderly. What reminded me of conventional old people’s homes, 
however, were two features: The dinner is prepared by another NPO, 
lunch can be ordered from a mobile service, and only breakfast is to 
be prepared by the individual residents. Consequently, the residents 
simply have to sit down to eat, which is an arrangement that has often 
                                                                                                         
“CoCo Shōnandai” [The wish to end in the town and house one is used to live in. 
Terminal care at home and its living conditions. Group living for elderly people 
“CoCo Shōnandai”], 12–14. 
22 Cf. Saijō (2007), 13. 
23 Additionally to CoCo Shōnandai, the NPO organized and is supporting two more 
group houses, which opened their doors in 2003 and 2006 respectively. 
24 Cf. Saijō (2007), 216–222. 
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been criticised by gerontologists, if residents are still capable of per-
forming the task themselves. Concerning this matter, Saijō gave me a 
rather convincing answer, saying that most of the residents, the major-
ity of them female, had prepared meals for themselves and their fami-
lies all their lives before coming to CoCo Shōnandai and were now 
relieved of this burden and therefore able to use their time in a more 
meaningful way. Organizers of exclusive retirement homes with hotel-
like dinner services can argue similar. The other feature that makes 
CoCo Shōnandai resemble institutional housing is the architectural 
design. Although the building seen from the outside, particularly the 
arrangement of the entrance and the common rooms, resemble a one 
family house, the long corridors on each floor with their individual 
rooms adjoining each other are typical for institutions. Although the 
floor materials and wall decoration made or chosen by some of the 
residents moderate this impression.25 The two further houses the NPO 
has built are roughly of the same size. One of them has the common 
rooms located in the centre of the house, which makes it more home-
like. Asked, which design was more suitable for the lives of the resi-
dents, the NPO staff answered that the common room in the centre 
made it impossible to leave one’s own room unwatched by the other 
residents and by potential visitors, a fact that seems to interfere with 
some residents’ wishes for privacy. 
In contrast to many private old people’s homes, which require that 
people move to nursing homes or hospitals in the case they need nurs-
ing care, CoCo Shōnandai aims at providing a living environment for 
its residents that enables them to stay in the house until the end of 
their lives. Currently, some residents receive help from the benefits of 
                                                 
25 Cf. Robinson, Julia W. (2006): Institution and home. Architecture as a cultural 
medium, 114, 120. 
Elderly Housing in Contemporary Japan 
 
47 
the long-term care insurance. Saijō and her fellow residents as well as 
care staff that are involved describe the case of a resident who eventu-
ally died of cancer, and what it had meant to her fellow residents, in 
great detail.26 According to Saijō, terminal care in the group house and 
caring for one’s fellow residents is one of the ideals that should be 
lived even though it cannot always be accomplished. 
Example B: Collective House Kankan Mori 
The so-called Collective House Kankan Mori 27  in Nippori was 
planned and organized by an NPO and followed the model of the 
Swedish concept of collective housing,28 which is based on “together-
ness” and “rational life”29. In 2003 people were able to move in. It has 
as much as 28 rental flats between the size of 25 to 60 square meters, 
one very large dining-kitchen of over 120 square metres and various 
other common rooms (working space, laundry room etc.). At present 
about 30 persons are living in the house. It is multigenerational with 
the residents aged between 0 and 82 years. The group of residents 
include a few families, mostly with small children, a single mother 
with her teen-aged daughter, an elderly couple in their eighties and a 
number of singles of various age, most of them in their thirties and 
early forties. The NPO was involved in the planning process and is 
still involved in choosing new residents, but daily life is organized by 
                                                 
26 Cf. Saijō (2007), 19–54, and Saijō, Setsuko (2004): Chi’iki ni ikite suminareta ie de 
owaritai. Zaitaku tāminaru kea no kiroku [The wish to live in the neighbourhood and 
to die in the familiar home. A record of terminal care at home]. 
27 If not stated otherwise, the following account of the collective house is based on 
observations made upon visits by the author and on statements made during inter-
views with NPO staff. 
28 Cf. Koyabe (2004), ii–iii. 
29 Cf. Vestbro, Dick U. (1992): From central kitchen to community cooperation. De-
velopment of collective housing in Sweden, 30–38. 
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an elected residents’ committee. Three times a week a common dinner 
is arranged. There is no obligation to take part and meal times can be 
chosen individually. The preparation of meals, however, is one of the 
residents’ duties with them taking turns. According to my observation, 
the common room was used by the residents as pleasured: people sat 
in groups as well as alone (reading or working). A mother went away 
saying, “I’ll be back in an hour. Could you just keep an eye on my 
son?” (who was about 5 years old).  
As the building was not originally designed to serve the purpose of 
an alternative form of housing, the architectural aspects will not be 
discussed in this paper. The interior design of the common dining-
kitchen, however, helps creating a comfortable atmosphere in spite of 
the hall-like size of the room.30 
At present, the elderly couple living in the collective house is still 
able to live independently. If care is eventually needed, a mobile care 
service can be made use of as would be the case in conventional hous-
ing arrangements. Since there are few elderly persons common duties 
could if necessary be taken over by younger residents, which should 
not pose a problem with about 30 persons sharing the tasks. However, 
should there be more elderly persons at some point in the future new 
concepts would have to be worked out. In comparison to CoCo Shō-
nandai, Kankan Mori is not explicitly oriented to the lives and needs 
of elderly people, especially those requiring help. But this may just 
make Kankan Mori more attractive to younger residents in particular, 
but also to middle-aged and younger elderly people. Although the 
fluctuation of residents is high (it is a rental form of housing after all) 
                                                 
30 In May 2009, a new, but slightly smaller house by the same NPO is planned to be 
opened in the western part of Tokyo. Wishes and preferences of the residents, who are 
involved in the planning process, have likely been taken into consideration. 
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and most of the new residents are of a younger age, it might become 
necessary to think about concepts of how to cope with elderly persons 
in need of help and care, if this form of housing aims to be an option 
for elderly people. 
Example C: Ryūgasaki Shinia Mura 
The third example is Ryūgasaki Shinia Mura31 (Ryūgasaki Senior Vil-
lage), which was completed in 2007 and is a project organized by a 
building cooperative. That means the house was planned by a group of 
people who intended to live in it themselves. In contrast to housing 
cooperatives in other countries residents in Japan usually own their 
flats within the cooperative houses.32 In Ryūgasaki Shinia Mura it was 
basically one couple that took a leading position throughout the plan-
ning process. The other residents joined in later or after the comple-
tion of the house. The house is located in a rural region in Ibaraki Pre-
fecture, roughly one and a half hours by train from Tokyo. It has 29 
flats for single persons and couples (between 50 and 70 square metres 
each). It has a strong resemblance to an ordinary apartment house, but 
is built barrier-free and oriented to the needs elderly people may have: 
A restaurant (also open to the public), which relieves the residents of 
the tasks of preparing their own meals and functions as a place of 
communal gathering, too. A day care centre for elderly people and a 
                                                 
31  Information for this section was obtained at a presentation by the founder of 
Ryūgasaki Shinia Mura, Imami Toshitaka at the NPO Toshi Jūtaku to Machizukuri 
Kenkyūkai on 5 April 2007. See also Katō, Hitoshi (2008): Teinen-go no 8man jikan 
ni idomu [80,000 hours – a challenge after retirement], 96–101. Images of the coop-
erative house could be seen online at http://shinia-mura.com/pc/ (accessed 15 Novem-
ber 2008), but the homepage has since been changed and gives information on the 
new project, Ryūgasaki Shinia Mura II, now (accessed 20 May 2009). 
32 Cf. Honma (2006), 36–39, and Kobayashi, Hideki (2006): Sekai no kōpu jūtaku 
[Housing cooperatives in the world], 22–24. 
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clinic on the ground floor of the building contribute to the integration 
into the neighbourhood. 
Unlike in the collective house Kankan Mori collaboration of the 
residents is not explicitly part of the concept, which also shows in the 
floor plan. Common space for the residents (except for the long hall-
ways) is identical to those places also opened to the public. Shared 
experience during the planning process of the house, however, seems 
to have led to a relatively close interaction among the residents. Em-
phasising “security, peace of mind and comfort” (anzen, anshin, 
kaiteki) in its web representation the Ryūgasaki Shinia Mura is similar 
to advertisings of profit-orientated old people’s homes. 
Why do people opt for alternative forms of housing  
and living? 
The examples discussed here are certainly deeply influenced by their 
organisers and residents and therefore highly individual, as show the 
significant differences in their philosophies. Nevertheless, they were 
chosen to represent three different types of alternative housing avail-
able to Japan’s elderly people. Their organization and architecture, the 
allocation of private and common space, vary widely but adjust to the 
diverse needs and preferences of the residents. All of three types re-
quire various degrees of commitment to the housing project, often 
even years before the house is built. Some of them demand the coop-
eration of the residents in their daily life. Sometimes there is a strong 
focus on the idea of communal life; other times it is regarded as op-
tional. After summing up the most important characteristics of the 
three types, potential motives for choosing these kinds of housing are 
presented. 
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Figure 1: Housing type “group living” of communal living. 
Source: Partly adopted from Ōhashi (2002): Kakudai suru kazoku [The enlarging 
family], 107, 120. 
Example A is a housing type called gurūpu ribingu or gurūpu 
hausu (group living, group house) in Japan. It was established with the 
explicit intention to provide a housing option for elderly persons and 
is hence only for elderly persons. The usual number of residents is 
three to fifteen persons. The residents are usually still able to take care 
of themselves when moving in. Nevertheless, this housing type has 
certain features and potential services with regard to the ageing of its 
residents. In many cases the houses are strongly assisted by NPOs, but 
individual persons can be the main organizers, too.33 A network of 
volunteers and professionals particularly organized to help with these 
needs can often be found offering support and assistance. In contrast 
to residential homes for the elderly, group houses are organized to 
give support and care only if individual needs arise and not as a gen-
eral prerequisite. Some projects see terminal care as one of their tasks, 
but are usually not prepared (concerning trained staff and architectural 
features) to handle for example severe cases of dementia. The resi-
                                                 
33 Cf. Kondō, Takayo and Moriyuki Ōe (2002): Kōreisha gurūpu ribingu ni kansuru 
kiso-teki kenkyū [A study on the group-living for the Aged], 345–346, and Ōe (2005), 
31−42. 
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dents mostly organize their lives themselves, but sometimes they be-
come recipients of care very similar to traditional residential care fa-
cilities. Group houses aim at combining privacy and communal ele-
ments, therefore focusing on mutual help and communal activities. 
Most of the residents live in single rooms, though there are couples 
among the residents of this kind of housing as well, who have to rent 
two separate rooms because rooms for two persons or more are not 
provided in most of the “group houses” (Figure 1). One particular 
problem with this kind of housing is that people are roughly of the 
same age when moving in and it is likely that a lot of them will re-
quire a higher level of care at almost the same time. 
 
Figure 2: Housing type “collective living” of communal living. 
Source:  Partly adopted from Ōhashi (2002), 107, 120. 
Example B is a so-called “collective house” following the Scandi-
navian example.34 This type does not centre on a certain age group. It 
focuses on a concept of living that tries to balance the need for indi-
                                                 
34 Cf. Vestbro (1992), 30–38. 
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vidual independence with comparatively strong social involvement. It 
often aims at creating a “neighbourly togetherness”. A willingness to 
contribute to the daily requirements of the group (e.g. preparing 
meals) is expected. Unlike “intentional communities” that follow a 
certain ideology (an ecological form of living or political and religious 
orientation, for example) is not an underlying principle. To secure 
continuity for this rental type of housing, a relatively large number of 
residents ranging between twenty to forty residents are preferred. As 
shown in figure 2 is the basic unit an individual person although they 
may live together as ordinary families within the house. 
Example C is a “cooperative house”35. It is usually planned by the 
residents themselves. It is based less on individuals but rather on tradi-
tional forms of households as basic units not unlike conventional 
multi-family houses. Shared rooms and facilities often exist, but are 
not a prerequisite. In contrast to the first two forms of housing the 
residential property is owner-occupied. It combines ordinary private 
homes, planned by the residents, with active social interaction among 
the neighbours. The number of households involved differs widely; 
most of them are composed of ten to twenty households. They are 
mostly family-orientated, but some include elderly people or consist 
of elderly-person-households only (Figure 3).  
What are the features that attract elderly people? Which prefer-
ences and needs do these alternative forms satisfy that more traditional 
ways of housing and living arrangements do not? The examples of 
alternative housing projects mentioned above suggest the following: 
                                                 
35 Information on cooperative houses in general and on a number of projects can be 
obtained on the website of the NPO Coop Jūtaku Suishin Kyōgikai: http://www.coop 
kyo.gr.jp/index.html (accessed 15 November 2008). 
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Figure 3: Housing type “cooperative housing” of communal living. 
Source:  Partly adopted from Ōhashi (2002), 107, 120. 
• lack of public solutions in the field of elderly housing apart from 
institutional elderly care (insufficient choice) → group house 
• growing reluctance to use institutional care (change of elderly 
perception, generational change) → group house 
• new demands caused by changes in family structures and family 
roles (surrogate family, ketsuen no nai kazoku [family without 
blood relation]) → group house, collective house 
• new demands caused by an increasing diversification of 
approaches to life (new lifestyles, insufficiency of choice) → group 
house, collective house, cooperative house 
• insufficiency of affordable commercial housing supply (economic 
reasons) → group house, collective house  
• mutual support and neighbourly help available while keeping 
independence, autonomy and privacy (jiritsu to kyōsei 
[independence and living together or “symbiosis”]) → group house, 
collective house (cooperative house) 
• active interaction among neighbours, generations (nagaya no tsu-
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kiai36) → group house, collective house, cooperative house 
• sense of security and safety (anshin, anzen) → group houses  
(collective house, cooperative house) 
• integration into the community (chiiki o ikiru, komyunity zukuri) → 
group houses, collective house (cooperative house) 
Conclusion: Is alternative housing a solution?  
Alternative housing can satisfy a number of needs, but some charac-
teristics of this form of housing may also pose problems. The residents 
of alternative housing are usually self-determined and very flexible in 
the way they lead their lives. They do not depend on care institutions 
or their families. However, they have to be very proactive. Living 
closely together with others certainly does prevent isolation, but social 
skills and conformity with basic agreements is necessary. Decision 
making on aspects concerning their fellow residents or the house as a 
whole can be very time-consuming. Whether an elderly person will 
choose an alternative form of housing may depend on his or her – 
objective and subjective – health condition as well as on lifestyle deci-
sions and, at least for some projects, on financial means. 
Compared to Northern Europe, the Netherlands and also Germany, 
collaborative housing in Japan is still in an experimental stage. Never-
theless, it is on the rise. Given future demographic developments, 
dissatisfaction with existing forms of services for the elderly and feel-
ings of insecurity especially felt by people living in single-person 
households as well as the expectation to live a life according to one’s 
                                                 
36 Nagaya are urban tenement houses associated with neighbourly cooperation of the 
past, especially those of the prewar area. For the concept of nagaya in relation to 
communal living see e.g. Hayakawa, Yūko and GL Netto (2000): Rōgo wa nakama to 
kurashitai. Gurūpu ribingu no susume [To live with one’s friends in old age. A rec-
ommendation of group living], 10–13. 
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own preferences might lead to an increase in alternative forms of 
housing. Alternative forms of housing could become one of those 
“micro trends” that, according to Mark J. Penn, are “small forces” 
“behind tomorrow’s big changes”37 and therefore deserve further ex-
amination. 
  
                                                 
37 Cf. Penn, Mark J. (2007) Microtrends. The small forces behind tomorrow’s big 
changes. 
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RICHARD RONALD 
The Housing System and Generational Divides: 
Housing Pathways and Life-courses in Japan 
Abstract 
While the impact of demographic change in Japan, with increasing 
longevity, declining fertility and a fundamental shift in the ratio be-
tween the retired and working populations has been well documented, 
the role of housing markets and the property sector, although having 
significant consequences in the structure of life-courses, has not been 
so central to debates. The objective of this chapter is to examine the 
role of the housing system in the emerging divide between younger 
and older generations in Japan. A central contention is that, in combi-
nation with restructuring in employment conditions and welfare sec-
tors, the housing system in Japan is shaping demographic changes and 
may be considered a driver of both declining family formation and 
socioeconomic inequality between younger and older cohorts. 
Introduction 
In the early post-war period, housing production and consumption 
played a central role in driving economic growth and in the formation 
of Japanese middle-class mainstream society. The growth of home 
ownership and the movement of households up a housing ladder rein-
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forced patterns of family formation and progression through the life-
course orientated around middle-class social identities and a “standard 
breadwinner family model”.1 However, in recent decades, the housing 
system has destabilized with households and movement up the hous-
ing ladder becoming increasingly fragmented. Clear gaps have 
emerged between different generations of household in Japan. On the 
one hand, significant differences in housing conditions and housing 
wealth have developed between different cohorts of homeowners 
based on time of entry and length of tenure. On the other, housing 
chances in terms of opportunities to enter independent family housing 
and accrue housing equity in the owner-occupied housing market have 
fundamentally diminished for younger people. This has been accom-
panied by a decline in “standard” family households and considerable 
growth in single only households renting in the private sector or stay-
ing on in the family home.2 Many of these changes are related to re-
cent socioeconomic restructuring which undermined employment and 
welfare practices in Japan and drove both a collapse in the housing 
market and a retrenchment in housing policy. These changes also un-
folded as the social, political and economic pressures of an aging pop-
ulation and low fertility became more intense.3 
This chapter examines how socioeconomic restructuring has inte-
racted with the housing system in restructuring Japanese life courses 
and social inequalities. A central concern is emerging divides between 
                                                 
1 Cf. Hinokidani, Mieko (2007): Housing, family and gender; Hirayama, Yosuke and 
Richard Ronald (2007): Housing and social transition in Japan, and Waswo, Anne 
(2002): Housing in postwar Japan. A social history. 
2 Cf. Ronald, Richard and Yosuke Hirayama (2009): Home alone. The individualiza-
tion of young, urban Japanese singles. 
3 See Coulmas, Florian et al. (2008): The demographic challenge. A handbook about 
Japan. 
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different generations structured around differentiated movement up 
the housing ladder or, as in the case of many young people, failure to 
do so. The chapter begins by considering the significance of housing 
systems in life courses, how they influence welfare practices as well 
as shape socioeconomic transformations. The discussion then turns to 
the Japanese post-war housing system. While the housing system once 
helped drive post-war economic growth and stability, the housing 
market now structures differences in economic security between 
younger and older households who are experiencing very different 
housing and economic conditions. This has essentially exacerbated the 
pressures imposed by the changing demographic balance between 
young and old, with increasing pressures on working generations to 
support the income and welfare requirements of older retired, or retir-
ing generations. Essentially, changes in housing conditions have 
aligned with shifts in employment and policy practices which have 
further destabilized the security and integrity of “standard” households 
and disrupted life-course trajectories. 
Households and housing systems 
How housing is organized in each country impacts the social system at 
various levels. Tenure systems in particular, have been associated with 
specific approaches to welfare provision and the role of households in 
the welfare mix. In understanding differences between countries along 
the lines of welfare regimes, societies with high home ownership rates 
are often associated with systems in which the family plays an impor-
tant role in the welfare mix.4 Home ownership provides a basis for 
                                                 
4 Cf. Castles, Francis G. (1998): The really big trade-off. Home ownership and the 
welfare state in the new world and the old. 
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intergenerational co-habitation and exchanges of care as well as for 
economic transfers between generations. In many developed countries 
in Europe and East Asia where institutions beyond the state have taken 
responsibility for welfare provision, owner-occupied housing has been 
promoted by governments as a means to provide families with finan-
cial security in the form of housing assets that have accrued in value, 
as well as to direct obligations for welfare provision onto the house-
hold itself.5 
Characteristic of housing systems geared towards owner-
occupation is a particular pattern of spending, saving and consumption 
over the life-course.6 Where home ownership is embedded as the pri-
mary tenure, and rental tenure stigmatized, young households are 
pressured to save a considerable deposit and subsequently take on a 
sizeable mortgage debt in order to buy a home. Housing costs are 
highest in the early years of occupation, but diminish over time as the 
mortgage is paid off and relative income increases. By retirement age 
most households have repaid their loan which improves the standard 
of living (with minimal housing costs) that can be achieved on a 
pension income. Owners additionally have an investment which in-
creases in value, and offsets reliance on other types of saving. People 
who buy their own homes both consume its services over time and 
also build up their wealth.7 Research in Europe and Japan has demon-
strated that households treat home ownership as a form of saving as 
                                                 
5 Cf. Groves, Richard et al. (2007): Housing and the new welfare state. Examples 
from East Asia and Europe, and Ronald, Richard (2008a): The ideology of home 
ownership. Homeowner societies and the role of housing. 
6 Cf. Kemeny, Jim (2005): “The really big trade-off” between home ownership and 
welfare. Castles’ evaluation of the 1980 thesis, and reformulation 25 years on. 
7 Cf. Doling, John (2008): Housing and demographic change, ENHR Working Group 
Conference, Building on home ownership. Housing policies and social strategies, 5. 
The Housing System in Japan 
 
65 
well as an asset on which they can fall back upon in old age.8 For most 
households, their home constitutes their largest investment and signif-
icantly impacts other types of saving and how much is available to 
consume on non-housing goods. It also becomes critical for maintain-
ing living standards in later life as owner-occupied homes tend to be 
of a higher standard than those affordable if a household were to rent 
in old age. Housing property assets are also central wealth transfers 
that are often the focus of family welfare care exchanges and co-
habitation arrangements. 
Since World War Two, the Japanese housing system became 
strongly orientated around facilitating the mass expansion of home 
ownership, as is examined in the following sections. This facilitated a 
considerable accumulation of housing assets among older people that 
provided a basis for economic and welfare security. The orientation of 
public policy towards family self-reliance and residential property 
ownership become more apparent in the late 1970s as LDP govern-
ments began to stress the necessity of “Japanese-style welfare society” 
in welfare policy restructuring.9 The formation of Japanese-style wel-
fare society involved a particular state-society relationship in which 
the state does not support individual social security directly but rather 
the family overall as a framework of welfare security provision. More 
specifically, family self-reliance has been mediated through state as-
sisted home ownership, which sought to reinforce social stability.10 
                                                 
8 Cf. Cattle, Pietro et al. (2004): Housing markets, wealth and the business cycle, and 
Ronald, Richard (2008b): Between investment, assets and use consumption. The 
meaning of home ownership in Japan. 
9 Cf. Shinkawa, Toshimitsu (1993): Nihongata no fukushi seiji-keizaigaku [Political 
economy of Japanese-style social welfare]. 
10 Cf. Harada, Sumitaka (1988): Nihongata fukushi shakai no kazoku zō [The image 
of the family in the Japanese-style welfare society]. 
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However, in recent decades socioeconomic transformations and rea-
lignment in the housing system have created a growing divide be-
tween housing-asset-rich and income-poor older generations and 
younger asset-poor and income-insecure ones. This is proving a chal-
lenge to the sustainability of the welfare system as life courses and 
routes into economic security are, arguably, no longer being adequate-
ly reproduced from one generation to the next. There is a fundamental 
reorientation in life courses and housing career trajectories characte-
rized by a growing inability of younger households to get on the hous-
ing ladder or even access housing deemed adequate to raising a family. 
The post-war Japanese housing system 
During the rapid pre-war urbanization of Japan, the majority of city 
workers had been accommodated in low quality rental housing.11 The 
housing situation was then compounded by the wholesale destruction 
of urban residences during war time bombing, which culminated in a 
massive housing shortfall of 4.2 million units (around one fifth of 
dwellings at the time). Post-war governments became proactive in 
housing policy and sought to promote home ownership as the primary 
tenure. At first this involved undermining the management basis of the 
rental sector through rent control and tax levies. In the 1950s new 
pillars of housing policy were introduced that redirected resources 
toward establishing a housing ladder up which families could move, 
accumulating housing wealth. The “three pillars” of housing policy 
included the Government Housing Loan Corporation Act, (GHLC 
1950), the Public Housing Act (PHA 1951), and the Japan Housing 
Corporation Act (JHC 1950). 
                                                 
11 See Sorensen, André (2002): The making of urban Japan. 
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Of the pillars of housing policy, the government emphasized the 
promotion of home-ownership through GHLC loans, which became 
central to housing finance and government market intervention meas-
ures. GHLC loans facilitated a rapid increase in home-ownership rates 
(from less than 30 per cent urban home ownership before 1940 to 64 
per cent by 1965). Of the more than 50 million housing units built 
between 1945 and 1995, 28.9 per cent were GHLC financed, with 45.7 
per cent built from public funds overall. 12  During the economic 
growth period the government increasingly improved lending condi-
tions through the GHLC to promote housing purchases and stimulate 
consumption and economic growth. The proportion of houses con-
structed using GHLC loans increased from 63 per cent in 1971 to 79.5 
per cent by 1980.13 The provision of public rental housing, alterna-
tively, was reduced over time. The GHLC provided government funds 
for long-term, low-interest mortgages for middle-income households. 
Through the PHA a limited amount of subsidized public housing was 
provided at below market rents for low-income families. Singles were 
excluded from public housing as the target was younger families sav-
ing to enter the private market. The JHC was founded to develop 
multi-family housing estates for middle-income households in large 
cities. 
The commercial sector may also be counted as a pillar of post-war 
housing 14  and strongly influenced the expansion of the owner-
occupied housing market. Firstly, the large and politically influential 
construction sector drove a considerable increase in residential hous-
                                                 
12 Cf. BCJ – Building Centre of Japan (1998): A quick look at housing in Japan. 
13 Cf. MC – Ministry of Construction (1995): Minkan jūtaku kensetsu shikin jittai 
chōsa [Survey on the financial situation in private home construction]. 
14 Cf. Waswo (2002). 
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ing output from the 1950s onward. Post-war housing output in Japan 
has averaged 10 to 14 new units per year per thousand people com-
pared to 3 to 6 in Western Europe and North America. Secondly, gov-
ernment support for home ownership has been supplemented by the 
company system. The “enterprise society” model rewarded company 
loyalty with lifelong-employment security and age-based wage in-
creases, but also a raft of welfare goods and services including hous-
ing subsidies.15 Cheap company rental housing provided a means for 
new family households to save up housing deposits, constituting a 
steppingstone to home ownership. Companies also provided subsi-
dized housing loans for employees, which supplemented the portfolio 
of borrowing necessary to get into owner-occupation. 
The social mainstream and “standard” households 
The post-war housing boom was associated with economic growth, 
which encouraged the government to sustain pro-home ownership 
policies.16 The expansion of a home owning middleclass was regarded 
as important in stabilizing socio-economic conditions and supported 
the capacity of family self-reliance.17 The objective of establishing a 
very broad “social mainstream” of middleclass households also con-
nected housing policy with ideological discourses regarding both so-
cial homogeneity and modern society. Hirayama 18  argues that the 
housing system established a “social-flow” of rental tenants on the 
                                                 
15 Cf. Sato, Iwao (2007): Welfare regime theories and the Japanese housing system. 
16 Cf. Miyake, Jun (1980): Genzai mochi-ie shikō ni tsuite [Current trends of home 
ownership]. 
17 Cf. Hirayama, Ronald (2007). 
18 Cf. Hirayama, Yosuke (2003): Housing policy and social inequality in Japan, and 
Hirayama 2007): Reshaping the housing system. Home ownership as a catalyst for 
social transformation. 
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outside of mainstream society into the inside via the owner-occupied 
housing-ladder. The housing-ladder system embedded a life-course 
pattern orientated around the ideal of mai hōmu (becoming a home-
owner) with households moving from renting an apartment through to 
condominium purchase, working their way up eventually to a de-
tached family house. Essentially, the emergent housing-ladder system 
had a strong hegemonic impact, defining social inclusion and a way of 
life for those aspiring to form modern middleclass families. By 1955, 
around 52 per cent of families aspired to buying their own-home, ris-
ing to 74 per cent in 1966 and 90 per cent in 1969.19 
Following the nuclearization of households, the “standard-family-
model” formed the basis of housing provision, social policies and 
employment practices. It comprised a breadwinning husband, a 
homemaking wife and two children. There were subsequent spatial 
impacts in the organization of residential neighbourhoods with a pro-
liferation of multi-family apartment-block estates in the 1950s and 
1960s, associated with modern families and ways of living.20 There 
was also continued growth in suburban developments and advances in 
prefabricated and two-by-four construction techniques with the in-
creasing number of families seeking better single-family housing. 
Demand for owner-occupation also drove house price inflation and, 
subsequently, the augmentation of property-assets. Buying a home not 
only seemed to provide security for the current household, it also 
promised security for future generations who would inherit, with a 
                                                 
19  Cf. Tamaki, S. (1974): Mochi-ie shikō to shakuya shikō [Tendency to owner-
occupied housing and rental housing]. 
20 Cf. Waswo (2002). 
Richard Ronald 
 
70    
build-up of family wealth over time.21 Price increases also fuelled a 
myth that housing and land were special types of commodity that in-
crease perpetually in value.22 
The generation that bought their own homes in the 1950s and 60s 
thus experienced a sense of growing wealth during the era of rapid 
economic expansion. This maintained restrained government provi-
sion of public welfare in favour of a system of welfare supported by 
employment security and corporate-based welfare provision comple-
mented by regulatory and tax incentive measures. The oil crisis of 
1973 upset this pattern and also interrupted house price inflation. The 
state looked to the housing system as a means to stimulate growth and 
housing policy became more aggressive. In the following years the 
GHLC improved lending conditions and launched a series of pro-
grammes to extend home ownership. These included the Step Repay-
ment System (1979), the Two-Generation Mortgage (1980) and the 
Supplementary Loan system (1985). These initiatives contributed to 
housing demand, but were also accompanied by increasing investment 
in land, considered a “safe” investment and used to secure other bor-
rowing, by banks and corporations.23 A speculative bubble began to 
form in which the improvement of lending conditions encouraged 
house acquisition, expanding demand for owner-occupied housing, 
boosting housing prices, and driving the further improvement of lend-
ing conditions.24 
                                                 
21 Cf. Hirayama, Yosuke and Kazuo Hayakawa (1995): Home ownership and family 
wealth in Japan. 
22 Cf. Mizuoka, Fujio (2004): Japan. The economic consequences of the fetish of 
space. 
23 Cf. Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu (1997): The housing question in Japan. 
24 Cf. Oizumi, Eiji (2007): Transformations in housing construction and finance, and 
Hirayama (2003). 
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The disproportionately large cohort born in Japan between 1945 
and 1950, when fertility rates reached 4.3 children per woman, began 
to enter the housing market in the late 1970s and early 80s, which 
further pressured the market. The 1980s saw the most substantial rises 
in the prices of properties, especially in metropolitan areas. 1987 and 
1988 saw increases in average condominium prices in Tokyo by 22 
per cent and 29 per cent respectively. Nationally, the rate was 8 per 
cent and 25 per cent.25 There was effectively a scramble to get on the 
housing ladder which appeared to promise opportunities for consider-
able capital gains. Nonetheless, conditions for those buying in the 
1980s were considerably tighter. The demand on incomes was much 
higher than it had been for Japan’s first post-war generations of urban 
homeowners and required considerably more indebtedness. The gov-
ernment further expanded credit conditions with the amount of out-
standing housing loans swelling from 48,229 billion yen in 1980 to 
191,203 billion yen in 2000 constituting an escalation in the ratio of 
outstanding housing loans against GDP from 19.4 per cent to 37.3 per 
cent. 
Housing and the “lost decade” 
The following decade, known as the “lost decade”, saw the disintegra-
tion of the housing-ladder and the integrity of the housing system. In 
1989, driven by over-investment in, and the over-inflation of, share 
and land values, the economic bubble famously burst throwing the 
economic system briefly into turmoil followed by a prolonged period 
of downturn lasting until 2002. The 1990s began with a collapse in 
share values followed by a long-standing decline in the nominal val-
                                                 
25 Cf. MC (1995). 
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ues of housing properties. The stock market shed around 80 per cent 
of its value between 1989 and 2003, while urban property values 
dropped by 40 to 50 per cent. Owner-occupiers experienced major 
capital losses on what was typically their primary asset. For example, 
the drop in price of an average new-build condominium bought in 
Tokyo in 1991 generated a capital loss of around 25 million yen, or 
almost 50 per cent, by 2000. 
The economic downturn and collapse of housing values revealed 
systematic problems, which had been disguised by the prolonged im-
provement in property values. System flaws exacerbated the economic 
insecurity of home-ownership and generated fractures between differ-
ent types of property ownership and cohorts of households. Firstly, 
despite improvements in building technologies, the construction sector 
had continued to promote “scrap and build” techniques where housing 
is rebuilt every 30 to 40 years.26 Research on housing consumption in 
Japan has demonstrated that housing units are perceived as relatively 
ephemeral objects, and there are strong prejudices against older units 
which stimulate rapid devaluation and periodic replacement.27  Fur-
thermore, in order to encourage construction, the GHLC also pro-
moted the purchase of newer properties by excluding loans on dwell-
ings more than 25 years old and providing longer repayment periods 
for buyers of new-builds. Consequently, housing units dropped rapidly 
in value once they were erected. Property prices before 1990 had been 
effectively maintained by increases in land values. However, after 
1990, marked fragmentations appeared in the housing market between 
new-build and existing properties and between condominiums and 
                                                 
26 See Oizumi (2007). 
27 Cf. Ronald (2008b). 
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detached family houses. Older properties devalued rapidly as did con-
dominiums where land (and rebuilding) rights were more restricted.28 
Secondly, as the government considered residential construction an 
economic pump-primer, when the economy failed in the early 1990s it 
sought to stimulate the sector by improving lending and promoting 
policies to stimulate construction. However, despite early post-war 
shortages, a housing surplus had been achieved by the end of the 
1960s with vacancy rates advancing to 7.6 per cent by 1978 and 9.8 
per cent by 1993 (around 14 per cent by 2003). There was thus con-
siderable housing market over-supply, which reinforced the erosion of 
property values.29 
Housing and generational divides 
In recent decades the number of people following the traditional hous-
ing ladder has been in decline, undermining the stable formation of 
new family households, especially “standard” ones. As the economy 
entered downturn and owner-occupied housing began generating capi-
tal losses, the number of homeowners trapped in negative equity bal-
looned along with increases in mortgage defaults. While younger 
homeowners found themselves in expensive properties with little ex-
pectation of capital gains, young renters faced greater economic ad-
versity in saving to buy a home and greater insecurity in the housing 
market. In 1978 over a quarter of those aged 25–29, and nearly half of 
those aged between 30 and 34, were homeowners. By 1998 this had 
dropped to one in eight for the former group and around one in five 
for the latter, whilst the overall level of home ownership (which was 
                                                 
28 Cf. Ronald, Richard and Yosuke Hirayama (2006): Housing commodities, context 
and meaning. Transformations in Japan’s urban condominium sector. 
29 Cf. Ronald and Hirayama (2006). 
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expected to expand) stayed about the same (Figure 1). The number of 
single-only and married-couple-only households respectively in-
creased from 23.1 per cent and 15.5 per cent in 1990 to 29.5 per cent 
and 19.6 per cent by 2005. Although 46.1 per cent of households were 
nuclear families in 1975, they accounted for only 29.9 per cent by 
2005 (Figure 2, p.15). 
Essentially, two major household trends since the 1980s have been 
declining homeownership entry and the diversification of households 
including greater fragmentation into couples without children and 
singles. It seems the housing-ladder system and home ownership aspi-
rations, once central to social mainstream homogeneity, are in retreat. 
The generation born in the 1970s, who entered adulthood in the 1990s, 
constitutes a particular generation whose chances to form family 
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households and move up the housing ladder, or even into independent 
households, contrasts to the baby boomer and baby busters who came 
before them. The housing conditions of this generation, named the 
“lost generation” in public discourses, have been further undermined 
by changes in employment and government policy changes in the 
1990s and 2000s. 
Employment and security 
Other factors that have reinforced the divide between younger and 
older generations include the restructuring of the labour market and 
employment practices, and social policy structures. Family formation 
and “standard life-courses” before the 1990s integrated both the hous-
ing ladder and the employment system. In the Japanese breadwinner 
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Figure 2:  Proportion of households by household type. 
Source:  Population census (various years). 
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household model, which formed the basis of company and state policy, 
it was assumed that male heads of household would enter company 
employment and move up an income ladder which would reliably 
advance with age. However after the 1990s economic downturn, com-
panies began retrenching “enterprise society” practices, including 
those that assisted home purchase.30 A particular break was made be-
tween older employees and younger ones. For Genda31 , corporate 
restructuring eroded conditions and opportunities for new company 
recruits. Companies have tended to cut down on job security, pay and 
training of younger employees, but have maintained the high salaries 
of older employees. 
A particular shift in employment practices has been the amendment 
of the Dispatched Labour Law in 1999, which regulates employment 
conditions for temporary staff. This has reinforced labour market dif-
ferences between non-regular and regular workers, while the share of 
the former, whether casual, part time or despatched, has increased 
from 20 per cent in 1994 to 34 per cent in 2007.32 Moreover, non-
regular employees that often perform the same work average consid-
erably less income per hour. Part time workers, who account for three-
quarters of non-regular workers, typically earn 40 per cent of their 
regular counterparts. The population of non-regular workers is particu-
larly concentrated among younger people. Between 1982 and 2006, 
while the average increase was from 16 per cent to 33 per cent, the 
                                                 
30 Cf. Sato (2007). 
31 Cf. Genda, Yuji (2001): Shigoto no naka no aimai na fuan [The vague uneasiness 
of work]. 
32 Cf. MIAC – Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (2008): Statistical 
handbook of Japan. 
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rate of non-regular employees aged 20–24 increased from 11 per cent 
to 41 per cent. 
A particular issue is that increasing amounts of younger people are 
being cut off from employment ladders that facilitate movement 
through the traditional life-course and housing ladder. The system of 
Japanese employment has very rigid windows of opportunity for re-
cruitment into regular employment, and those who fail to move 
through at the right time are often permanently cut off from regular 
employment conditions.33 Indeed, the growing number of NEET (not 
in employment, education or training) and furīta (non-regular workers 
aged 15–34) reflect the growing divide in society between those on the 
inside and outside of mainstream society. Government figures suggest 
that there were around 2.7 million NEETs and furīta in 2005.34 Failure 
to get into secure employment may fundamentally inhibit the ability 
for many young people to form their own family households. There 
has been a clear correlation between the unmarried rate and economic 
status. In 2002 the ratio of unmarried men aged 30 to 34 in regular 
employment was 41 per cent compared to 70 per cent among non-
regular workers.35 Attitude surveys have also demonstrated the sig-
nificance of this relationship. Among singles in full time employment 
the desire to, and the perceived merits of marriage are much higher for 
regular workers than among non-regular employees, at 70 per cent 
compared to 40–50 per cent.36 
                                                 
33 Cf. Matthews, Gordon (2004): Seeking a career, finding a job. How young people 
enter and resist the Japanese world of work. 
34 Cf. MHLW – Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2006): Chingin kōzō kihon 
tōkei chōsa [Basic statistical survey on wage structure in Japan]. 
35 Ibid. 
36  Cf. IPSSR – Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2008): 
http://www.ipss.go.jp/index-e.html (accessed 19 January 2008). 
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In many developed societies government policies and welfare 
structures provide alternative networks of support and security which 
facilitate continued family formation among those on low or irregular 
incomes. In Japan however, welfare policies are orientated around the 
“male breadwinner model” making it difficult for individuals to re-
ceive government support until after they have established an inde-
pendent family household.37 Women in particular, who are disadvan-
taged in the labour market (for example, non-regular work accounts 
for 53.4 per cent of female employment compared to 18.3 per cent for 
men), have relied on marriage to achieve economic security and get on 
the housing ladder.38 Government housing assistance has been pro-
vided mostly for family households and channelled primarily through 
subsidies for housing loans that support those already economically 
secure enough to get on the property ladder. There is no provision of 
rent subsidies at all. Before 1981 the GHLC did not provide loans to 
one-person households and until 1988 only to those aged over 40. The 
restriction was reduced to 35 and then removed in 1993. In 2007 
GHLC loan provision was withdrawn. Public spending on the con-
struction for private rental housing has been limited, while public sub-
sidy for social rental housing, which constitutes less than 7 per cent of 
total housing, has been continuously residualised. Furthermore, subsi-
dised housing is not available to young single people. The prospects 
for singles in irregular employment of forming an independent house-
hold are neither improved by housing nor social policies. Even the 
situation of family households with regular employment has been 
                                                 
37 Cf. Yokoyama, Fumino (2002): Sengo Nihon no josei seisaku [Public policy for 
women in post war Japan].  
38 Cf. Hirayama, Yosuke and Misa Izuhara (2008): Women and housing assets in the 
context of Japan’s home-owning democracy. 
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undermined as public and company housing assistance has been re-
trenched. 
New housing directions 
The combination of changing housing and employment conditions has 
made it increasingly difficult for young households to get a foothold 
on the housing ladder. Indeed, it has become a challenge for many 
younger people to even get out of the parental home. Arguably, the 
very basis of middle-class formation and the reproduction of family 
households are under threat from the insecurity that now surrounds 
transition through the different stages of the life-course involving 
home-leaving, partnership and family formation, and moving up a 
housing ladder to more adequate and secure housing. The growth of 
people under 40 staying on as a “parasite” in the parental home has 
been the source of considerable debate in recent years. Indeed, be-
tween 1980 and 2005 the rate of 25 to 29 year olds staying on in the 
family home increased from 24 per cent to 43 per cent and from 8 per 
cent to 24 per cent for those aged 30 to 34.39 Although this develop-
ment was initially considered the outcome of a feckless Japanese 
youth, attention has turned increasingly to the economic rationality of 
young people in the current employment climate and the propensity 
and ability of baby boomer and baby buster parents, who usually have 
greater economic security and spacious owner-occupied homes, to 
protect their children.40 There is a strong relationship between em-
                                                 
39 Cf. Ronald, Richard and Yosuke Hirayama (2009): Home alone. The individualiza-
tion of young, urban Japanese singles.  
40 Cf. Kitamura, Akiko (2001): Seijin mikonsha no rika to oyako kankei [Unmarried 
adults, home leaving and parent-child relations], and Yamada, Masahiro (1999): 
Parasaito shinguru no jidai [The age of the parasite singles]. 
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ployment status and “parasite singlehood”, with 60 per cent of furīta 
living with their parents.41 Indeed, most non-regular workers have net 
annual incomes of less than 3 million yen, making living independent-
ly, let alone forming an independent family household, very difficult 
without parental assistance. 
Of those individuals who do leave the family home, the common 
trajectory has been small compact rental apartment units. Between 
1983 and 2003 the ratio of independent households aged 25–29 rent-
ing in the private sector increased from 53 per cent to 71 per cent and 
from 34 per cent to 55 per cent for those aged 30–35. This sector is 
dominated by 1K and 1DK units of less than 29m² which are normally 
inadequate to meeting the needs of starting a family or even married 
life. Again, for those in non-regular employment, rent payments can 
only be maintained by very frugal living (often with extra financial 
assistance from family) and chances of moving to better accommoda-
tion, either alone or with a partner, is low. Even for younger people 
who do find regular employment and establish a level of financial 
security, moving from rental housing to owner-occupied housing is 
still challenging. Despite declines in house prices, housing affordabili-
ty is still an issue and the average price-to-income ratio in Tokyo, for 
example, is 5.2 for a condominium and 5.7 for a family house42, well 
above comparative averages and beyond many ordinary young house-
holds. For non-regular workers it is next to impossible to get a hous-
ing loan or service repayments, especially as deflation or low inflation 
no longer erode the real cost of repayments. 
                                                 
41 Cf. Freeter Kenkyūkai (2001): Furītā ga wakaru hon [A book for understanding 
temporary workers]. 
42 Cf. MLIT – Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2005): Survey of hous-
ing market tendency. 
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The housing market and economic situations faced by younger 
people now are radically different from those faced by preceding gen-
erations. The sympathetic alignment of the housing system, family 
formation and regular life-courses appears to have become discon-
nected. Government policy has not been conducive in this regard and 
in many ways has exacerbated disalignment. Deregulation and mar-
ketization have become the focus of housing and urban reforms since 
the 2000, with housing as a specific target. The Housing and Urban 
Development Corporation (the JHC until 1981) has been restructured 
into the Urban Renaissance Agency and no longer supports public 
rental housing provision, but rather services the interests of private 
sector development. 
More significantly, the GHLC began to be phased out in the late 
1990s (Figure 3) to be replaced by the Housing Finance Services 
Agency (HFSA) in 2007, leaving the private banking sector to fill the 
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gap in the primary loans market. The HFSA has a similar function to 
Fannie Mae in the USA, regulating securities in a secondary mortgage 
market. It is likely that private banks will be more eager to transfer 
economic risks onto homeowners and will serve the needs of low-
income borrowers less effectively.43 
Post-war generations received considerable subsidies in their 
movement up the owner-occupied housing ladder, which have now 
been withdrawn. Even rental housing has been undermined by deregu-
lation initiatives designed to provide more efficiency in the housing 
market. The 2000 revision of the Tenant Protection Law introduced a 
fixed-term tenant contract system which effectively eroded tenure 
security and rent control in private rental housing. The logic of the 
change was that tenant protection had impeded improvement in size 
and quality of rental stock. The private rental sector has now become 
split between longer term tenants with stable contracts and new, typi-
cally younger ones on fixed contracts, often one or two years, with 
landlords having greater freedom to raise rents or evict. While the 
impact on rents has not so far been significant, the improvement in the 
quality and size of dwellings has not improved either.44 
Housing and family formation 
Housing conditions for the young have largely become family un-
friendly and arguably support a pattern of very low fertility, reinforc-
ing the features of social ageing. Demographic research has demon-
strated a relatively strong positive relationship between becoming a 
                                                 
43 Cf. Oizumi (2007). 
44 Cf. Seko, Miki and Kazuto Sumida (2007): Japanese tenure choice and welfare 
implications after the revision of the tenant protection law. 
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homeowner, marriage and fertility.45 However this relationship is of-
ten reversed in situations where homeownership has become a social 
norm (i.e. considered a requirement for starting a family), but where 
the owner-occupied housing market has become tight, excluding new 
entrants.46 Couples may choose to postpone marriage or even partner-
ship formation until they can find a secure and adequate home. Break-
down in conduits of transition into owner-occupied housing thus im-
pede the decision or opportunities to bear children. 
In Japan, the erosion of traditional trajectories through the housing 
ladder brought on by housing market dysfunction, restructuring of 
employment and welfare relations, and intensified by housing policy 
liberalization, may constitute a particularly powerful formula for de-
clining fertility rates. Moreover, social policies have tended to neglect 
the housing dimension in attempting to resolve social issues surround-
ing fertility. In many societies rental housing provides an adequate 
alternative for younger couples for starting a life together and bearing 
children. In Japan however, the rental market is dominated by private 
rental stock, approximately 30 per cent of all housing, which is cha-
racterized by small and poorer quality units. Rental homes are on av-
erage 46.3m² and in urban areas where as much as 41 per cent of 
rental housing is made up of units less than 30m² and 73 per cent less 
than 50m².47 Housing policy has failed to provide either attractive, 
well spaced rental alternatives for couples to start families in or subsi-
dies to help younger couples rent larger properties. Public rental hous-
                                                 
45 Cf. Mulder, Clara H. and Michael Wagner (1998): First-time home-ownership in 
the family life course. A West German-Dutch comparison. 
46 Cf. Mulder, Clara H. (2006): Home ownership and family formation. 
47 Cf. MLIT – Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2003): Housing and 
land survey of Japan. 
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ing constitutes between 5 and 7 per cent of all housing, but is a largely 
stigmatised sector and qualification criteria are restrictive as public 
housing provision has been targeted at special needs categories of 
low-income households, especially the elderly. 
The trend has been, consequently, for increasing numbers of twen-
ty- and thirty-somethings to stay in the natal home, or, alternatively, 
rent a small single unit adequate only to the needs of one. Fewer and 
fewer younger people can afford to buy a home, especially on a single 
income. Housing situations of young people are also associated with a 
notable decline in coupling. A feature of contemporary Japanese soci-
ety has been the tendency to delay or avoid marriage. Between 1980 
and 2005, the rate of “never-marrieds” aged 30 to 34 increased from 
21.5 per cent to 47.1 per cent for men and from 9.1 per cent to 32 per 
cent for women. The unmarried rate by the age of 50 reached 15.4 per 
cent for men and 6.8 per cent for women in 2005.48 Housing system 
developments appear to support the disruption of established middle-
class life-course movement into marriage and up a housing ladder that 
shaped households and family lives for previous post-war generations. 
Furthermore, where households do become established on the housing 
ladder, the cost of home purchase and maintaining a mortgage com-
pete strongly with desires and expectations of having children. In na-
tional surveys “the cost” is the most common reason given for why 
married couples have fewer children. This cause is cited in 65.9 per 
cent of cases of married women and is as high as 83.5 per cent among 
women in their 20s. 
  
                                                 
48 Cf. IPSSR (2008). 
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Housing wealth and the elderly 
Declining family formation is essentially contributing to declining 
fertility rates which are in turn enhancing the imbalance between re-
tired and working populations. Japan’s transformation from an “age-
ing” to an “aged” society, with the share of over 65s increasing from 7 
per cent to 14 per cent of the population, took only 24 years. Moreover, 
older people are living longer (on average 79 years for men and 86 
years for women), further unbalancing the ratio between periods of 
economic activity and inactivity over the life cycle. By 2002 one-fifth 
of the population was already over 65, and this will likely expand to 
one-third by 2040.49 It is expected that the ratio of workers to pension-
ers, which was 5.8:1 in 1990 and 3.9:1 in 2000, will increase to 2.1:1 
in 2025. This will put considerable pressure on the tax and pay-as-
you-go pension contributions of working populations and has already 
resulted in the restructuring of the pension system around a direct 
contributions system, since 2004, that demands higher contributions 
and provides fewer benefits on retirement.50 On the other hand, demo-
graphic shifts reinforce the significance of housing conditions and 
wealth. Many among early post-war generations had stable jobs, en-
joyed growing national affluence and could build up considerable 
owner-occupied property assets. This wealth, although not evenly 
distributed, provides a basis for security for many elderly in retirement. 
Indeed, housing wealth is playing significant part in shaping life 
course trends and social inequalities across Japanese society that may 
                                                 
49 Cf. UN – United Nations (2008): World population prospects. http://esa.un.org/ 
unpp/p2k0data.asp (accessed 16. July 2008). 
50 See Shinakawa, Toshimitsu (2005): The politics of pension reform in Japan. Institu-
tional legacies, credit claiming and blame avoidance. 
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be repeated elsewhere as social aging increases, especially in countries 
strongly orientated towards home ownership. 
The post-war growth of home ownership along with periods of rap-
id house price inflation led to a build up of, and dependency on, hous-
ing assets among older generations, especially those born before 1950 
who typically bought homes before the 1980s economic bubble. The 
demographic developments currently underway in Japan, however, 
mark a particular shift in the balance of housing wealth. 
Arakawa51 has identified that more than half of the nation’s domes-
tic financial assets (53 per cent according to the 2000 survey on atti-
tudes towards saving) are contained in the housing property held by 
those over 60 (Figure 4). Furthermore, the home ownership rate 
                                                 
51 Cf. Arakawa, Tadashi (2003): Kōreisha hoyu shisan no genjō to sōzoku [Older 
people’s assets and inheritance]. 
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Note:  Cited from Izuhara 2007, 99. 
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among this age group is 85 per cent and approximately 20 per cent of 
real estate assets held by older people include properties other than 
their own home. There are numerous consequences involving an in-
creasing role for housing in maintaining wealth and living standards in 
old age. 
As the economic pressures of ageing society increase, the ability of 
retired homeowners to live in better quality housing and pay lower 
housing costs is likely to become more significant to maintaining liv-
ing standards over time, meaning tenure and levels of housing equity 
will become greater determinants of social inequality and poverty in 
old age. In addition, because of indigenous construction techniques 
and the limited longevity of Japanese built units52, the maintenance 
cost of individual homes will also become a significant factor in the 
performance of housing properties as a supplement to retired living 
costs. It is likely that urban middle-class homeowners in newer prop-
erties will enjoy the greatest benefits, while owner-occupiers in poorer 
or older housing, especially in rural areas where wooden housing still 
dominates, may even be disadvantaged by the costs of home owner-
ship. 
Although intergenerational co-residency has been in prolonged de-
cline, proximity has become a preferred means of facilitating recipro-
cal care arrangements within families. Modern housing units have 
been designed to accommodate this. Nisetai jūtaku (two generation 
house) is a mainstay product of the house-building industry. It pro-
vides a level of self-containment and privacy for parents and children 
on one floor of the house, separate from the space of the grandparents 
on another. Intergenerational housing transfers and cohabitation are 
                                                 
52 Cf. Ronald, Hirayama (2006). 
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likely to increasingly feature in provisioning for old age.53 This may 
well enhance social differences based on the tenure, quality and loca-
tion of parent’s housing. Moreover, this may involve intensified nego-
tiation over residential and housing inheritance arrangements, reviving 
the family in the welfare mix despite the greater socialisation of public 
health and welfare arrangements in recent decades. 
A provision for remodelling homes constitutes part of Long Term 
Care Insurance programme (LTCI) initiated in 2000. This scheme 
provides those over 64 access to health and welfare facilities (nursing 
homes etc.), but also home care services. In practice, the approach of 
LTCI has become increasingly focused on self-reliance and the family 
to provide care, with the use of insurance only where it is absolutely 
necessary. A notable feature of state subsidized services is the provi-
sion for improvements in the homes of care receivers.54 Since 1993, 
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Ministry of 
Health and Labour have been assisting in the remodelling of private 
homes to suit mobility and care needs of the elderly, which has been 
incorporated into LTCI provision. The government’s approach to 
house remodelling, which extends the self-reliance of the elderly 
within their own homes, relies considerably on the housing situation 
of elderly households who are mostly homeowners. Those with large 
owner-occupied homes are often better able to take advantage of state 
subsidies and home care, as well as family care. They also retain the 
wealth contained in their home, which is normally passed on to their 
                                                 
53  Cf. Brown, Naomi (1996): The nisetai jūtaku phenomenon. The prefabrication 
housing industry and changing family patterns in contemporary Japan. 
54 Cf. Park, Byung Hyun and Han Oak Lee (2008): A comparative study of housing 
welfare politics for the elderly between Korea and Japan – focused on the elderly who 
can live independently. 
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children. Although LTCI constituted a universal provision (and 
marked state responsibility) for elderly care, it may well reproduce 
inequalities based on differences in housing situations in terms of 
tenure status and property values, with the divide between generations 
and economic groups becoming more pronounced over time. 
Conclusions 
Appreciation of housing system and property market changes has 
largely been absent in the consideration of demographic transforma-
tion in Japan. This paper has sought to demonstrate the role of the 
housing sector in post-war social economic development and how it 
contributed to shaping standard families and life-courses. In the post-
bubble era the housing market and housing ladder were destabilized, 
which in combination with restructuring in employment and policy 
has helped further undermine household stability and contributed to 
the fragmentation of households and life-course trajectories. An 
emerging issue is the gap in housing conditions and disalignment in 
life-courses between different generations of Japanese that contribute 
to the polarization of wealth, insecurity and risk which have destabi-
lized processes of Japanese social reproduction. 
This paper has also emphasized the social impact that housing and 
tenure systems as well as the specific interaction with socioeconomic 
and demographic developments. While social and economic restruc-
turing in Japan, which has impacted housing markets and influenced 
household patterns, the housing system itself is also helping to shape 
new patterns of household formation and movement through the life-
course. It appears that the bias toward owner-occupation, which once 
supported fertility and family formation, is beginning to have the re-
verse effect. Furthermore, this tendency seems to reinforce the imbal-
Richard Ronald 
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ance between younger and ageing populations in terms of economic 
pressures and residential conditions. A situation appears to be devel-
oping in which an “asset-rich, cash-poor” older population, who often 
hold considerable housing assets and dwell in large homes, relies in-
creasingly on the working population as well as their housing assets in 
order to maintain living standards in old age. Meanwhile, an “asset-
poor, income-insecure” younger generation is emerging that is strug-
gling to access independent housing adequate for starting a family or 
providing an asset reserve to supplement their own old age. Essential-
ly, the housing system seems to be now exaggerating the effects of an 
ageing population as well as the significance of differences in housing 
conditions between households. 
It appears that attitudes to family formation, life-course trajectories 
and housing preferences are being renegotiated among younger people. 
It is not yet clear how and if younger generations will ascend a hous-
ing ladder or what norms will become embedded in terms of partner-
ship formation, childbearing and dwelling practices. It seems they face 
a completely new set of conditions in which many of the certainties of 
the post-war social order have melted away. Older people too have to 
cope with their old age in terms of new social contracts that require 
renegotiating family reciprocity and the use of their homes as contain-
ers and conduits of wealth. Those without housing assets will be par-
ticularly disadvantaged, as will their descendants. 
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AKIKO ODA 
Older Japanese Spouse Care in Relation  
to Household Structure, Gender Relations, and  
Political Economy 
Abstract 
In Japanese families, the extramarital relation is increasingly gaining 
prominence over the traditional parent-son stem relation as the ful-
crum in many households. Patriarchy is being structurally transformed 
in domestic life where social changes are gradually re-shaping the 
family ideal in terms of care provision for older parents. At the root of 
this lies a change in the power balance in relations between the young 
and the elderly, where changes in household structures are witnessing 
a marked shift in which older people are increasingly maintaining 
couple-only households, with a recent sharp decline in the traditional 
multi-generational living arrangement. Consequently, older people 
have to rely increasingly on their own means to take care of each 
other’s needs. This placed an increased strain on older women, in par-
ticular on those who have to take care of disabled partners. These 
women are traditionally subjugated by power dynamics whereas the 
older Japanese male maintains the dominant daikokubashira (head of 
household) status. Trying to ease the burden, the Long Term Care 
Insurance (LTCI) scheme was introduced by the Japanese Government 
in 2000. However, the elderly couples participating in my study have 
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shown a reluctance to ask for this kind of help. Instead they are mostly 
relying on their own means and are deterred from invoking external 
care through a number of complex factors correlating to socio-eco-
nomic issues, pragmatism, social stigma, and gendered norms. 
Introduction 
Japan is experiencing a rapid and striking demographic development 
in its population of elderly people, which proportionally ranks high 
amongst the developed nations. The issue of who will provide for their 
care has come into political focus, whereas established norms of older 
people being cared for within the multi-generational family setting are 
in decline.1 Japan’s rapid change in its demographic structure is dra-
matic; the proportion of people over 65 was just 4.9 per cent in 1950, 
increased to 7.9 per cent in 1975, and 21.5 per cent in 2007 and is 
expected to reach 39.6 per cent by 2050.2 The same trend is observed 
in Western Europe where those aged above 65 are estimated to reach 
27 per cent and 32 per cent in the UK and Germany by 2050.3 
The time period it took for the UK population aged 65 and older to 
double from 7 to 14 per cent of the total population was 45 years (be-
tween 1930 and 1975), while the Japanese population reached the 
                                                 
1 Cf. Sumiya, Mikio (1992): Shakai hoshō no tenkai to tenbō [Progress and prospect 
of social security in Japan], 137. 
2  Cf. Statistics Bureau (2008): The Statistical Handbook of Japan 2008. 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/c02cont.htm (accessed 24 October 2008). 
3 Cf. Eurostat (2006): International day of older persons EU25 population aged 65 
and over expected to double between 1995 and 2050, 12 September 2006 – 29 Sep-
tember 2006. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PGP_PRD_ 
CAT_PREREL/PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEAR_2006/PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEAR_20
06_ MONTH_09/3-29092006-EN-BP.PDF (accessed 19 October 2008). 
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same growth in only 26 years (between 1970 and 1996).4 This is an 
important factor in discussions about health care finances and the pen-
sion system; the more rapid the ageing process, the faster the necessity 
for a political response. In the light of this demographic trend, Ueno5 
argues that the “common sense” of care giving for older Japanese 
people has shifted dramatically from the daikazoku ideal (living in the 
3 generational household and being looked after by the extended fam-
ily6) to living alone. In 1980, about 70 per cent of the Japanese people 
who were older than 64 cohabited with their children’s family. This 
figure shrank to 44 per cent in 20067 while the percentage of elderly 
couple’s households has increased rapidly in the last two decades and 
is predicted to grow further8. With that said Ueno pointed out that 
spouse caregiving in old age has now become a common practice in 
Japan. 
In this paper, the care dynamics among 21 elderly couples living in 
the Kantō region of Eastern Honshū (the main Japanese island) where 
one partner requires intensive informal care to remain living in the 
community are analyzed. The main focus is on older spouses provid-
ing care for a husband who has a limiting disability that can range 
from physiological impairment to cancer. The more concealed situa-
tion of the older spouse is researched on in terms of caregiving in re-
                                                 
4 Cf. Smith, Chris et al. (2005): Focus on people and migration. The changing age 
structure of the UK population. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_com 
pendia/fom2005/04_FOPM_AgeStructure.pdf (accessed 18 October 2008). 
5 Cf. Ueno, Chizuko (2007): Ohitorisama no rōgo [Alone in later life]. 
6 Cf. Thang, Leng Leng (2001): Generations in touch. Linking the old and young in a 
Tokyo neighborhood. 
7 Cf. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2008): Heisei 20 nen kōsei hakusho [Wel-
fare white paper for 2008]. http://www8.cao.go.jp/kourei/whitepaper/w-2008/zen 
bun/html/s1-2-1-02.html (accessed 15 September 2008). 
8 Cf. Statistics Bureau (2008). 
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gards to the difficulties encountered in performing physical labour 
linked to caregiving and domestic tasks. Closely related to the issue 
are gender power relations between husband and wife whereas the 
elderly man is confronted by the reality of having less control over his 
body because of significant medical factors and relies heavily on those 
providing care for him. 
Power dynamics in older couple’s relationships can adversely af-
fect matters when, according to Graeber, women are compelled to 
handle their husband carefully in order not to cause their spouse to 
behave in an aggressive manner. In doing so they constantly have to 
perceive matters from a male point of view (imaginative identification 
or interpretive labour).9 This is not typically reciprocated by older men 
who are likely to disdain the converse situation, while their wives 
constantly have to deal with and maintain their husband’s egos.10 
This paper also analyzes how care provision is influenced by the 
type of the household (couple versus multi-generational model), and 
the relationship between the male care recipient and his wife. Socio-
economic factors influence the types and quality of care provided 
which is influenced by the recipient’s social class and the use of exter-
nal care services that encompass inequalities of access to Japan’s LTCI 
(Long Term Care Insurance) scheme. Elderly couple’s points of view 
on the use of care services under the LTCI scheme are discussed in 
relation to traditional family ideology and gendered norms, which can 
be regarded as the reason for the reluctance to utilize external care 
                                                 
9 Cf. Graeber, David (2006): Beyond power/knowledge. An exploration of the relation 
of power, ignorance and stupidity. LSE Malinowski Memorial Lecture Thursday 25 
May 2006. http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/pdf/200 
60525-Graeber.pdf (accessed 1 September 2008). 
10 Cf. Itō, Kimio (2002): Dekinai otoko kara dekiru otoko e [How “unable men” be-
come “able”]. 
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among older people, despite the need for intensive care by many of 
the elderly men. 
Older Japanese women who have to take care of a disabled spouse 
face increasing tasks in their daily lives and have to sustain their roles 
despite rapid societal changes, among them particularly the decline of 
multi-generational living arrangements and difficult economic times. 
This paper therefore contrasts how older women from different social 
classes are challenged in their roles as caregivers. To widen the scope, 
this paper will also highlight a number of important factors that 
emerge in the decision making processes of elderly couples when they 
decide not to seek external care, whereby the dynamics are connected 
to socio-economic and class-based factors, social stigma, and gen-
dered norms. 
Methodology 
This paper is based on data on a subset of 21 couples out of 47 inter-
viewed who fulfil the required criteria that one partner or both among 
them has to have a significant health problem. Semi-structured inter-
views were conducted with married couples between the age of 62 and 
87 years, focusing on couple dynamics on several issues relating to the 
level of care. The interviewees came from communities within the 
Kantō region of Eastern Honshū; therefore no claim for generalization 
can be made. However the analysis of the data revealed common 
themes amongst the older spouse caregivers. Data gathering was in 
accordance with ethical procedures laid out by the British Sociological 
Association11. 
                                                 
11  Cf. British Sociological Association (2004): Statement of ethical practice. 
http://www.britsoc.co.uk/NR/rdonlyres/468F236C-FFD9-4791-A0BD-
4DF73F10BA43/0/StatementofEthicalPractice.doc (accessed 18 September 2008). 
Akiko Oda 
 
100 
Sample Characteristics 
There were 20 couples with one partner in need of a high level of care 
(17 men and 3 women) and one couple, in which both spouses showed 
a high level of care. The care recipient’s education level, occupation, 
and major health problems are listed in Table 1 on page 26. In all but 
one case, the care for the husband was completely or almost com-
pletely provided by the wife. Among the 4 older women requiring care, 
3 were cared for by their daughters or daughters in law, and only one 
was cared for by her husband. 
Aspects correlating to a high level of dependency on care 
Intimacy in care provision is particularly poignant when the recipient 
has developed incontinence or requires assistance with bathing and 
dressing, although in my research the elderly couples were reluctant to 
discuss such matters. This reluctance is linked to a number of issues; 
the most significant one being the fact that basic everyday activities 
such as toileting, bathing, and dressing are not verbally discussed. 
These activities are taboo-related and the reluctance to discuss such 
matters can also be described as a way of thinking. This corresponds 
to the psychological interpretation by regarding the importance of 
“non-linguistic knowledge”.12 
In terms of common frame of reference, it was pointed out on sev-
eral occasions during the data collection that it was pointless to talk to 
me about matters outside my comprehension due to my young age and 
lack of appreciation. In this respect, Lave coined the term “apprentice-
                                                 
12 Cf. Bloch, Maurice (1991): Language, anthropology and cognitive science, 186. 
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ship learning”, which relies on the “assumptions that knowing, think-
ing and understanding are generated in practice”.13 
For the elderly couples who refused to be interviewed separately 
discussing intimate matters was complicated because the spouses were 
reluctant to embarrass their husband by outspokenly talking about 
intimate aspects (e.g. incontinence) of the men’s health status. Instead, 
the wife was inclined to be upbeat and positive rather than focused on 
the negative or pessimistic aspects of caregiving, if possible. Most of 
the men were reluctant to discuss their declined health in any detail 
and tried to deflect or play down its significance on occasions. 
Caregiving pressure faced by older women 
Physical and psychological stress increases the burden experienced by 
older women who take care of their partner, who has a high level of 
dependency on care. Mr. Ikeda succumbed to his terminal stomach 
cancer several months after my interview with him. In the final stages 
of his life, Mrs. Ikeda and her daughter were minded to look after him 
and tried to keep his spirits up by maintaining a positive attitude. De-
spite her husband’s depression that caused great emotional hurt, as his 
wife and main caregiver, Mrs. Ikeda was determined to see her pas-
toral role through to the end. As well as carrying out physical care 
tasks, elderly women like Mrs. Ikeda are also giving emotional sup-
port. This aspect of hidden work is described by Kasuga as the central 
necessary skill for looking after older frail people.14 
                                                 
13 Cf. Lave, Jean (1990): The culture of acquisition and the practice of understanding, 
310. 
14 Cf. Kasuga, Kisuyo (1999): Kazoku to iu kankei no konnan to kibō [Difficulties 
and wishes concerning family]. 
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Mrs. Ikeda revealed how stressful it was for her to suppress her in-
ner feelings regarding her husband’s depressive state, which was a 
sentiment that came across in many of the interviews with the women. 
Long mentions how the caregiver is expected to suppress the mental 
stress or burden as a virtue (of ideal caregiving).15 However, recently, 
there has been more public awareness in Japan about the mental and 
physical burden of caregiving imposed on spouses (mostly older 
women) taking care of their partners.16 Like in the case of Mrs. Yama-
shita, who suffered a stroke three years ago but has completely recov-
ered now. She took over the management of their grocery store ten 
years ago, when her husband was confined to a wheelchair. She also 
supported the family by taking over a range of domestic tasks. Her 
stroke was attributed to the endurance of the great work load that ac-
cording to Ochiai is a common cause of burden which induces illness 
in elderly women who provide care17. 
Their ability to continue to provide care for their husbands in the 
future was the concern which was more frequently stated by older 
women in households in which only the couple lived and where there 
are less options to withdraw and support compared to multi-genera-
tional households. The main factors identified by the spouses were 
increased body limitations with age, and financial related difficulties.18 
                                                 
15 Cf. Long, Susan O. (1996): Nurturing and femininity. The impact of the ideal of 
care giving in post war Japan. 
16 Cf. Kasuga, Kisuyo (2007): Kea, kanjō, jendā. Kōreisha kaigo mondai wo tōshite 
[Care, feelings, gender. Through the problem of geriatric care], and Kusumoto, Yuko 
et al. (2008): Zaitaku ninchishō kōreisha no kazokub kaigosha no kōfukukan to sono 
riyū – Nihon to Kankoku no genjō [Family caregivers of demented elderly. Subjective 
well-being and attitudes toward caregiving – present situations in Japan and Korea]. 
17 Cf. Ochiai, Emiko (1999): 21 seiki kazoku e [Towards the 21st century family]. 
18 Cf. Utsunomiya, Hiroshi (2000): Kōreisha no kekkon seikatsu no keizokuishi to 
tekiō ni kansuru hattatsu-teki kenkyū. Kankeisei suteitasu no kanten kara [A deve-
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In general spouses from a lower income background were more aware 
of possible implications of their own bodily constitution, and how it 
could affect their viability to continue to provide care. In contrast, 
elderly couples from a more affluent background tended to display a 
more relaxed attitude and greater confidence in the future. This topic 
is more closely examined later in the paper in relation to the elderly 
people’s opinions on the Japanese LTCI scheme, and the socio-eco-
nomic factors impinging on their ability to afford care services. 
Physical work connected to caregiving 
Physical work requirements in this paper are defined as hands-on care 
that focuses on the body of the recipient and relates to hygiene aspects 
of taking care of someone. It carries the stigma of “dirty” work19. Mr. 
Nemura, Mr. Ikeda and Mr. Ono (individually interviewed), and sev-
eral others mentioned difficulties with toileting but were reluctant to 
elaborate on this matter. The inability to be in full control of one’s 
bodily functions can have a damaging effect on the person’s self worth, 
since such a lack of toileting control has usually not been experienced 
since early childhood. Citing Miller20, Twigg mentions how “the idiom 
of disgust evokes the sensory experience” whereas incontinence can 
be the most difficult of situations to deal with.21 Of the interviewed 
caregivers Mr. Hama talked most openly about his coping strategies 
                                                                                                         
lopmental study on the intention of elderly persons to continue and adapt to their 
marital life. From the viewpoint of the relationship status] and Amada, Jōsuke (2003): 
Rōfūfu shinjū ron. (1) Kōrei fūfu kaigo wo meguru aidentitī no seijigaku [The contro-
versy of double suicide among senior couples. (1) The political science of identity 
concerning the nursing of elderly couples]. 
19 Cf. Twigg, Julia (2000): Bathing. The body and community care. 
20 Cf. Miller, William I. (1997): The anatomy of disgust. 
21 Cf. Twigg (2000). 
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with his wife’s incontinence, and two other women described similar 
proceedings dealing with the incontinence of their mothers-in-law 
over a prolonged period of time. 
Physical work can be particularly demeaning when conducted by a 
person of high status, and it is not unusual in such cases for distancing 
techniques to be applied.22 For example Mr. Hama, a senior English 
teacher tried to sound “matter of fact”23 saying it was just a part of 
living with his wife, when talking about the difficult experience of 
dealing with his wife’s incontinence. This type of talking is indicative 
of the effective “worker” characteristics of the male care giver dis-
cussed by Harris.24  
Gender differences in the attitudes of older people can be discov-
ered while talking about toileting-related issues. Several women in my 
study pointed out that the worst case future scenario was to require 
toileting assistance themselves. However, none of the older men 
commented on the issue. It seemed as if they implicitly expected their 
wives to take care of their incontinence and did not feel ashamed. In 
this respect Namihira notes that the heightened awareness towards 
hygiene standards of Japanese people underwent a shift towards a 
desire not to mention, toilet-related matters at all.25 When asked about 
toileting difficulties, Mrs. Hama did not disclose her previous inconti-
nence. As it had occurred mainly in the past, she might have thought 
                                                 
22 Cf. Twigg, Julia (2004): The body, gender and age. Feminist insights in social 
gerontology. 
23 Cf. Rose, Hillary and Bruce Errollyn (1995): Mutual care but differential esteem. 
Caring between older couples, 127. 
24 Cf. Harris, Phyllis Braudy (1993): Listening to care giving sons. Misunderstood 
realities. 
25 Cf. Namihira, Emiko (1996): Inochi no bunka jinruigaku [The cultural anthropol-
ogy of life], 69. 
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of it as no longer relevant. However, from my own deductions and Mr. 
Hama’s comments regarding his wife’s personality, I conclude that her 
reluctance to acknowledge it was based on the possibility that admit-
ting to such a loss of bodily control is considered unacceptable in 
Japanese society. As previously stated, most of the older disabled men 
expect their wives to perform the physical work connected to caregiv-
ing. The only mentionable exception was Mr. Watanabe, who takes 
care of his own toileting matters despite the fact that he has been con-
fined to a wheelchair for seven years. He had an operation to fit a 
colostomy bag and stoma (collects faeces). He is determined to stay as 
active as possible by driving a wheelchair adapted car operated by 
hand gears to improve his independence. He wishes to be a “proper 
member of society”, fully participating and not to be compromised by 
age and disability. 
Sharing the burden 
Physical work connected to caregiving is complicated because it is not 
just limited to the hygiene aspects but as in the case of bathing in-
volves nakedness and therefore intimacy. How these activities are 
performed and how the care recipients and caregivers connect emo-
tionally is also important. Bathing for example reveals cultural differ-
ences. Twigg mentioned, that in the U.K. parents are reluctant to be 
bathed by their own children and prefer professional care provision 
instead.26 However, in my study, a greater willingness to be bathed by 
one’s own children or daughters-in-law was expressed. Mr. Nemura 
could not bath alone so his son assisted him and when Mrs. Nemura 
had difficulties bathing, their daughter assisted her. 
                                                 
26 Cf. Twigg (2000). 
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Mrs. Nemura looks after her husband who suffers from vertigo and 
dementia resulting from a brain haemorrhage; however she is cur-
rently recovering from a thigh fracture and has difficulties looking 
after him. During the day, she performs her chores (cleaning and cook-
ing etc.) for her son’s family and their daughter in a three generational 
household. The couple’s children provide occasional assistance such 
as transport. About half of the older interviewed couples mentioned 
that their extended family provided them with additional care support 
such as shopping and taxi service. Most of these couples stated that 
those arrangements were based on past reciprocity, and wished to 
make clear that their children were not “blackmailed” to provide them 
care support. As a matter of fact it is the household structure that often 
dictates the amount of available care. A multi-generational household 
is more likely to provide available helpers, by default. 
An example of reciprocal caregiving is practiced in Mrs. Yama-
shita’s home. Mrs. Yamashita has lived in the same area for most of 
her life. Her third son and brother-in-law live in the same neighbour-
hood, so she can call upon additional assistance from her extended 
family when she requires additional help to care for her wheelchair-
bound husband. However, those couples interviewed who had a 
household to themselves could not draw upon a similar support net-
work. In several cases that was due to separating distances to their 
family members, unavailability of help from their extended family, or 
due to childlessness. In this situation, the elderly couples have a ten-
dency to cope on their own with a strong reluctance to impose any 
care assistance upon their children. In the case of Mrs. Katō, Mrs. 
Miyamoto, and Mr. Hama they all expressed a resolute couple-
oriented mindset and the reluctance to seek care support from their 
extended families. 
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Important aspects of physical work related to caregiving are the di-
rect effects on the caregiver’s health. When the caregiver is advanced 
in years it can be very difficult and hard work to care for a disabled 
person. Mrs. Yamashita and Mrs. Miyamoto stated their concern about 
the possibility of being helpless if their husbands should have an acci-
dent at home. Several of the women also commented on their worsen-
ing knee pain due to the physical efforts required looking after their 
spouses. Mrs. Yamashita, for example, had strained her knees more 
than once when she crouched down to dress her wheelchair bound 
husband, and found it very difficult to stand due to the repetitive bend-
ing motions. 
This section has discussed the pressure faced by older women who 
operate as caregivers and who provide care on a daily basis to their 
husbands. It has also looked at the physical side of their tasks and their 
options to share the burden. It was stated that the burden was greater 
where care support was not available as it is the case in households 
maintained by couples. In multi-generational households more support 
could be provided. Examples for physical work and emotional pres-
sures connected to caregiving were given to show how a considerable 
strain is imposed on the caregiver and how in several cases elderly 
women sustained some kind of injury as a direct consequence of the 
burden. It was found that providing emotional support while suppress-
ing one’s own emotions was an attitude often found in older spouses 
in order to deal with their husband’s particular situation. “Pragmatic 
acceptance”27 of their caregiving responsibility is an important factor 
of the way in which these older women are able to cope and manage 
within a stressful environment. 
                                                 
27 Cf. Mann, Michael (1970): The social cohesion of liberal democracy, 425. 
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Power dynamics 
It is of importance to consider power dynamics between the caregiver 
and the care recipient, especially in situations where the man, despite 
his poor health, is unwilling to relinquish his daikokubashira (head of 
household) status, meaning that he remains the dominant partner in 
the couple’s relationship.28 Also the men’s behaviour due to their in-
ability and frustration to accept their disability, and how it undermines 
their personal status, has an effect on the power dynamics within the 
couple’s relationship. It is an important issue because chronic illness 
and disability can have a very negative impact on the nature and qual-
ity of a couple’s relationship. 
Couple power dynamics 
David Graeber referred to his observations of the situation comedy 
culture in 1950s America when he talked of the internalized forms 
(conscious or sub-conscious guiding principles) of structural inequal-
ity in couple’s relations to each other. This is based on images sub-
scribed to patriarchal families in which men ridicule their wives as 
irrational or for having their own female logic, while the wife is ex-
pected to understand her husband’s.29 Several elderly women in my 
research expressed that they have to make an effort to understand their 
husband’s perspectives and their feelings. Graeber’s observations are 
supported by the older men in my research who were unable or un-
willing to take account of their wives perspective on various matters 
such as finances and health concerns etc. 
  
                                                 
28 Cf. Itō (2002), Ueno, Chizuko (2003): Ueno Chizuko ga bungaku wo shakaigaku 
suru [Ueno Chizuko sociologises literature] and Ueno (2007). 
29 Cf. Graeber (2006). 
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The men in my study had a traditional body image that requires the 
body to be “healthy and apt” and in cases when they were unable to 
live up to this image, their frustration often manifested in form of 
emotional outbursts against their wives. Living alone with her hus-
band, consequently put Mrs. Gotō in her husband’s line of fire. She 
claimed to often having to calm down her husband. The women in my 
study typically voiced frustration towards their husbands regarding the 
inequality in their relationships and their desire for a more egalitarian 
understanding and mutual participation in household chores. It was 
however assumed that it was unlikely to change as according to the 
women their husband’s mindset conformed to the Shōwa hitoketa (the 
single-digit Shōwa-Japanese, born between 1925 and 1934), which 
refers to old fashioned values and mindsets in which men regard la-
bour as gender-segregated.30 Furthermore, the women believed that at 
their husbands’ current stage in life and with their poor health it was 
too late for them to undergo a radical change of attitude. Mr. Gotō’s 
wife quoted her husband saying, “I feed you, so if you do not like the 
way I do things, leave”, which is at the least, an uncompromising 
statement. The use of what can be best described as “economic 
blackmail” to assert the husband’s authority in the marital relationship 
was also reported by Ueno.31 Regarding structural inequality, older 
women such as Mrs. Gotō are in a weak position in this type of rela-
tionship when according to Graeber “patriarchal families of this sort 
are, as generations of feminists have emphasized, most certainly forms 
of structural violence; their norms are indeed sanctioned by threat of 
                                                 
30 Cf. Borovoy, Amy (2005): The too-good wife. Alcohol, co-dependency, and the 
politics of nurturance in post war Japan, 36f. 
31 Cf. Ueno (2007). 
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physical harm in endless subtle and not-so-subtle ways”.32 Graeber’s 
“violence” broadly refers to situations, which oppose the realisation of 
a more egalitarian social relationship when women are wary of chal-
lenging the status quo by seeking to debate, clarify, or re-negotiate 
contentious issues with their husband.33 The cause behind the situation 
is the husband’s unwillingness to consider his wife’s point of view, 
expressed through abrupt endings to any discussions on the matter. 
Consequently, the husband’s point of view is justifiably perceived as 
unreasonable by his wife. In the interviews, none of the women dis-
closed any information suggesting they were in fear of, or had previ-
ously suffered physical harm. But following Graeber’s philosophy 
“physical harm” also includes verbal attacks that inflict mental psy-
chological stress.34 Due to her lack of financial autonomy and the so-
cial normative restrictions applied to women in Japan, the dominant 
position of Mrs. Gotō’s husband in the marital relationship is likely to 
remain unchallenged. 
A number of important factors that explain why many spouses tol-
erate situations like Mrs. Gotō’s became clear during the conducted 
interviews. Reasons given by the elderly women included not to seek 
jukunen rikon (older couple divorce) on the ground of having invested 
so much into their relationships over a long period of time. Also, their 
husbands advanced age or poor medical prognosis often predicted a 
natural ending to their marriage. Women were also opposed to divorce 
considering possible negative effects on their children. Implications 
were also made, indicating the potential cause of a schism within the 
extended family network. 
                                                 
32 Cf. Graeber (2006), 7. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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Intergenerational power dynamics 
Daikazoku (large family) in Japan is an idealized image of the ex-
tended family household in which older parents demand power and 
respect, especially from their daughters-in-law, and it is synonymous 
with older parents being well cared for within the extended family 
settings.35  However, Mrs. Katō and Mr. Ikeda stated that previous 
tensions with their daughters-in-law were the dominant factor behind 
the decision to live away from their son’s families. Mrs. Yamashita 
also reported similar tensions that resulted in her daughter-in-law 
moving out. In each case, the daughter and parents-in-law were in 
dispute over a power struggle where the daughter-in-law refused to 
follow the established convention of the idealized image of the daika-
zoku.36 It was further implied by several women of my study that their 
daughters-in-law had a mercenary mindset. The basis for this accusa-
tion was a reluctance on behalf of the daughters-in-law to provide care, 
where those cared for were unable to provide a financial legacy. 
Although the older couples in my study who live in multi-genera-
tional settings received help from within their families, it is my con-
tention that the idealised image of the daikazoku is exposed to increas-
ing pressure due to social changes. Ochiai, Jenike, and Kasuga argue 
that the ideal of warmth in daikazoku, which assumes that elderly 
people in three generational households are well looked after by their 
extended family, is a myth.37 Instead the older people in such house-
holds may struggle to be taken care of by their family, and in my study, 
                                                 
35 Cf. Thang (2001). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Cf. Ochiai (1999), Jenike, Brenda R. (2004): Alone in the family. Great-grand-
parenthood in urban Japan, and Kasuga, Kisuyo (2009): Kōreisha to jendā – hitori to 
kazokuno aida [Older persons and gender – between individual and family]. 
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some older couples did in fact struggle to care for each other when 
their co-resident children were busy. Ochiai and Jenike have pointed 
out that many older people living within multi-generational house-
holds experience loneliness and depression.38 Jenike, Hashimoto and 
Kasuga have also highlighted how increasing numbers of older people 
who live in multi-generational households are becoming more isolated 
with less communication and other forms of contact with their co-
resident children. This has been termed kateinai hitorigurashi (living 
as a single person within a family).39 
Older people’s perception of what intergenerational relations ought 
to be in a stem family may also have changed. In my study, a major 
opinion of the elderly women was that the daughters-in-law were less 
normative in the way they related to their parents-in-law, and had 
greater autonomy than previous generations. The changed dynamic is 
such that most Japanese people believe that economically secure older 
parents should live independently in separate households to avoid 
possible conflicts with their daughters-in-law40, an observation that 
also proved to be true in my study. This contradicts the “traditional” 
daikazoku ideal and until recently would have let to stigmatization of 
older parents, as it would have indicated their failure in raising chil-
dren.41 
This section has discussed the complex power dynamics between 
older couples in different household settings. Initially, the power dy-
                                                 
38 Cf. Ochiai (1999) and Jenike, Brenda R. (2003): Parent care and shifting family 
obligations in urban Japan, Chapter 9. 
39 Cf. Jenike (2004), Hashimoto, Akiko (2008). Blondie, Sazae, and their storied 
successors. Japanese families in newspaper comics, and Kasuga (2009), 2. 
40 Cf. Ueno (2007). 
41 Cf. Koyano, Wataru (1996). Filial piety and intergenerational solidarity in Japan. 
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namics in the older couples were based on the patrilineal family sys-
tem, in which the husband retained the dominant position despite his 
failing health. In the intergenerational setting, the power dynamics 
have shifted away from the elderly couples towards the younger gen-
eration where the former norm of the older parent’s authority over the 
family has declined considerably. A further important area of interest 
related to caregiving involves the LTCI scheme introduced in Japan in 
2000. The LTCI scheme is based on policies that are designed to pro-
vide support and care for the elderly in contemporary Japan.42 The 
large shift in Japan’s population’s age average coupled with the de-
cline of multi-generational households and socio-economic factors, as 
well as the changing attitudes found in the society concerning how to 
take care of its elderly people means that the support provided under 
the auspices of the LTCI scheme is likely to become more significant. 
We now examine how the older couples in my study relate to the LTCI 
scheme. 
Attitudes and use of external care (LTCI) 
Ueno and Long et al. have argued that external care provided through 
the LTCI scheme can be beneficial in terms of the effect on the life 
quality of elderly couples where one partner has a serious chronic or 
disabling illness.43 Mrs. Katō mentioned particular advantages of her 
husband’s regular day care centre attendance, which offer her space 
and respite. Under the LTCI scheme, people can attend the day care 
centre several times a week, or receive home care visits, depending on 
                                                 
42 Cf. Sumiya (1992). 
43 Cf. Ueno (2007) and Long, Susan O., Ruth Campbell and Chie Nishimura (2009): 
Does it matter who cares? A comparison of daughters versus daughters-in-law in 
Japanese elder care. 
Akiko Oda 
 
114 
the assessment of the individual’s needs, the availability of particular 
services, and also the affordability of the combination of services. At 
the day care centre, elderly people are able to use a bathroom that has 
wheelchair adapted fixtures, and they can also receive assistance in 
feeding if required.44 Mr. Hama used the LTCI scheme for his wife 
and had an attendant prepare meals at his home once a week. Mrs. 
Watanabe used the weekly home care bathing service for her husband, 
and Mr. Katō regularly attended the day care centre to take part in a 
rehabilitation program after his stroke. 
However, Shimono and Takami et al. have argued that the LTCI 
scheme is not sufficient to support elderly disabled care recipients in 
the community because it is based on the premise that the caregiver’s 
burden is reduced.45 This issue was raised by elderly couples in my 
study who pointed out that the LTCI scheme is more beneficial for 
family caregivers who need respite from caregiving rather than for the 
care recipients themselves. 
Factors in reluctant utilisation of external care services 
The strength of social stigma that opposes the use of LTCI care has 
been reported by several scholars.46 Nonetheless, the number of eld-
                                                 
44 Cf. MHLW – Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2009): Kaigo hoken seido no 
gaiyō [An overview of the long term care insurance system]. http://www.mhlw.go.jp/ 
topics/kaigo/index_gaiyo.html (accessed 19 September 2009). 
45 Cf. Shimono, Keiko (2007). Why it is important to have a kind daughter-in-law in 
Japan. Long-term care for the elderly in Japan and Australia, and Takami, Chie, Sa-
wayo Tadatsu and Mizuko Manabu (2008). Kaigo hoken sābisu riyōsha no sābisu ni 
taisuru manzokudo shakudo datōsei oyobi shiranaisei [Validity and reliability of the 
scale of users’ satisfaction with services received under the long-term care insurance 
system]. 
46 Cf. Brown, Naomi (2003): Under one roof. The evolving story of three generation 
housing in Japan, Jenike (2003) and Tsukada, Noriko and Yasuhiko Saitō (2006): 
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erly people registered to use the LTCI services has significantly in-
creased during the past 5 years.47 Recent studies have shown that the 
social stigma is lessening, particularly amongst the younger elderly 
people.48  However, it is often reported that significant numbers of 
older frail men in lower socio-economic groups are less inclined to 
use the health services to which they are entitled.49  
The frequent use of utterances such as “not wishing to be depend-
ent” and “being unlucky” in relation to external care indicated the 
desire of many older men in my research not to depend on care pro-
vided through the LTCI scheme, neither day care visits nor home visits. 
Instead, Mr. Endō emphasised reciprocity, saying that as he had de-
voted a significant amount of time and effort into caring for his chil-
dren and grandchildren in the past he now expected them to provide 
for his care. The intergenerational reciprocal ties are strong enough 
such that support is provided within the Endō family. But there’s also 
Mr. Ono who lives with his eldest daughter’s family whereas his wife 
leads a busy life managing her own hairdressing salon and is therefore 
not able to dedicate a lot of time to her husband’s care. She is an ex-
ception among the older women in my study. However, Mr. Ono is 
content with the care provided by his daughter and does not envision 
                                                                                                         
Factors that affect older Japanese people’s reluctance to use home help care and adult 
day care services. 
47 Cf. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2009): Annual report on the ageing 
society 2008. http://www8.cao.go.jp/kourei/whitepaper/w-2008/zenbun/20index.html 
(accessed 17 May 2009). 
48 Cf. Wake, Junko et al. (2007): Kaigo hoken seido shikō 5 nengo no kōreisha sābisu 
ninchi to riyō ikō [The aim of the geriatric care system. Recognition and utilization 
after 5 years of implementation], and Long et al. (2009). 
49 Cf. Hiramatsu, Makoto, Katsunori Kondō and Hiroshi Hirai (2009): Kaigo yobō 
shisaku no taishōsha ga kenshin wo jushin shinai haikei yōin [Integral background 
factors for the neglect of health check-ups by recipients of the care precaution policy]. 
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any future LTCI care intervention. External care was widely perceived 
as something undesirable among the older couples in my research, 
which come from a self-employed background. That included institu-
tional care as well as any associated assistance provided under the 
LTCI scheme, even though a mandatory insurance premium is de-
ducted from both state and occupational pensions. 
The elderly people’s desire not to depend on the state also relates to 
a stigma of not wishing to be seen as having been abandoned by one’s 
family and to be perceived as being unable to cope in the eyes of 
friends or neighbours. On this basis, Jenike, Tsukada and Saito have 
argued that stigma is the prime cause of under-utilisation of the care 
services.50 Furthermore, there was a strong sense of the individual 
capability to cope amongst the elderly couples in my study. The 
women tended to express their resoluteness by emphasising that they 
were physically able to provide care for their husbands, even if they 
were handicapped and/or multi-generational based care was not avail-
able. These older women’s accounts indicate that they take pride in 
being able to take care of their husband’s needs at home. Amada has 
highlighted how older wives providing care use mothering experi-
ences and apply those to their husbands.51 Nakamura and Okura et al. 
have also reported that women participating in their studies com-
mented on feeling pity for their husbands and caring for them because 
of their husband’s frail state of health due to age.52 This was observed 
in my study as well, particularly in the case of Mrs. Ikeda who ex-
                                                 
50 Cf. Jenike (2003), Tsukada and Saito (2006). 
51 Cf. Amada (2003).  
52 Cf. Nakamura, Ritsuko (2004): Rōrō kaigo saikō [The rethinking of older spouse 
care] and Okura, Mika et al. (2008). Perceptions of nursing care held by elderly 
women in mountainous regions. 
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pressed complex emotional thoughts on looking after her terminally ill 
husband. 
Tsukada and Saitō argue that stigma is the prime cause of under-
utilisation of the care services.53 Bathing involves nakedness and eld-
erly people who consider assistance from external care service provid-
ers may be troubled by the fact that their bodies could be exposed to 
younger people during bathing. Twigg’s study highlights how older 
people have an internalised image of their bodies and perceive it as 
unattractive, which then contributes to the sense of discomfort felt 
during personal hygiene and to the asymmetrical nature of the ex-
change, where the older person is in the position of least power.54 Dur-
ing a recent hospital stay Mr. Yamashita was showered by a female 
nurse which he perceived as a humiliating experience. For older men 
in my study, it comes down to the importance of maintaining one’s 
sense of self-sufficiency, authority, and masculine identity, and refusal 
to the “powerlessness” ascribed to care recipient dependant on the 
younger woman. 
Another factor that explains why elderly people are reluctant to re-
quest external care was highlighted by Mr. Watanabe and Mr. Hama. 
They stated that the LTCI scheme doesn’t meet their needs because it 
was founded by healthy people who fail to address the fact that people 
have different disabilities and need different types of care and discour-
age the disabled person’s desire to be autonomous and independent.  
This section has focused on different opinions on the LTCI scheme 
to be found amongst the older people – among which only three cou-
ples reported any previous associations or current uses of health care 
assistance provided under the LTCI scheme. An interesting criticism 
                                                 
53 Cf. Tsukada and Saitō (2006). 
54 Cf. Twigg (2000), 59. 
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was directed towards the “young and able bodied” architects of the 
LTCI care services who, because they lacked a common frame of ref-
erence, were unable to take the particular needs of elderly disabled 
persons into consideration. Factors identified to shape the elderly peo-
ples attitude towards the use of external care included their family 
background, generation and reciprocity. These issues of social class 
and LTCI care service affordability are also important factors for the 
avoidance of older people to either seek or receive external care that 
meets all their needs. 
Care choice, constraint, and affordability 
In Table 1, the care recipients (17 men and 4 women) have been char-
acterised into three broad “mainstream” sub-groupings defined by 
Kelly.55 This categorisation was based on my assessment of socio- 
economic groups according to the care recipients self-reported educa-
tion level, former/current occupation and housing. Mrs. Ōtsuka and 
Mrs. Fujita are shown as members of the upper middle and middle 
class, respectively because of their husbands’ financial prosperity. Mr. 
Katō, who is a former salaryman with a university degree is catego-
rised as lower middle class on the basis of his current declined socio-
economic circumstances. 
Class definitions in Japan are not directly comparable to social 
classes as in the UK or the US where social inclusiveness rather than 
categorical differentiation apply, as represented by the term chūryū 
(middle class) which translates as “mainstream”56.  
                                                 
55 Cf. Kelly, William Wright (2002): At the limits of new middle class Japan. Beyond 
“mainstream consciousness”. 
56 Cf. Kelly (2002). 
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Table 1: Major health problems, education level, and previous/current occupations of 
care recipients who were categorised by the author as (a) upper middle class, 
(b) middle class, and (c) lower middle class. These categories are in accor-
dance with the “mainstream” identified by the term chūryū. 
This line of thought showed in the responses given by the majority of 
elderly people in my research. By identifying with the societal main-
stream, the Japanese people tend to see themselves within the wider 
population in relation to class. Since the 1960s, about 90 per cent of 
Care 
Recipient 
Major health problems Education level Occupation 
(a) upper middle class 
Mrs. Hama depression, dementia, slow mobility university degree housewife 
Mr. Harada lung cancer university degree senior salaryman 
Mr. Gotō 
cerebral infarction, stroke, diabetes, 
hearing 
university degree dentist 
Mr. Iriya stoke, physically frail university degree senior salaryman 
Mr. Niyama multiple cardiac problems high school senior manager 
Mr. Watanabe paralysed below waist high school salaryman 
Mr. Ono 
pulmonary embolism, dialysis, HUS, 
vertigo 
high school accountant 
Mr. Endō frequent fever, lymph gland removed basic school agri-administrator 
Mrs. Ōtsuka diabetes, fluid on knee, cardiac pacemaker basic school cattle farmer 
(b) middle class 
Mrs. Fujita breast cancer in remission high school housewife 
Mr. Nemura vertigo, dementia, impaired movement high school agri-administrator 
Mrs. Nemura diabetes, thigh fracture, pancreatitis basic school crop farmer 
Mr. Kubota right side partial paralysis, poor vision basic school 
small business 
owner 
(c) lower middle class 
Mr. Katō stroke (in remission) university degree salaryman 
Mr. Wada multiple stokes, impaired movement university degree postman 
Mr. Ikeda terminal cancer, dialysis, poor vision high school haulage driver 
Mr. Kotani cardiac arrest, dialysis high school haulage driver 
Mr. Miyamoto cardiac arrest, gall stones high school poet 
Mr. Ishikawa diabetes, poor hearing and vision, fever high school 
small business 
owner 
Mr. Kitagawa 
dialysis, diabetes, cardiovascular, poor 
vision 
high school 
small business 
owner 
Mr. Yamashita wheelchair bound, slurred speech basic school grocer 
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those questioned in large scale surveys have consistently seen them-
selves in the upper-middle, middle, or lower-middle class strata.57 
In Table 1, those belonging to the upper middle class had medical 
insurance and at least one private income through a pension or other 
sources, and consequently are more likely to find the relevant infor-
mation on how to use the local authority care services. Mr. Hama was 
able to get information on hand rail support subsidies from his city 
council and regularly studies the care insurance systems. Mr. Wata-
nabe increased his independence by purchasing a wheelchair adapted 
car, two imported wheelchairs and a French bed (operated by electric 
remote control). Mrs. Yamashita, on the other hand, has to assist her 
husband to get about and cannot afford certain essential care items. 
Consequently, Mr. Yamashita does not enjoy the same level of life 
quality. 
In the UK, Arber and Ginn, and Twigg point out that substantial 
evidence exists to prove that people belonging to the middle class and 
people with a higher education have better negotiation skills dealing 
with professionals to optimise their care with help that meets their 
individual requirements.58 Recently, this socio-economic class based 
inequality has been looked into in Japan. One aspect within the works 
of Kondō and Hisamatsu et al.59 focuses on the ability of older people 
of lower skills or educational background and their comprehension of 
complicated information protocols on how to identify the most appro-
                                                 
57 Cf. Kelly (2002). 
58 Cf. Arber, Sara and Jay Ginn (1991): Gender and later life. A sociological analysis 
of resources and constraint, and Twigg (2000). 
59  Cf. Kondō, Katsunori (2005): Kenkō kakusa shakai [The society of polarized 
health] and Hiramatsu et al. (2009). 
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priate health care services, as well as completing the documentation to 
access these services. 
The findings in my study revealed that socio-economic circum-
stances influenced the quality and availability of health care received 
by the older people on the basis of income through a pension as well 
as financial affluence, which depended on my interviewee’s former 
occupation as low or medium skilled, or professionals. This agreed 
with results from other large scale researches.60 The elderly people in 
my study who receive an occupational pension or other asset-related 
income are in a better position to afford a range of external care ser-
vices, and also have more autonomy to purchase the required items to 
meet their individual needs. However, those shown in Table 2 as lower 
middle class are not so fortunate, which agrees with similar findings 
by Kondō.61 Mr. and Mrs. Ikeda went ahead with private surgery for 
Mr. Ikeda’s cancer without medical insurance and consequently spent 
almost all of their savings on the medical procedure. Subsequently, 
Mrs. Ikeda had to seek seikatsu hogo (poverty relief). After drawn out 
negotiations with officials, Mrs. Ikeda obtained this benefit which 
exempted her from health care costs, local taxes and prescription costs. 
Several people from this group incurred significant hospital-based 
medical expenses, which impacted heavily on their financial state such 
that they are in a constant struggle to deal with the consequences. 
                                                 
60 Cf. Kondō (2005), Hiramatsu et al. (2009), Hanibuchi, Tomoya (2010): Iryō to 
kenkō no kakusa – JGSS-2008 ni motozuku iryō akusesu no bunseki [Inequalities in 
health and health care access. Analysis of access to medical care using JGSS-2008] 
and Murata, Chiyoe (2010): Iryō fuan to shakai keizai chii no kanren-JGSS-2008 ni 
motozuku bunseki [Concern about health care and socio-economic status. Analysis 
using JGSS-2008 data]. 
61 Cf. Kondō (2005). 
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This section has illustrated the distinct gap between the older peo-
ple who, through financial affluence and social background, are able 
to cope better in their retirement and obtain the required healthcare to 
meet their needs, as opposed to those in the lower middle class. A lack 
of adequate pensions coupled with costs incurred through medical 
expenditure, as well as normal everyday life expenses had a more 
significant impact on those in the lower middle class. Furthermore, 
those in couple households and belonging to the lower middle class, 
i.e., the Katō, Wada, and Miyamoto households, had to face additional 
disadvantages as they couldn’t rely on support by extended family 
members to meet their care requirements. 
To provide a wider perspective, the interrelated areas of spouse 
care, couple and intergenerational power dynamics, and external care 
have been researched upon to gain a deeper insight into the spouse 
care dynamics of older Japanese couples. The areas have focused on 
the processes of performing physical work connected to caregiving 
and the complex factors that come into play and have a bearing on 
whether or not external care assistance through the LTCI scheme or 
care from within the extended family is either sought or received. 
Discussion 
In terms of the key demographic, it is expected that approximately 40 
per cent of Japan’s population will be in retirement by the middle of 
this century, and that currently, nearly one in three older Japanese 
couples live on their own.62 With increased life expectancy into the 
21st century, age-related health decline in both men and women is 
                                                 
62 Cf. IPSS – National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2008): 
Population statistics of Japan 2008.  
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likely to put increased pressure on the care support system. To further 
complicate matters, the proportion of elderly people who live in multi-
generational households is likely to continue to fall, so the care op-
tions provided within the family will decline as well. This paper has 
therefore explored the complexity of older spouse care in the rapidly 
changing Japanese society to further the understanding of older Japa-
nese couple relationships. 
The pressure, on older women in particular, to function as a care-
giver and to provide care for a disabled spouse comes from a complex 
net of social conflicts, which arise out of discrepancies between cou-
ples, as well as discrepancies between generations; conflicts of inter-
ests and social processes such as individual attitudes and use of the 
LTCI scheme, and socio-economic reality linked to class-based con-
siderations. In spouse care dynamics, it was highlighted how power 
imbalance between married couples has shaped the current care ar-
rangement. The two main features were the lack of appreciation of the 
hidden (emotional) aspects of caregiving provided by the older 
women, and the reluctance of their husbands to give up or soften their 
dominant position within the household, even in cases where the 
man’s physical health had declined. These marital dynamics should be 
further investigated particularly with respect to the men, who have 
been largely under-reported in previous researches. We need to under-
stand in particular why older Japanese men are much less likely to 
provide care for their wives compared to the reciprocal arrangement, 
which is largely based on hegemonic patrilineal factors.63 
I have argued that spouse care and physical work correlating to 
caregiving for elderly people are pertinent pressing issues in Japan’s 
                                                 
63 Cf. Long, Susan O. (2008): Someone’s old, something’s new, someone’s borrowed, 
someone’s blue. Tales of elder care at the turn of the 21st century, Chapter 7. 
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ageing society. With the changes taking place in intergenerational 
reciprocity and power dynamics, some older people are increasingly at 
risk to be left without any family or external assistance. To ensure that 
sufficient care will be provided in the future, we need to look more 
closely at individual cases and family histories of elderly people in 
assessing their care requirements and needs, rather than assuming that 
elderly people will have sufficient family-based support. 
I contend that the LTCI scheme could be further developed to pro-
vide care support for older people. To achieve this it is necessary to 
grasp the wide complexity of issues that currently serve to undermine 
its use amongst older people in the community. This paper has illus-
trated how such considerations are based on class and socio-economic 
factors, as well as gendered norms, and the adherence to patrilineal 
notions of care provision within the families. Furthermore, policy-
makers need to take the diverse views of elderly people to modify the 
care services according to their needs into account although it is likely 
to be tempered to an extent by financial pragmatism and the tailoring 
of care services. 
Outside of Japan, it is found that the strength of hegemonic mascu-
linity in older men has precluded them from seeking medical help to 
deal with health problems.64 Therefore more research is needed to 
explore the connection between health and socio-economic back-
ground of older men in Japan. Especially as the correlation between 
poor health and “risky behaviour” (e.g. drinking and smoking) has 
been discussed in the field of men’s studies, it is a promising area of 
                                                 
64 Cf. Courtenay, William (2000): Constructions of masculinity and their influence on 
men’s well-being. A theory of gender and health, Charles, Nickie and Vivienne Wal-
ters (2008): Men are leavers alone and women are worriers. Gender differences in 
discourses of health, and Sieverding, Monica et al. (2008): Gender differences in 
FOBT use. Evidence from a large German survey. 
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research.65 Research in this area is also of great importance in respect 
of lessening the future burden of women who currently have to pro-
vide care to their husbands at a relatively early stage in life. 
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COSIMA WAGNER 
“Silver Robots” and “Robotic Nurses”?  
Japanese Robot Culture and Elderly Care  
Abstract 
Japan is often referred to as the “robot kingdom” as its robot culture is 
popular around the world. The general acceptance of robots as part-
ners of human beings at their workplaces and at home is also a major 
argument of the Japanese government to promote the use of “social 
robots” in- and outside the factories to overcome the hardships of the 
ageing society and especially the decreasing number of Japan’s work-
force population. A field of special interest is the “elderly care”-
sector, as an increasing number of elderly people will need support in 
daily tasks and care in the near future. Numerous studies suggest that 
very soon the “robotic nurse” or robot technology based care will not 
only be a solution for the shortage of care givers, but will also become 
an important business in the silver market of the future. This paper 
will explain the expectations and measures regarding the use of robot 
technology for Japan’s ageing society and discuss the following ques-
tions: What expectations does the Japanese government have regard-
ing a future market for “next generation robots” and which measures 
have been taken so far? What are the models of first applications of 
robot technology in the elderly care sector so far and can a “robot 
therapy” and “silver robots” have a “healing” effect on elderly people? 
Cosima Wagner 
 
132 
Finally, can the proposed Japanese “robotic lifestyle” of the future be 
a role model for other ageing societies?1 
Introduction 
Robotto ga Nihon wo sukuu (Robots will save Japan) is the book title 
of a study by Nakayama Shin2, Chairman of the Board of Yasukawa 
Electric Corporation (market leader in the manufacturing of industrial 
robots), in which he stresses the importance of new “social robots” or 
jisedai robotto (next generation robots) as a solution for the problems 
of Japan’s ageing society. According to him, they would not only 
eliminate labour shortage in the industry and service sector, but also 
become home helpers and lifestyle assistants for the elderly who want 
to lead an independent live in their homes as long as possible.3 In con-
trast to their counterparts in the manufacturing industry, a special fea-
ture of the “next generation robots” is their direct contact and often 
interaction with human beings. Therefore they are also called “social 
robots”, which can be classified into three categories: 
1. Research oriented humanoid robots: This category contains hu-
manoid robots like the famous ASIMO4 developed by car manufac-
turer Honda or the HRP-2 PROMET 5  from Kawada Industries, 
                                                 
1 For a detailed discussion on the subject of tele-care for the elderly and robot therapy 
refer to Wagner, Cosima (2009a): “Tele-Altenpflege” und “Robotertherapie”. Leben 
mit Robotern als Vision und Realität für die überalterte Gesellschaft Japans [“Tele-
care for the elderly” and “robot therapy”. Living with robots as vision and reality in 
Japan]. 
2 Cf. Nakayama, Shin (2006): Robotto ga Nihon o sukuu [Robots will save Japan]. 
3 Ibid., 186−194. 
4 Cf. ASIMO official website: http://www.honda.co.jp/ASIMO/index.html (accessed 
17 July 2009). 
5  Cf. HRP-2 official website: http://www.kawada.co.jp/mechs/promet/index.html 
(accessed 17 July 2009). 
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which was developed as a national prestige project on the initiative 
of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Na-
tional Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology 
(AIST) in the years 1998 to 2002 with a budget of 4.6 billion Yen6. 
Other examples are the android robots by Ishiguro Hiroshi from the 
University of Osaka, who is a leading roboticist in the field of “an-
droid science” and the development of android robots. In 2006 he 
introduced his robotic twin GEMINOID to the public.7  
2. Robots for daily life, entertainment or therapeutic issues: Robots of 
this category usually have no or more than two legs, like Sony’s 
robot dog AIBO,8 which was for sale between 1999 and 2006, or 
the therapeutic robot baby harp seal PARO9. The first market ready 
household robot was WAKAMARU10 from Mitsubishi Heavy Indus-
tries. It was sold from 2005 to 2007 and costs the purchaser one 
million Yen, which proved to be too expensive and repair-intensive 
and prevented the product to become a mass consumer product. 
3. Robots for extreme areas/maintenance robots: The third category 
includes maintenance robots (e.g. cleaning robots), guard robots 
like TMSUK’s ARTEMIS11 and other robots also used in extreme 
areas like outer space or disaster aftermaths and in deep sea zones. 
  
                                                 
6 1 Million Yen equals about 8,100 Euro (March 2010). 
7  Cf. Website of Ishiguro Research Laboratory/Geminoid-project: http://www.is.sy 
s.es.osaka-u.ac.jp/research/0011/index.ja.html (accessed 17 July 2009). 
8 Cf. AIBO official website: http://www.sony.jp/products/Consumer/aibo/index.html 
(accessed 17 July 2009). 
9 Cf. PARO official website: http://paro.jp/ (accessed 17 July 2009). 
10  Cf. WAKAMARU official website: http://www.mhi.co.jp/kobe/wakamaru/ (ac-
cessed 17 July 2009). 
11  Cf. ARTEMIS (TMSUK) official website: http://www.tmsuk.co.jp/artemis (ac-
cessed 12 July 2009). 
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Within the first two categories, a field of special interest is the “el-
derly care”-sector, as it contains an increasing number of elderly peo-
ple who will need support in daily tasks and care in the near future. As 
numerous studies suggest, very soon the “robotic nurse” or robot 
technology based care will not only be a solution for the shortage of 
care givers, but will also become an important business in the silver 
market of the future. This paper aims to present some of these recent 
studies on the expectations of Japan’s future robot industry, referring 
in particular to the activities of the Japanese government, and to dis-
cuss the following questions: Which expectations does the Japanese 
government have towards a future market for “next generation robots” 
and what measures have been taken so far? Which models of first 
applications of robot technology in the elderly care sector already 
exist and can a “robot therapy” and “silver robots” have a “healing” 
effect on elderly people? Could the proposed Japanese “robotic life-
style” of the future become a role model for other ageing societies? 
Which expectations does the Japanese government have 
towards a future market for “next generation robots” and 
what measures have been taken so far? 
As governmental strategy papers and numerous publications from 
engineers, robot manufacturers, and politicians in Japan suggest, there 
are high expectations towards the market scale, scope size and future 
role of jisedai robotto for Japan’s ageing society. According to the 
Kōrei shakai hakusho heisei 20 (Whitepaper on Japan’s ageing society 
2008), Japan is the oldest society in the world in regards to age. Its 
people between the age of 65 years and older make up a ratio of 21.5 
per cent and a continuously decreasing workforce is observed in the 
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age group between 15 and 64.12 This continuously decreasing national 
workforce will have to be replaced to keep the Japanese economy 
going. Yet, as political scientist Gabriele Vogt has pointed out in her 
research on Japan’s workforce measures, neither family policy nor 
migration policy are successfully addressing the issue of replacement. 
Especially Japan’s migration policy is still considered a “political 
taboo issue”.13 In an interview with the METI-Manufacturing Indus-
tries Bureau in 2006 I was told that “next generation robots” are re-
garded as a good solution for the dissent on the labour shortage and 
migration policy problem, because, thanks to their positive image, 
they would be “easier to accept for the Japanese society than invited 
foreign workers”.14 
The easy acceptance of robots as partners of human beings at 
workplaces and at home is therefore a major argument of the Japanese 
government to promote the use of “social robots” in- and outside the 
factories. Yet, not only the positive image of robots but their eco-
nomic prospects have led to a strategic governmental promotion of 
robot technology since 2002. In 2001 the Japan Robot Association 
(JARA) and Japan Machinery Federation (JMF) published a joint re-
port titled Technology strategy for creating a ‘robot society’ in the 
21st century on the future market potential of the robot industry. They 
criticized the Japanese government for not supporting the new promis-
                                                 
12 Cf. CAO – Cabinet Office of the Japanese Government (2008a): Whitepaper on 
Japan’s ageing society 2008, 8, 13. 
13  Cf. Vogt, Gabriele (2008): Talking Politics. Demographic variables and policy 
measures in Japan, 23. 
14 Interview with Yūko Nakagiri, Manufacturing Industries Bureau, METI, on 4 April 
2006, see Wagner, Cosima (2009b): Robotopia Nipponica – Recherchen zur Akzep-
tanz von Robotern in Japan [Robotopia Nipponica – Research on the acceptance of 
robots in Japan]. 
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ing next generation robot technology development outside the manu-
facturing industry and presented an impressive growth forecast: 
According to this forecast on the future market of robot technology 
the total market volume was estimated 7.2 trillion Yen in the year 
2025 (Figure 1). 
However, the biggest growth potential within the market of robot 
technology of the future was predicted for the market sector “everyday 
life”. It was estimated to make between 1.5 trillion Yen in 2010 to 4.1 
trillion Yen in 2025. This sector was followed by the robot technology 
market for “medical care and social welfare” (an estimated 0.3 trillion 
Yen in 2010 and 1.1 trillion Yen in 2025), “public service” (0.3 tril-
lion Yen in 2010 to 0.9 trillion Yen in 2025), and “bio-industry” (90 
billion Yen in 2010 to 360 billion Yen in 2025). Only minimal growth 
potential was predicted for the currently biggest market sector of in-
dustrial robot technology in the manufacturing industry with an esti-
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Figure 1:  Market growth estimation for robot technology up to the year 2025 by JARA 
and JMF. 
Source:  JARA/JMF 2001, 10. 
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mated growth of 0.9 trillion Yen in 2010 to 1.4 trillion Yen in 2025.15 
The main message of the report was a recommendation for the Japa-
nese government to promote research and development in the promis-
ing field of non-industrial applications of robot technology. In 2008 a 
new research report on the future market of robot technology was 
published by JARA, correcting the figures of the 2001 report to a 
much higher proportion of the industrial robot technology sector. It 
doubled the estimated amount predicted in the study from the year 
2001 to 1.4 trillion Yen, 3.7 trillion yen in 2025 and corrected the 
estimated 4.1 trillion Yen predicted for the household and service 
robot technology in 2001 to a lesser proportion of 1.3 trillion Yen for 
the year 2025 in the 2008 year estimation.16 Nevertheless, the first 
JARA/JMF report of the year 2001 caused a discussion in the METI’s 
Economic & Industrial Policy Bureau and robots for everyday life and 
elderly care were eventually classified as “most promising” and rec-
ommended for promotion.17 
From 2002 onwards METI took over leadership in convening study 
groups and commissions to discuss and promote next generation robot 
technology in general and for the elderly care sector in particular. 
Members of the study groups and commissions were robot technology 
                                                 
15  Cf. JARA/JMF – Japan Robot Association/Japan Machinery Federation (Eds.) 
(2001): Heisei 12 nendo. 21seiki ni okeru robotto shakai sōzō no tame no gijutsu 
senryaku chōsa hōkokusho [Technology strategy for creating a “robot society” in the 
21st century], 10. 
16 Cf. JARA – Japan Robot Association (Ed.) (2008): RT (robotto tekunorojī) ni yoru 
sangyō hakyū kōka to shijō bunseki ni kan suru chōsa [Survey on the market growth 
effect of robot technology and market analysis], 6. 
17 Cf. METI – Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Ed.) (2001): Sangyō kōzō 
shingikai − Shinseichō seisaku bukai. Chūkan torimatome [Economic & Industrial 
Policy Bureau – Interim report on new economic growth policies], 60−61, 92, 102, 
110. 
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manufacturers, scientists, experts from welfare organizations, observ-
ers from other ministries and even a science fiction author (Sena Hi-
deaki) in 2004. The Jisedai Robotto Bijon Kondankai (Study Group 
on The Vision of Robots in the Future) recommended to take meas-
ures towards a standardization of robot technology (similar to house-
hold electronic appliances), the introduction of a “robot license” (simi-
lar to a driving license), the modularization of robot components, the 
enhancement of data security measures as well as the promotion of 
sangakukan (industry-academic-government cooperation) and public 
relations activities to promote the use of “next generation robots”.18 
To support the idea of the “one robot in every household”-goal the 
report also included three “science fiction stories” describing a fam-
ily’s life in the year 2025 with robots as household helpers etc. One of 
these governmental science fiction stories featured the character of a 
household robot through which a working mother is connected to her 
household, greeting her son when he returns from school and monitor-
ing his activities through the robot’s camera eyes. Remarkable about 
the story is a comment in the report regarding the plan of wanting to 
increase the number of working women in the future, especially moth-
ers with children who currently stay at home. The report reads: 
“Household robots [as machines] will make housework attractive to 
men and convince them to engage in housework and child rearing 
thereby enabling more women to go to work […]”.19 In the Nakagawa 
Report towards a new industrial structure of May 2004 the robot in-
dustry was designated as one of seven key industries for Japan’s fu-
                                                 
18 Cf. METI – Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Ed.) (2004a): Jisedai ro-
botto bijon kondankai hōkokusho no torimatome ni tsuite [Report of the “Study Group 
on the Vision of Robots in the Future”], 10−12, 14, 16. 
19 Ibid., 2. 
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ture economy.20 The Robotto Seisaku Kenkyūkai (Robot Policy Re-
search Group) of the years 2005 and 2006 formulated the following 
mission statement: “To envision a future ‘Neo Mechatronics Society’ 
and to implement robot technology measures in order to prevent a 
weakening of the Japanese economy as a result of Japan’s ageing so-
ciety and its decreasing workforce“.21 In addition, the report contained 
first market research data on the acceptance of household robots stat-
ing e.g. the readiness of half of the probands to use robot technology 
for the home care of family members.22 In order to make the estab-
lishment of a Japanese “Neo Mechatronics Society” a nationwide pro-
ject, the Robot Policy Study Group also initiated the formation of the 
robot business network Roboness 23  with four local robot business 
promotion centres in Kawasaki, Gifu, Kansai and Fukuoka and budg-
eted a total of 5.5 billion Yen for the promotion of next generation 
robot technology.24 The current budget for fiscal year 2009 amounts to 
1.4 billion Yen.25 Furthermore, Japan’s parliament was probably the 
only parliament in the world, in which the Robot Care Study Group 
                                                 
20 Cf. METI – Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Ed.) (2004b): Shin-sangyō 
sōzō senryaku [Strategy for a new industrial structure], 9. 
21 Cf. METI – Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Ed.) (2005): Robotto Sei-
saku Kenykūkai chūkan hōkokusho. Robotto de hiraku bijinesu furontia [Interim 
report of the Robot Policy Research Group. To open new business opportunities with 
robots], 12. 
22 Ibid., 51−53. 
23  See Robotto Bijinesu Suishin Kyōgikai official website: www.roboness.jp (ac-
cessed 7 July 2009). 
24 Cf. METI – Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Ed.) (2006): Robotto Sei-
saku Kenkyūkai hōkokusho. RT kakumei ga nihon o hiyaku saseru [Final report of the 
Robot Policy Research Group. Robot technology will lead to an economic recovery], 
49. 
25 Cf. CAO – Cabinet Office of the Japanese Government (Ed.) (2008b): Heisei 21 
nendo kagaku gijutsu kankei yosan ni okeru jūten no gairyaku [Overview of the main 
points of the budget for science and technology in 2009], 4. 
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(Jimintō Robotto Kaigo Kenkyūkai) consisting of members of the par-
liament (representatives of the Liberal Democratic Party, LDP) could 
be found (until 2009). The founder of the group, former LDP-
representative of the Lower House (member until August 2009), 
Shin’ya Ōno, illustrated his visions of a robot nurse26 and other social 
robots in Japan in a book. He even developed a calculation model on 
financing the “one robotic nurse for one household”-program with the 
care insurance system.27 
As elaborated on earlier in this paper, there are high expectations 
on the future use and the market scale of robot technology for Japan’s 
ageing society by the Japanese government. Robot technology is re-
garded as one of Japan’s most important future industries. Therefore 
large amounts of money are invested in the research and development 
of new social robots. From December 2008 to March 2009 a new Ro-
botto Sangyō Seisaku Kenkyūkai (Robot Industry Policy Research 
Group) was installed. In their final report of 25 March 2009 they an-
nounced that only within five years robot technology devices for the 
elderly care sector would be market-ready.28 
  
                                                 
26 For a detailed analysis of Ono and his “robot nurse“-vision see Wagner 2009a and 
2009b. 
27 Cf. Ōno, Shin’ya (2005): Robotto hassō omochabako [Show bag of robot ideas], 
94−99. 
28 For latest information on recent robot technology promotion projects with special 
focus on robots for daily life and elderly care refer to the Japanese project websites of 
METI (http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/robotto/robokenkyu/roboken.htm) (accessed 7 
July 2009) and NEDO (New Industrial and Industrial Technology Development Or-
ganisation) (https://app3.infoc.nedo.go.jp/informations/koubo/koubo/EP/nedokoubo.2 
009-03-11.7032429880) (accessed 7 July 2009). 
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Which models of first applications of robot technology in the 
elderly care sector already exist and can a “robot therapy” 
and “silver robots” have a “healing” effect on elderly  
people?  
Despite the governmental visions and sketches of a future Japanese 
“robotopia”, market-ready “silver robots” for senior consumers are 
still rare. However, there are a lot of ideas, prototypes and very few 
commercial products like the robot seal PARO mentioned before or 
the feeding robot My Spoon29. Remarkable about the discussion on 
social robots for Japan’s ageing society is the variety of scenarios of a 
“robot-living” in the future and a great interest of the government in 
communicating its robot visions to the Japanese public. In 2007 the 
newly established Innovation Strategy Council of the Abe Cabinet 
Office published a report on innovation strategies for Japan including 
a governmental science fiction story with the title 2025-nen Inobe-ke 
no ichinichi (One day in the life of the Inobe family in the year 2025) 
featuring a “typical” Japanese family with two children and grandpar-
ents living together in a high-tech-house with their household robot 
Inobe-kun and other innovative new products. The “Year 2025 Inobe 
family”-story was published in May 2007 and a manga with the same 
title followed. In the preface of the manga written by the former Min-
ister of State for Science and Technology Policy, Food Safety and 
Consumer Affairs, Takaichi Sanae, the Japanese public is asked to 
understand the importance of the innovation initiative for Japan’s age-
ing society and the need for a change in values of the society.30 The 
                                                 
29 Cf. MY SPOON official website: http://www.secom.co.jp/personal/medical/myspo 
on.html (accessed 7 July 2009).  
30 Cf. Eguchi, Fujii (Ed.) (2007): 2025-nen Inobe-ke no ichinichi [A day in the life of 
the Inobe-familiy in the year 2025]. 
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way it is depicted in the Inobe-Manga, the Japanese robot technology 
does not only become the number one robot technology in the world, 
but also an essential asset to the average household. The fictional 
household robot Inobe-kun monitors the health status of the grandpar-
ents and cleans the house, while mother Inobe is doing telework from 
her home office. Analyzed from a gender studies point of view, the 
Inobe-Manga clearly promotes the traditional family role of a mother 
as a housewife, who manages her household and family (with the as-
sistance of robot technology), though in the manga she also juggles a 
part-time telework-job.31 Furthermore the report and manga suggest a 
very nationalistic technological empowerment vision towards China. 
In the book the rivalling country is described as looking up to Japan 
for its progressive bio- and robot technology.32 
On the other hand, not only politicians or bureaucrats engage in 
envisioning a robotic lifestyle for elderly people: Kobayashi Hisato, 
professor of engineering and robotics at Hōsei University in Tokyo 
wrote his own robot science fiction short story in a book titled Robotto 
wa tomodachi da! (Robots are friends!) in the year 1999. In it he de-
scribes the life of a three-generation family, in which the grandparents 
still work and lead an independent life at the age of 70. In his story 
scenario Kobayashi describes the grandmother, who is monitoring 
care robots all over Japan through a tele-robotic control desk (Figure 
2). Through the tele-monitoring feature of her care-robots the grand-
mother is able to communicate with other seniors all over Japan and is 
                                                 
31 For a further discussion of the Inobe-Manga from a gender studies perspective refer 
to Robertson, Jennifer (2007): Robo sapiens japanicus. Humanoid robots and the 
posthuman family, 369–398 and Robertson, Jennifer (2008): Science fiction as do-
mestic policy in Japan. Humanoid robots, posthumans, and innovation 25, 29–34. 
32 Cf. CAO (2007), 7−17. 
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therefore not controlled by machines, but controlling machines her-
self. Kobayashi therefore completely reverses the image of the heter-
onomy of old age in his narration and invented the new human species 
of “robot empowered senior[s]”.33 
 
Figure 2:  Kobayashi Hisato’s vision of a grandmother communicating with care robots 
all over Japan via telemonitoring. 
Source:  Kobayashi (1999), 99. 
A recent non-fictional but real care robot is the robot Twendy-One 
(Figure 3), developed by Sugano Shigeki, professor of robot engineer-
ing at Waseda University in Tokyo, who introduced his invention to 
the public in November 2007. Twendy-One is about 1.5 meters high, 
weighs 111 kg, and has 47 degrees of freedom. With her back and big 
arms she has a higher resemblance to a body-builder or an ET-like 
                                                 
33 Cf. Kobayashi, Hisato (1999): Technolife Series. Robotto wa tomodachi da! [Tech-
nolife-series. Robots are friends!], 99. 
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fantasy figure than to a care robot. She was developed explicitly as a 
social robot for the care of elderly people and is capable of fetching 
hot toast bread as well as things from the fridge. According to a pro-
motional video she is even capable of lifting physically handicapped 
persons out of bed. However, Twendy-One´s market release is not 
scheduled until as late as 2015 and her estimated price is 146.000 
Euro.34 
 
Figure 3:  Twendy-One, a future “robotic nurse” (?!), retrieving a slice of hot white bread 
from a toaster. 
Source: Waseda University Sugano Laboratory (Ed.) (2009): Internet. 
An example for already market-ready robot technology with thera-
peutic value for elderly people and especially people with dementia is 
the robot seal PARO (Figure 4) mentioned before in this paper. Robot 
therapy is a new field of interdisciplinary cooperation between robot 
                                                 
34 Cf. Waseda University Sugano Laboratory (2009): Homepage Twendy-One project. 
http://twendyone.com (accessed 3 July 2009). 
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engineers, psychologists and physicians in Japan. The Robotto serapii 
bukai (Study Group of Robot Therapy) was founded in 2002 in Tokyo 
and counted 17 regular members with support of a team of volunteer 
activists (mostly students) in December 2007. During my PhD-
scholarship in 2006 at the German Institute for Japanese Studies in 
Tokyo, I had the chance to a participant observation of the work of the 
group in a nursing home in Takao city in Tokyo. The robot therapy 
research group visits the nursing home every month and offers the 
patients 30 minutes to play with a robopet and talks to them about it. 
The robopet is positioned on a table in front of the participants. While 
communicating with the residents of the nursing home, the reaction of 
the participants to the robots is filmed and analyzed afterwards: which 
robopet was most popular with the participants, how do they talk with 
it, where do they touch it and what are the changes in the mood and 
vitality signs (emotions, blood pressure) of the participants after a 
session, etc.  
One member of the group, Shibata Takanori, senior researcher at 
AIST, has gained worldwide popularity with his “world’s most thera-
peutic robot”, the seal-like PARO (abbreviation of pāsonaru robotto, 
personal robot), in numerous studies and fieldwork in nursing homes. 
Shibata has proven positive effects, especially on patients with demen-
tia, through robot therapy with PARO. PARO has been on sale in Ja-
pan since 2005 and costs 420,000 Yen (around 2,700 Euro). It can 
also be rented and is sold to research cooperation-partners in South-
Korea, Sweden, Italy, Brunei, USA and as of recently, to Germany 
and Denmark as well. 
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Figure 4:  The robotic seal PARO. 
Source:  Promotion CD-ROM of Shibata Takanori 
PARO’s therapeutically value is measured by three “effects”:35 
• psychological effect (relaxation, motivation), 
• physiological effect (improvement of vitality signs), 
• social effect (activation of communication between patients and 
care givers)  
The same effects could be achieved through animal therapy with real 
dogs and cats, but due to hygienic reasons, animals are usually not 
allowed in hospitals and nursing homes. As Shibata has shown in nu-
merous studies, PAROs appearance in nursing homes lightens up the 
atmosphere and increases the interaction of the residents.36 However, 
these effects cannot only be found in an allegedly robot friendly coun-
try like Japan, but in other countries such as Germany, where Barbara 
Klein, professor for organization and management of social work at 
Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences, researches on it as well. She 
                                                 
35 Cf. PARO official website: http://paro.jp/?page_id=244 (accessed 23 July 2009).  
36 Cf. Shibata, Takanori (2006): Mentaru kommitto robotto PARO to robotto serapī no 
tenkai [Therapeutical robot PARO and the progress in robot therapy], 319−322. 
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has been testing PARO in a senior residence and with autistic children 
in Germany since January 2009.37  
On the one hand, robot therapy appears to be a rather pragmatic 
approach to solving the problem of shortages in caregiver personnel, 
on the other hand its positive effects cannot be denied. To exemplify 
the international acceptance of PARO’s positive effects on its con-
sumer’s health it should be mentioned, that the Danish government 
bought 1,000 PAROs for literally every nursing home in Denmark38 on 
17 November 2008.  
However, as recent promotional videos for PARO show, the inven-
tor Shibata now also aims for the pet-market boom and to use PARO 
as a substitute pet for elderly people. In a promotional film Shibata 
presents an elderly couple, who lives with a PARO and praises him as 
the “ideal pet” for elderly people. They argue that in contrast to real 
animals it can be taken everywhere, even on voyages, and there is no 
need to worry about a caretaker for the mechanical pet, if its owner 
dies.39 But at 420,000 Yen still rather expensive, the Silver-Market-
Hit-Product-factor remains modest to the day. 
Could the proposed Japanese “robotic lifestyle” of the future 
become a role model for other ageing societies?  
As I have argued in more detail in my dissertation on the acceptance 
of robots in Japan, the positive image of robots and their continuous 
narration in form of manga, anime and (governmental) science fiction 
                                                 
37 Cf. Klein, Cook (2009): Ein Freund... ein guter Freund. Was kann die elektronische 
Robbe? [A friend, a very good friend... What are the abilities of the electronic seal?], 
34−36. 
38 Cf. PARO official website at: http://paro.jp/?page_id=293 (accessed 2 July 2009). 
39 Cf. PARO official website at: http://paro.jp/?page_id=247 (accessed 2 July 2009). 
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stories is a successful “cultural construction”. It enables engineers and 
the Japanese government to propose a future “robotic lifestyle” with 
special emphasis on the development of robots for the elderly.40 If any 
of these visions and strategies will become reality, is questionable. 
Thinking about Japan as a future “robotic lifestyle”-role model for 
other ageing industrial societies like Germany, three factors regarding 
the acceptance of robots have to be taken into consideration:  
• The importance of the “robot narrative soil”: In my dissertation on 
the Japanese “Robotopia” I have elaborated in detail on how the 
“narrative soil” of a history of “social” robots and robots as friends, 
as it can be found in hundreds of pop-cultural manifestations like 
manga, anime, plastic model figures etc., not only influences po-
tential future consumers of robot technology, but also engineers, 
robot researchers and governmental policy makers.41 The positive 
narration of robots as friends of human beings is crucial for the 
creation of a future silver robot market, but cannot be found in 
Germany. 
• Robotisation ≠ Rationalization: Although there has been a lot of 
rationalization due to robot technology’s introduction in Japan in 
the 1980s42, a strong debate about the issue, as it marks the dis-
course on robot technology in Germany is lacking totally in the Ja-
pan of today. The German fear of rationalization through robot 
technology makes it difficult to promote robots as “saviours” of the 
German ageing society.  
                                                 
40 Cf. Wagner (2009b). 
41 A famous example is the robot manga hero Astro Boy (Tetsuwan Atomu), who was 
the role model for Honda’s engineers when developing the first bipedal walking robot 
of the world: ASIMO (for more examples refer to Wagner 2009b: chapter 3.2).  
42 See for example Kamata, Satoshi (1988): Robotto zetsubō kōjō [The hopeless robot 
factory]. 
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• Ethical questions: Unlike in Japan, the introduction of robot tech-
nology as a solution to the problems of an ageing society in Ger-
many is accompanied by a strong ethical debate on the question of 
whether using technology is a general solution to social problems. 
Therefore the scepticism against a therapeutical and supportive 
value of robot technology in Germany is rather high. Another 
strong point of criticism in Japan as well as in Germany is the 
“misuse” of robot technology for military use as it is the aim of the 
entire research on robots in the USA (financed by the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA). The denying of all 
military purposes in Japan’s robot technology research and conse-
quent development is an important factor in the acceptance of the 
idea of a “social” robot. 
Although the discourse on robot technology as a measure for the 
German ageing society is still very critical, some first robot technol-
ogy appliances for seniors in Germany can already be found: The 
German Fraunhofer Institute has developed a Care-o-Bot43 as a proto-
type household robot for seniors since 1998. Furthermore, German 
robotic scientists like Thomas Christaller also predict the growth po-
tential of service robots in our Western daily life.44 
  
                                                 
43 Cf. Care-o-bot official homepage: http://www.care-o-bot.de/ (accessed 1 July 2009). 
44 Christaller, Thomas (2006): Haushalts- und Spiele-Roboter als Begleiter und Helfer 
[Household robots and entertainment robots as companions and assistants], 133−151. 
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Summary 
To summarize the findings on “silver robots”, “robotic nurses”, and 
Japanese robot culture it can be concluded, that there is a lot of inno-
vative potential and ideas for a future silver market of robot technol-
ogy appliances. It is strongly supported not only by governmental and 
scientific robot visions, research and development, but also by robot 
strategies and investments, which the Japanese government has en-
forced since the beginning of the 21st century. However, how much of 
these plans and strategies will be realized and if Japanese elderly peo-
ple and other consumers are really ready to accept social robots in 
their midst, has to yet to be proven. 
Finally, by analysing social robots in Japan with a cultural sciences 
perspective on technology research and development, the “negotiation 
character” 45  of the creation and use of technical artefacts can be 
shown. By highlighting the socio-cultural context and negotiability of 
all technology development and use, social robots as a cultural topos 
reveal the desires, dreams and needs of a society at a certain point in 
time. Therefore social robots will continue to be a fruitful research 
topic for the understanding of the contemporary Japanese society. 
                                                 
45 Cf. Hoerning, Karl (1985): Technik und Symbol [Technology and symbol]. Soziale 
Welt 36, 186–207. 
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The Effectiveness of New Job Security Measure for 
the Older Employees in Japan* 
Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the amended Law for the Stabilization of 
Employment of Older Persons (LSEOP) that was enforced in 2006. 
The LSEOP requires enterprises to take one of three job security 
measures for their employees in line with the upward revision of the 
pensionable age: a) any increase in the mandatory retirement age that 
exceeds the current pensionable age; b) the introduction of continuing 
employment systems; or c) the complete abolition of mandatory re-
tirement systems. Our results suggest that a wage reduction after the 
mandatory retirement age is a key determinant of continued employ-
ment in an enterprise. Because the LSEOP does not regulate wage 
reductions, the effect of the LSEOP is limited. However, our results 
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also imply this would be appropriate for avoiding the distortion of 
labour demand, particularly the increase of young recruits. 
Introduction 
Japan retains a relatively high labour force participation (LFP) rate of 
older people among developed countries. In 2004, the LFP rate of 
people aged 60 to 64 in Japan exceeded 70 per cent. This is the sev-
enth highest rate among OECD countries and has not changed since 
1970.1 The LFP rate of males aged 60 to 64 is close to 90 per cent, 
which is the second highest next to the Iceland among developed 
countries. 
In June 2006, the amended Law for the Stabilization of Employ-
ment of Older Persons (LSEOP) was introduced. Under this law, all 
enterprises, which set their mandatory retirement ages under 65, are 
obliged to introduce a job security measure that allows their older 
employees to continuously work up to the pensionable age in the same 
enterprise. Because the mandatory retirement policy is a major factor 
in inducing retirement in Japan2, this new policy is expected to in-
crease the LFP of older people in Japan. Nevertheless, at the same 
time, the LSEOP may increase labour costs by generating continued 
employment, which enterprises may resist. In this paper, we investi-
gate how enterprises manage this possible increase in labour costs and 
investigate the determinants of increasing continued employment or 
an increase in the mandatory retirement age. To do so, we use a new 
                                                 
1 Cf. OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2006): 
Live longer, work longer. Aging and employment policy. 
2 Cf. Seike, Atsushi and Atsuhiro Yamada (2004): Kōreisha shūgyō no keizaigaku 
[The economics of older people]. 
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data set collected by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Train-
ing (JILPT): the “Survey of the Continued Employment of Older Em-
ployees (SCEOE)”. 
Our analysis suggests that reducing the wages of older employees 
is a key device for controlling the continued employment rate (CER) 
in the enterprise. Older workers do not want to extend their employ-
ment contracts, because they have to accept reduced wages. A popular 
job security measure is the introduction of the reemployment system, 
which enables the enterprise to considerably reduce the wages of 
workers past the mandatory retirement age, compared with the upward 
revision of the mandatory retirement age. Substantial wage reductions 
reduce the number of applicants for continuing employment contracts. 
Therefore, the amended LSEOP may have only a marginal effect on 
the LFP of older people in the short run. Policymakers did not realize 
this when the LSEOP was amended. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we 
outline the policies related to older employees, including the public 
pension and wage subsidies. This facilitates an understanding of the 
interaction between public policies and company wage setting. In the 
third section, we develop a simple model to explain the relationship 
between wage reductions and the continued employment of older peo-
ple. In the subsequent section, we describe the data set used in our 
analysis. The fifth and sixth sections descriptively and statistically 
describe the interactions between wage setting, public benefits, the 
upward revision of the mandatory retirement age, and the continued 
employment of older workers. The final section provides discussion 
and brief concluding remarks about the effect of the LSEOP on the job 
security of older employees. 
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Social policies related to older employees 
The amendment of the LSEOP 
In Japan, most regular employees in the private sector are covered by 
the Employees Pension (EP), which provides both flat-rate and earn-
ings-related public pensions.3 Before 2001, the pensionable age for 
full EP benefit was set at age 60. However, because of a rapidly age-
ing population, several reforms have been made to strengthen the fi-
nancial sustainability of the EP scheme.4 Two types of upward revi-
sions of the pensionable age in the EP scheme are important elements 
of these reforms. The 1994 pension reform introduced the upward 
revision of the pensionable age for the flat-rate portion, which took 
effect in 2001. In addition, the 2000 pension reform scheduled the 
upward revision of the pensionable age for the earnings-related por-
tion, to take effect in 2013. Details are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Scheduled upward revision of the pensionable age for the full EP benefit 
Note: The upward revision for women was delayed for five years. 
Flat-rate portion Earnings-related portion 
Year Age Year Age 
2001 61  2013 61 
2004 62 2016 62 
2007 63 2019 63 
2010 64 2022 64 
2013 65 2025 65 
                                                 
3 Non-regular workers, whose working hours exceed 75 per cent of those of regular 
workers, are also covered by the EP scheme. More than 60 per cent of employees are 
estimated to be insured under the EP scheme. Public employees and private school 
teachers are covered by Mutual Aid Association Pensions (MAAPs), which also 
provide both flat-rate and earnings-related public pensions. 
4 In Japan, the public pension system has been reformed every five years, based on 
actuarial reviews. This legislated reform process contributes to minimizing political 
conflict. 
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This revision would have substantially reduced the total income of 
people aged 60 and over if new job security measures had not been 
introduced. This is because mandatory retirement is a common em-
ployment practice in Japan, and takes effect at age 60, which is the 
legal minimum.5 In addition, in 2000, the unemployment rate for peo-
ple aged 60 to 64 was 8 per cent, which is three percentage points 
above the population average. This means that supplementing reduced 
EP benefits by finding a new job after reaching the mandatory retire-
ment age is difficult for older people. This reduced-income risk, 
caused by the upward revision of the pensionable age, forced the gov-
ernment to introduce a new job security measure. In 1998, the LSEOP 
was amended to oblige enterprises to make an effort to ensure the job 
security of their employees up to age 65. However, official statistics 
show that in 2004, only 16 per cent of enterprises with mandatory 
retirement schemes implemented continuous employment after the 
mandatory retirement age.6  Because of low continued employment 
after the mandatory retirement age, the government further amended 
the LSEOP in 2004. The new amended LSEOP, enforced in 2006, 
                                                 
5 According to the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, almost 100 per cent of 
workplaces with more than 100 employees have mandatory retirement systems and 
more than 90 per cent of those workplaces set their mandatory retirement age at 60 
(MHLW – Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (2006a): Survey on employment 
conditions of elderly persons 2004. http://www-bm.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/itiran/roudou/ 
koyou/keitai/04/index.html (accessed 28 June 2010)). For a wider discussion of Japa-
nese retirement income systems from an international comparative perspective see 
Casey, Bernhard H. (2001): The employment of older people. Can we learn from 
Japan? http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/communications/pdf/2001/enepri07080901 
/casey.pdf (accessed 28 June 2010) and Casey, Bernhard H. (2004): Reforming the 
Japanese retirement income system. A special case? http://www.bc.edu/centers/ 
crr/issues/gib_4.pdf (accessed 28 June 2010). 
6 Cf. MHLW – Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (2006a): Survey on employ-
ment conditions of elderly persons 2004. http://www-bm.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/itiran/ 
roudou/koyou/keitai/04/index.html (accessed 28 June 2010). 
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obliges enterprises to adopt a job security measure for their employees 
following the upward revision of the pensionable age (see Table 1, p. 
158).7 For example, from April 2007, all enterprises must provide a 
job security measure for their employees up to age 63. 
The job security measure required by the amended LSEOP 
The amended LSEOP requires the enterprise to take one of three 
measures for ensuring the job security of older employees until their 
pensionable age: a) any increase in the mandatory retirement age that 
exceeds the current pensionable age; b) the introduction of continuing 
employment systems; or c) the complete abolition of mandatory re-
tirement systems. The first and third measures provide effective job 
security for all older employees up to their retirement age; however, 
the second measure allows the enterprise to select older employees 
who are on continuing employment contracts through a labour agree-
ment or working regulation. The second is the most common measure. 
According to the survey conducted by the government just after the 
enforcement of the amended LSEOP, 84 per cent of the enterprises 
that employed more than 50 employees had already introduced some 
job security measure.8 Most enterprises (86 per cent) used continuing 
employment systems, and 13 per cent of enterprises increased the 
mandatory retirement age. Of those enterprises with continuing em-
ployment systems, 61 per cent selected their employees who applied 
for continuing employment contracts, and the other 39 per cent of-
fered continuing employment contracts to all applicants. Only a few 
                                                 
7 For female employees, the upward revision of the pensionable age for males is 
applied for job security measures. 
8 Cf. MHLW – Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2006b): Report on implemen-
tation of job security measures for older employees required by the amended LSEOP. 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/2006/06/h0609-1.html (accessed 28 June 2010). 
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enterprises (1 per cent) completely abolished mandatory retirement 
systems. 
There are two types of continuing employment systems: the reem-
ployment system and the employment extension system. Whether the 
employment contract is terminated or not at the mandatory retirement 
age distinguishes these two systems. Under the reemployment system, 
contract termination occurs at the mandatory retirement age and it 
usually involves a large wage reduction. Most enterprises (92 per 
cent) chose reemployment systems rather than employment extension 
systems.9 
Social security benefits related to continued employment 
Besides the LSEOP, there are two important social security benefits, 
which implicitly or explicitly affect the employment of older people: 
the Employment Continuation Benefit for the Aged (ECB) and the 
Old-age EP for Active Employees (EPAE). The ECB was introduced 
in 1995 under the employment insurance system. The ECB is paid in 
the form of wage subsidies to workers. The objective of this in-work 
benefit is to increase the incentives for older persons aged 60 to 64 to 
continue working rather than take up unemployment benefits. Under 
current ECB rules, older workers aged 60 to 64, whose wages have 
fallen by more than 25 per cent below their wages at age 60,10 are 
eligible for the ECB at the reduced rate of 15 per cent of their current 
wages. This rate is reduced further if the current wage is between 61 
                                                 
9 Cf. Arakawa, Sota (2007): Kōnenreisha no keizoku koyō no jittai ni kansuru kigyō 
chōsa [A Summary of the survey on continued employment of older employees 
(SCEOE) conducted by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (JILPT)]. 
10 The maximum wage at age 60, which is considered for the calculation of ECB, is 
454,000 yen. This is equivalent to around 150 per cent of the average monthly wage 
of regular workers. 
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per cent and 75 per cent of the wage at age 60.11 Even workers who 
are reemployed in the same workplace can receive this benefit. The 
maximum duration of this benefit is two years, which is much longer 
than the maximum period of 150 days for receiving unemployment 
benefits in the case of job loss through mandatory retirement. 
The EPAE was originally introduced in 1965. Before 1965, pen-
sion benefits had been fully suspended for workers aged 60 and over, 
because the qualification as a beneficiary was “retirement”. This 
meant that people in poverty could not supplement their low pension 
benefits with earnings. Under the current rules, the EP benefits of 
regular employees aged 60 and over who are working in enterprises 
covered by EP insurance are partially or fully suspended depending on 
their wages. The earnings rule differs slightly between employees 
aged 60 to 64, those aged 65 to 69, and those aged 70 and over, but 
generally, one unit of pension is suspended for every two-unit increase 
in earnings for those who earn a particular level of wages and EP 
benefits.12 The earnings rule has been reformed several times to mini-
mize work disincentives. 
From the viewpoint of enterprises, both the ECB and EPAE can be 
utilized as wage subsidies and may reduce wages for older employees, 
although the earnings rule of the EPAE creates a disincentive effect on 
the labour supply side. As we show later, many enterprises take ac-
count of these benefits when setting wages for continuing employees. 
                                                 
11 If their current wages exceed 341,000 yen, which is equivalent to 110 per cent of 
the average monthly wage of workers, the ECB will not be paid. Moreover, if the sum 
of current wages and the ECB exceeds 341,000 yen, an amount of ECB equivalent to 
the amount above 341,000 yen will be suspended. 
12 The earnings rule for working EP beneficiaries will be applied when the sum of 
their monthly wages and EP benefits exceed 280,000 yen. This amount is equivalent 
to around 90 per cent of the average monthly wage of regular workers. For those aged 
65 and over, the rule will be applied when the sum exceeds 480,000 yen. 
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Wage-age profiles, wage reductions and  
continued employment 
Previous work on continued employment 
Lazear13 develops a model that facilitates an understanding of contin-
ued employment after the mandatory retirement age. According to his 
theory, the wage profile has an upward slope, even if the value of the 
marginal productivity (VMP) of workers is constant. Concretely, en-
terprises pay wages below the VMP when workers are young and pay 
wages above the VMP when workers are old. This type of implicit 
contract discourages workers from shirking or engaging in malfea-
sance by shifting compensation to the end period of the contract. In 
addition, mandatory retirement is necessary when the delayed com-
pensation is exhausted. 
Carmichael14 and Gibbons and Murphy15 extend this implicit con-
tracts theory to the employment contract after the mandatory retire-
ment age has been reached. They show that support given to workers 
by employers in finding post-mandatory retirement jobs would have 
the same effect as a deferred wage contract, and would therefore dis-
courage shirking behaviour by workers. Interestingly, Gibbons and 
Murphy16 explain why the mandatory retirement age in Japan is usu-
ally lower than the pensionable age. They suggest that the discrepancy 
between the mandatory retirement and pensionable ages reflects em-
ployer attempts to retain influence on workers to the end of the em-
                                                 
13 Cf. Lazear, Edward P. (1979): Why is there mandatory retirement? 
14 Cf. Carmichael, H. Lourne (1989): Self-enforcing contracts, shirking, and life cycle 
incentives. 
15 Cf. Gibbons, Robert and Kevin J. Murphy (1989): Optimal incentive contracts in 
the presence of career concerns. Theory and evidence. 
16 Ibid. 
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ployment period. Rebick17 and Yamada18 show that enterprise support 
in finding post-mandatory retirement jobs raises workers’ new wages 
substantially above those that workers could obtain without support. 
Therefore, employees’ expectations of getting such support are an 
important work incentive before their mandatory retirement. The 
amended LSEOP, which obliges an enterprise to provide job security 
up to the pensionable age, may counteract these incentive strategies 
adopted by enterprises. Moreover, unless the VMP is equal to the 
wage before the mandatory retirement age is reached, the amended 
LSEOP may impose additional labour costs on enterprises. 
Continuing employment contracts and the steepness  
of the wage-age profile 
We now consider how enterprises would react to a potential increase 
in labour costs following amendment of the LSEOP. Figure 1 illus-
trates the simplified model originally proposed by Lazear19. 
The horizontal and vertical axes record age and the wage-to-VMP 
ratio, respectively. The line AE represents the VMP of a worker and 
the line BD represents the wage-age profile. We assume that VMP is 
constant through the whole period of the employment contract. At 
point B, the worker is hired and is paid wage B, which is below the 
VMP. His or her wage increases with age and is equal to the VMP at 
point C. After point C is reached, the worker’s wage exceeds the 
VMP, and deferred compensation (represented by area ABC) totally 
offsets the excess payment (area CDE) at point T, which represents the  
                                                 
17 Cf. Rebick, Marcuse E. (1995): Rewards in the afterlife. Late career job placements 
as incentives in the Japanese firm. 
18 Cf. Yamada, Atsuhiro (2000): Intai katei ni okeru chingin teika to shotoku hoshō 
[Wage reduction after quitting the career job. Implications for social policy]. 
19 Cf. Lazear (1979). 
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Figure 1: The wage, the VPM and the mandatory retirement age 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a: Possible options after amendment of the LSEOP 
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Figure 2b: Possible options after amendment of the LSEOP 
 
mandatory retirement age. If a worker cheats and the employer dis-
covers this, the worker will be fired and will lose the deferred com-
pensation. Therefore, this deferred compensation arrangement dis-
courages worker shirking or malfeasance. 
Figure 2a shows the two possible options for the enterprise when 
the amended LSEOP is introduced. Figure 2b shows the change of 
wage profile from BD to B'D'. The new deferred compensation ABC' 
matches C'D'E' under the less steep wage-age profile (B'D') and, 
therefore, the mandatory retirement age can be increased from T to T'. 
Many studies indicate that this option actually exists. By using 
Japanese micro data sets, Ohashi20, Clark and Ogawa21, and Mitani22 
found that higher ages of mandatory retirement are associated with 
lower wage growth with increased job tenure. By using the US Cur-
                                                 
20 Cf. Ohashi, Isao (1990): Rōdō shijō no riron [Labour market theory]. 
21 Cf. Clark, Robert L. and Naohiro Ogawa (1992): Effect of mandatory retirement on 
earnings profile in Japan. 
22  Cf. Mitani, Naoki (2003): Nenrei-chingin purofairu no henka to teinen enchō 
[Changes in age-wage profiles and the extension of mandatory retirement age]. 
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rent Population Survey, Hirsch et al.23 also found that steep wage pro-
files are associated with fewer older workers and fewer older hires. By 
using cross-sectional national data, the OECD24 found evidence of a 
negative relationship between the employment rate of males aged 55 
to 64 and the wages of male workers aged 55 to 59, relative to those of 
male workers aged 25 to 29.25 However, adjusting the steepness of the 
wage profile takes time because it requires falls in the current wages 
of all employees. Therefore, it may be relatively difficult to take this 
option in response to the amended LSEOP because there were only 
two years between the enactment and the enforcement of the amended 
law. 
Another option is to reduce the wage levels for periods T and T' by 
generating the new wage profile BDEF. In this new wage profile, the 
wage level represented by EF is equivalent to the VMP, as Figure 2b 
(p. 12) shows. This option only affects the wages of reemployed 
workers, but the associated wage contract may induce cheating by 
reemployed workers. This is because the deferred compensation has 
been already exhausted at the mandatory retirement age at T. It is dif-
ficult to reset an implicit contract for the relatively short period of 
continued employment between T and T'. Given that the typical man-
datory retirement age is 60 and given that, as of 2006, the amended 
LSEOP imposes an additional minimum of two years of continued 
employment, the period from T to T' is rather short. 
                                                 
23 Cf. Hirsch, Barry T., David A. Macpherson and Melissa A. Hardy (2000): Occupa-
tional age structure and access for older workers. 
24 Cf. OECD (2006). 
25 The OECD suggests that Japan is an exceptional case because a steep wage curve 
coexists with Japan’s high LFP rate for older people (OECD (2006)). 
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One solution, which may be acceptable to both enterprises and 
workers, is to reduce the wage level below the VMP (line BDE"F") 
and then utilize the ECB. The line BDGH indicates the sum of the 
wage fall and the ECB. If worker’s shirking or malfeasance is discov-
ered and the worker is fired, the worker will lose not only his or her 
wage but also the ECB. In addition, even if the worker is employed by 
some other enterprise and receives the ECB, his or her income is 
lower than BDGH because of the loss of his or her firm-specific skill. 
Therefore, enterprises can continuously employ their workers on low 
wages after they have reached the mandatory retirement age (T) and 
can simultaneously discourage workers from cheating by utilizing the 
ECB. By using the simple model, we investigate the relationship be-
tween the rate of continued employment on the one hand and the 
steepness of wage profile, the extent of wage reduction, and the utili-
zation of the ECB and other benefits, on the other. Concretely, we 
test: 1) whether enterprises that succeed in reducing wages after the 
mandatory retirement age by using the ECB and other benefits are 
more likely to employ older workers continuously after they have 
reached the mandatory retirement age; and 2) whether enterprises with 
less steep wage profiles are more likely to either set their mandatory 
retirement age above 60 or completely abolish mandatory retirement 
systems. For our analysis, we use new data from the SCEOE collected 
by the JILPT. 
The data and descriptions of variables 
The SCEOE 
Six months after the amended LSEOP was introduced, the JILPT con-
ducted the SCEOE in October 2006. Five thousand private sector en-
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terprises, each with more than 300 employees, were randomly sam-
pled from all over the country and asked a wide range of questions 
relating to the job security of older employees.26 The questionnaire 
was sent by mail and the effective response rate was 22 per cent. We 
excluded from the sample enterprises that did not respond to questions 
about wages, because this variable is crucial to our analysis. Some 
enterprises introduced a job security measure, but did not use it be-
cause they did not employ anyone aged 60 or over. We excluded these 
enterprises from our analysis because we are interested in how the rate 
of continued employment is determined. This data cleaning process 
eliminated 30 per cent of the enterprises surveyed; the final sample 
constitutes 700 enterprises. 
Definitions of subsamples and the dependent variables 
Corresponding to our two hypotheses, we create two subsamples for 
our analysis, as indicated in Table 2.  
Table 2: Subsamples 
Subsample A: N = 
687 
Enterprises that employ all older workers above age 60, and 
enterprises that employ some older workers above age 60 
Subsample B: N = 
470 
Enterprises with continuing employment systems that were 
actually utilized by their employees in the last three years, and 
with a mandatory retirement age of 60. This subsample is a 
subset of subsample A 
 
Subsample A is used to investigate the determinants of increases in 
the mandatory retirement age. This subsample covers all enterprises 
that introduced one of three job security measures for their older em-
ployees below the pensionable age: a) an upward revision of the man-
                                                 
26 Enterprises in the agriculture, forestry, fisheries and mining industries are also 
excluded from the sample. 
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datory retirement age; b) the introduction of continuing employment 
systems; or c) the abolition of mandatory retirement systems. Sub-
sample B is used to identify the determinants of continued employ-
ment, or the difference between the amount of ECB and other benefits 
and the rate of continued employment. This subsample comprises 
enterprises that have continuing employment systems that were actu-
ally utilized by their employees in the last three years, and that have a 
mandatory retirement age of 60. Subsample B is a subset of subsample 
A. We use the two dependent variables described in Table 3. 
Table 3: Definition of the dependent variables 
Variable Definition 
MR: Mandatory retirement 
age > 60 
A dummy variable that indicates whether the enterprise 
employs all (= 1) or some (= 0) older workers beyond age 
60 
CER: ln p/(1 – p) The average rate of continued employment in the last three 
years as a percentage of employees who reached their 
mandatory retirement age of 60 
The first is a dummy variable that indicates whether the enterprise 
has a mandatory retirement age exceeding 60. Thus, this variable 
splits subsample A into two groups, depending on whether the enter-
prise continuously employed all its workers beyond age 60 or not. The 
second dependent variable is the average rate of continued employ-
ment as a percentage of the number of employees who reached the 
mandatory retirement age of 60 in the last three years and is the prod-
uct of two variables: the proportion of applicants who wish to be con-
tinuously employed after reaching the mandatory retirement age of 60, 
and the approval rate of continued employment as a percentage of the 
number of applicants. 
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Definitions of the independent variables and the econometric model 
Corresponding to the two models to be estimated, Table 4 lists the 
independent variables and their expected effects (signs) on the contin-
ued employment of older workers. 
Table 4: Definitions of the independent variables 
Variable Description Sign 
W: average wage schedule 
(ln) 
The average wage schedule for university gradu-
ate employees. 
(+) 
WI: wage increase rate The annual rate of increase of the wage schedule 
for university graduate employees. 
(–) 
WD: wage reduction rate The rate of reduction in the wage schedule of 
university graduate employees who are conti-
nuously employed after the mandatory retirement 
age of 60. 
(+) 
PB: public benefits (10,000 
yen) 
The ECB and EPAE, which are received by 
workers continuously employed after the manda-
tory retirement age of 60.  The amount of benefit 
is calculated based on the wage schedule for 
university graduate employees. 
(+) 
PP: corporate pension 
benefits (10,000 yen) 
Corporate pension benefits, which are received 
by workers continuously employed after the 
mandatory retirement age of 60.  The calculated 
amount of benefit is based on the wage schedule 
for university graduate employees. 
(?) 
RE: growth rate of regular 
employment 
The average growth rate of regular employment 
in the last five years. 
(+) 
NG: hiring rate of young 
recruits 
The average hiring rate of young recruits (just 
out of education into work) in the last three years 
as a percentage of regular employment. 
(–) 
S: Firm size The number of employees, excluding temporary 
employees. 
 
I: Industry dummy Dummy variables, corresponding to construction; 
manufacturing; transportation; wholesale and 
retail trade; finance, insurance and real estate; 
services; and other industries. 
 
The first model is a probit model, which investigates the determi-
nants of increases in the mandatory retirement age. The model is: Pr(𝑀𝑅 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥) = 𝜙(𝑥′𝛽)   (1) 
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The vector of independent variables (x) contains the following: av-
erage wage schedule (W); wage increase rate (WI); growth rate of 
regular employment (RE); hiring rate of young recruits (NG); firm size 
(S); and industry dummies (I). We expect positive coefficients for W 
and RE. The average wage schedule is standardized to represent the 
wage schedule of university graduate employees, and hence, should 
proxy accumulate firm-specific skills. Higher firm-specific skill levels 
are expected to induce longer employment contracts. The growth rate 
of regular employment proxies enterprise labour demand, which is 
expected to increase the mandatory retirement age. As explained in 
Section 3.2, the less steep the wage profile, the easier for the enter-
prise to increase the mandatory retirement age. Therefore, we expect 
the coefficient of WI to be negative. The hiring rate of young recruits 
(NG) is another proxy for enterprise labour demand; however, it may 
also reflect the enterprise’s preference for employing younger em-
ployees. Ohta’s27 survey of the literature for Japan suggests that there 
is a trade-off between the employment of older workers and recruit-
ment; however, there is cross-country evidence to the contrary. 28 
Therefore, the expected sign of the NG coefficient is negative. Firm 
size (S) and the industry dummies (I) are used to control for other 
enterprise characteristics. The second model, estimated by using OLS, 
investigates whether enterprises that lower wages substantially for 
workers who reach the mandatory retirement age are more likely to 
employ older workers continuously. The model is: 
𝐶𝑃𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝑥𝛽  (2) 
                                                 
27 Cf. Ohta, Souchi (2003): Wakamono no shugyō kikai no genshō to gakuryoku teika 
mondai [Declining opportunity of younger employment and falling academic stan-
dards]. 
28 Cf. OECD (2006). 
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In this model, the vector of independent variables (x) contains the 
(already defined) W, WI, RE, NG, S, and I, as well as the wage reduc-
tion rate (WD), public benefits (PB), and corporation pension benefits 
(PP). For the reasons given above, we expect positive coefficients on 
W and RE, and negative coefficients on WI and NG. According to the 
simple model described in Section 3, the coefficients of WD and PB 
are expected to be negative and positive, respectively. The variable 
WD reflects how well the enterprise can adjust the wage levels of its 
continuing employees in relation to their VMPs after they reach the 
mandatory retirement age. Better wage adjustment is expected to in-
crease continued employment. The use of public benefits, particularly 
the ECB, to absorb wage reductions is expected to increase continued 
employment. Unlike public benefits, corporation pension benefits are 
expected to have an ambiguous effect even though these benefits play 
the same role in enterprises. However, given that corporation benefits 
are seen by employees as deferred payments, employees may view 
these benefits as further wage reductions and thus be deterred from 
continuing their employment. The summary statistics are reported in 
Table 5. 
Table 5: Summary statistics 
 
Subsample A Subsample B
Mean [ Std. Dev. ] Mean [ Std. Dev. ]
Dependent Variables
MR : Mandatory retirement age > age 60 0.045 [0.207 ]
CER : Continued employment rate = ARCE  x DRCE  (ln p/(1-p)) 2.061 [4.573 ]
(ARCE : Applicant rate for continued employment) 2.511 [4.522 ]
(DRCE : Adoption rate of applicants for continued employment) 9.305 [6.248 ]
Independent Variables
W : average wage schedule (ln) 12.745 [0.223 ] 12.748 [0.216 ]
WI : wage increase rate 0.035 [0.018 ] 0.035 [0.018 ]
WD : wage redeuction rate 0.510 [0.186 ]
PB : public benefits (10,000 yen) 4.463 [4.646 ]
PP : corporate pension benefits (10,000 yen) 2.054 [3.899 ]
RE : growth rate of regular employment -0.008 [0.131 ] -0.011 [0.127 ]
NG : hiring rate of young recruits 0.028 [0.030 ] 0.028 [0.029 ]
S : Firm size 1281.531 [2498.6 ] 1378.357 [2682.0 ]
I_C : construction industries 0.072 [0.258 ] 0.083 [0.276 ]
I_M : manufacturing industries 0.272 [0.445 ] 0.296 [0.456 ]
I_T : transportation industries 0.076 [0.265 ] 0.089 [0.286 ]
I_W : wholesale and retail trade industries 0.244 [0.430 ] 0.236 [0.425 ]
I_F : finance, insurance and real estate industries 0.035 [0.184 ] 0.032 [0.176 ]
I_S : services industries 0.173 [0.378 ] 0.164 [0.371 ]
I_O : other industries 0.128 [0.334 ] 0.100 [0.300 ]
N 712 470
Atsuhiro Yamada 
 
174 
Empirical results 
The wage schedule and continued employment 
We expect that the less steep the wage-age profile, the higher the 
mandatory retirement age. Figure 3 illustrates this relationship.  
 
Figure 3: The wage schedule by age and mandatory retirement 
(based on the wage schedule for university graduates; the wage at recruit-
ment = 100) 
There are two wage schedules: one for enterprises with a manda-
tory retirement age of 60, and one for those with a mandatory retire-
ment age of over 60. The former schedule applies to 95 per cent of 
enterprises. The wage schedule for enterprises with a mandatory re-
tirement age of 60 is higher than the other, particularly for workers 
between ages 40 and 55. In addition, wages fall more for workers over 
55 in enterprises that have a mandatory retirement age of 60. This 
suggests that enterprises with a mandatory retirement age of above 60 
have a less steep wage-age profile. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship 
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between the wage schedule and the CER after the mandatory retire-
ment age has been reached. 
 
Figure 4: The wage schedule by age and the CER after the mandatory retirement  
(based on the wage schedule for university graduates; the wage at recruit-
ment = 100 
The CER is based on the three-year average in each enterprise. The 
highest CER (of over 80 per cent) is recorded in enterprises with the 
lowest wage schedules in all age categories except at recruitment. 
However, the relationship between the wage schedule and the CER is 
unclear in enterprises with a CER of less than 80 per cent. 
Wage reductions, the utilization of public benefits  
and continued employment 
As explained in Section 3.2, it is not only the wage curve, but also 
wage reductions after the attainment of the mandatory retirement age 
and the utilization of public benefits that are important determinants of 
the CER. We expect large wage reductions to encourage enterprises to 
continuously employ their workers beyond the mandatory retirement 
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age. Table 6 shows the relationship between the CER and the targeted 
income level after the attainment of the mandatory retirement age of 
60.  
Table 6: The targeted income level and CER after the mandatory retirement age 
(based on wage schedule for university graduates in enterprises with continu-
ing employment systems) 
 
The targeted income considered by the enterprise is the sum of so-
cial security benefits (such as the ECB and EPAE), corporation pen-
sion benefits, and the wage. Table 6 shows that half the enterprises 
target the post-mandatory retirement income at age 60 to 70 per cent 
of the income before the mandatory retirement age. On the other hand, 
more than 30 per cent of the enterprises target the income level at 50 
per cent or less than the income at the mandatory retirement age. This 
suggests that wage reductions after the mandatory retirement age are 
quite substantial in some enterprises. Enterprises targeting the income 
level at 30 per cent to 40 per cent of the income at the mandatory re-
tirement age only pay wages of 100,000 yen. This amount is equiva-
lent to one-third of average wage for regular employees. With respect 
to the relationship between wage reductions and continued employ-
ment, the larger the reduction in wages, generally, the lower the CER. 
Targeted income level as a
percentage of income at
mandatory retirement age
Distribution
(%)
Wage (10,000
yen)
Wage as a
percentage of
average wage
(%)
CER  (%)
around 100% 5 31 99 65
           80 - 90% 15 30 98 69
           60 - 70% 48 22 72 66
50% 22 17 54 55
           30 - 40% 9 10 33 50
less than 30% 1 4 12 31
(N=470) 100 21 70 62
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This is contrary to our expectation. Let us now consider how enter-
prises utilize public benefits and corporation benefits to absorb these 
wage reductions. Table 7 reports the determinants of the wage levels 
of continuing employees. 
Table 7: Determinants of the wage levels of continuing employees 
(for enterprises with continuing employment system) 
 
Half the enterprises consider the wage level at the mandatory re-
tirement age for continuing employees. Thirty percent of enterprises 
take account of the EPAE or ECB when setting wages. This suggests 
that the social policies designed for older workers broadly affect wage 
setting by enterprises. Figure 5 (p. 24) shows the distribution of how 
enterprises utilize social benefits and corporation pensions to compen-
sate for wage falls after the mandatory retirement age. 
For this figure, enterprises that do not pay these benefits are ex-
cluded. Although the modes of the distributions of both benefits are 
between 20,000 and 40,000 yen, which is equivalent to between 6 per 
cent and 12 per cent of the average wage of regular workers, 20 per 
cent and 15 per cent of enterprises, respectively, pay out more than 
100,000 yen  in social benefits and corporation pensions as wage com- 
Determinants of wage standard （multiple answer） (%)
Average wages in the same industry 24
Average wages of the assigned job in the same industry 16
The Wage reached at mandatory retirement 52
Wage at the recruitment in the same enterprise 7
Benefits level of EPAE 30
Minimum wage in the region 5
Retirement benefits level 1
Benefits level of ECB 31
Other 5
（N=470） 100
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pensation. We classified the enterprises that introduced continuing 
employment systems into four types, depending on whether they used 
social benefits and/or corporation pensions to compensate for wage 
falls after the mandatory retirement age. The results are reported in 
Table 8. 
Table 8: Combinations of social benefits and corporate pensions used to maintain 
wages 
 
Twenty-seven percent of enterprises did not utilize either social 
benefits or corporate pensions to compensate for wage falls; of the 
four types, these enterprises paid the highest average monthly income 
of 320,000 yen. Seventy-four percent of enterprises used social bene-
Utilization of … Composition ratio of income (%) Ave. income
Social
Benefits
Corporate
Pensions Wage
Social
Benefits
Corporate
Pnesion
Total
income （10,000 yen）
1 No No 27 100 0 0 100 32.1 67
2 Yes No 40 74 26 0 100 29.1 63
3 No Yes 2 68 0 32 100 31.0 65
4 Yes Yes 32 60 18 21 100 28.3 58
（N=470） 100 73 19 9 100 28.1 62
 (%) CER （%）
  
Figure 5: Amounts of social benefits and corporation pension use to maintain income 
level 
(based on the wage schedule for university graduates; in 10.000 yen) 
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fits or corporate pensions that amount to 30 per cent to 40 per cent of 
their targeted incomes. Half of these enterprises utilized both social 
benefits and corporate pensions to compensate for wage falls. How-
ever, their average targeted income is the lowest of the four types. In 
terms of the relationship between the utilization of these benefits and 
the CER, enterprises that do not pay benefits have the highest CER of 
the four types. Enterprises that pay both benefits to compensate for 
wage falls have the lowest CERs. Because we cannot control for wage 
falls, the effect of using social benefits on the CER is unclear. Later, 
we attempt to control for these effects when estimating the OLS 
model. To summarize the results in this section, the less steep the 
wage curve, the higher the mandatory retirement age and the CER; 
however, wage reductions seem to lower the CER, contrary to our 
expectation. 
The relationship between wage setting and the  
mandatory retirement age 
As already mentioned, upward revision of the mandatory retirement 
age is an effective way of providing job security for older employees 
relative to the introduction of a continuing employment system. This 
is because the former guarantees that all workers are employed up to 
the mandatory retirement age under the lifetime employment system 
for regular employees in Japan, whereas the latter allows enterprises 
to choose from applicants for continuing employment contracts after 
the mandatory retirement age is reached. Table 9 reports our probit 
estimates. 
The dependent variable is whether the enterprise’s mandatory re-
tirement age is above 60 (= 1) or not (= 0). Remember that, before the 
amendment  of the LSEOP, age 60  was the most common  mandatory  
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Table 9: The determinants of an increased mandatory retirement age 
(probit estimates; marginal effects (∂F/∂x)) 
 
Note: Subsample A is used for estimation. *** implies 1% significance, ** implies 5% 
significance, and * implies 10% significance. The manufacturing industry is the base for 
the industry dummies. Because all enterprises from the finance, insurance and real 
estate industry in our sample have a mandatory retirement age above 60, we excluded 
these enterprises from our sample. 
retirement age in Japan. For the analysis of this section, enterprises 
that completely abolished mandatory retirement were categorized as 
the former group because of their small sample size. The preferred 
model is (3). Our results suggest that the wage system is a key deter-
minant of the mandatory retirement age. The average wage schedule 
(W), which can be regarded as an indicator of accumulated firm-
specific skills, has a positive effect on the mandatory retirement age. 
The wage increase rate (WI) reduces the probability of an increased 
mandatory retirement at a statistically significant level. A one percent 
increase in the slope induces a 1.5 per cent decrease in the probability 
that an enterprise sets the mandatory retirement age above age 60. 
These results are consistent with empirical results in Ōhashi29, Clark 
                                                 
29 Cf. Ōhashi (1990). 
Dependent Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
MR : Mandatory retirement age > age 60 dF/dx [Std. Err.] dF/dx [Std. Err.] dF/dx [Std. Err.]
Independent variables
W : average wage schedule (ln) 0.100 [0.040 ] ** 0.098 [0.040 ] ** 0.092 [0.037 ] **
WI : wage increase rate -1.621 [0.537 ] *** -1.611 [0.535 ] *** -1.498 [0.503 ] ***
RE : growth rate of regular employment -0.048 [0.047 ] -0.021 [0.044 ]
NG : hiring rate of young recruits -0.628 [0.263 ] **
S : Firm size 0.000 [0.000 ] 0.000 [0.000 ] 0.000 [0.000 ]
I_C : construction industries 0.076 [0.061 ] * 0.072 [0.060 ] * 0.061 [0.055 ]
I_T : transportation industries 0.136 [0.072 ] *** 0.136 [0.072 ] *** 0.108 [0.065 ] ***
I_W : wholesale and retail trade industries -0.001 [0.023 ] 0.000 [0.023 ] 0.008 [0.024 ]
I_F : finance, insurance and real estate industries
I_S : services industries 0.100 [0.047 ] *** 0.106 [0.048 ] *** 0.097 [0.047 ] ***
I_O : other industries 0.064 [0.046 ] * 0.063 [0.046 ] * 0.074 [0.049 ] **
Log likelihood -114.546 -114.011 -110.716
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.119 0.144
obs. P. 0.047 0.047 0.047
pred. P. 0.031 0.030 0.027
N 687 687 687
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and Ogawa30, and Mitani31, with our predictions, and with Figure 3 (p. 
20). While the rate of increase in regular employment (RE) does not 
significantly affect the mandatory retirement age, the hiring rate of 
young recruits (NG) correlates negatively with the mandatory retire-
ment age. A one percentage point increase in NG lowers the probabil-
ity of an increased mandatory retirement age by six percentage points 
at a statistically significant level.32 This result suggests that there is a 
trade-off between the employment of younger and older workers in 
Japan33, in terms of a higher mandatory retirement age. 
The relationship between wage setting and the CER 
We now use OLS to investigate how the CER is determined. Most 
enterprises chose continuing employment systems as a job security 
measure in response to the amendment to the LSEOP, rather than rais-
ing the mandatory retirement age. Table 10 reports OLS estimates of 
the determinants of the CER. 
The estimating sample is enterprises with a mandatory retirement 
age of 60 in which employees used continuing employment systems in 
the last three years (i.e., subsample B). Again, the preferred model is 
(3). The average wage schedule (W) is not statistically significant in 
all three models. A powerful predictor of the CER is the wage reduc-
tion rate after the mandatory retirement age (WD); however, the sign 
is negative, contrary to our expectation. This result implies that wage 
falls might discourage older people from staying with enterprises. We 
investigate this  hypothesis in  the next section.  The coefficient on the  
                                                 
30 Cf. Clark, Ogawa (1992). 
31 Cf. Mitani (2003). 
32 Putting these two variables into our regressions separately did not change our re-
sults. 
33 Cf. Ohta (2003). 
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Table 10: OLS estimates of the determinants of the CER 
 
Note: Subsample B is used for estimation. *** implies 1% significance, **implies 5% 
significance, and * implies 10% significance. The manufacturing industry is the base for 
the industry dummies. 
growth rate of regular employment in the last five years (RE) is posi-
tive and implies that a one percentage point increase in RE results in a 
five percentage point increase in the CER. In other words, increased 
enterprise labour demand substantially raises the CER. Unlike in the 
model for increases in the mandatory retirement age, the hiring rate of 
young recruits (NG) is not statistically significant.34 The amount of 
corporation pension benefits (PP) used to compensate for wage reduc-
tions has a negative effect on the CER, although it is only marginally 
significant. This may reflect the fact that employees consider corpo-
rate pension benefits as deferred wages. Older workers would leave 
enterprises that use corporation pension benefits because otherwise 
they would have lost some part of their lifetime wages, which includes 
deferred wages in the form of corporation pension benefits. The nega-
                                                 
34 Putting RE and NG into our regressions separately did not change our results. 
Dependent Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
CER : Continued employment rate Coef. [Std. Err.] Coef. [Std. Err.] Coef. [Std. Err.]
Independent variables
W : average wage schedule (ln) 0.825 [1.529 ] 1.038 [1.536 ] 0.752 [1.531 ]
WI : wage increase rate 15.073 [17.68 ] 16.809 [17.74 ] 19.208 [17.70 ]
WD : wage redeuction rate -5.837 [1.116 ] *** -5.393 [1.285 ] *** -4.846 [1.296 ] ***
PB : public benefits (10,000 yen) 0.057 [0.048 ] 0.045 [0.048 ]
PP : corporate pension benefits (10,000 yen) -0.116 [0.059 ] * -0.115 [0.059 ] *
RE : growth rate of regular employment 4.555 [1.658 ] ***
NG : hiring rate of young recruits -1.471 [7.363 ]
S : Firm size 0.000 [0.000 ] 0.000 [0.000 ] 0.000 [0.000 ]
I_C : construction industries -0.060 [0.803 ] -0.070 [0.801 ] 0.115 [0.799 ]
I_T : transportation industries 0.565 [0.779 ] 0.560 [0.776 ] 0.639 [0.778 ]
I_W : wholesale and retail trade industries 1.311 [0.556 ] ** 1.310 [0.555 ] ** 1.457 [0.554 ] ***
I_F : finance, insurance and real estate industries 0.015 [1.193 ] 0.061 [1.198 ] 0.456 [1.199 ]
I_S : services industries 2.696 [0.628 ] *** 2.645 [0.629 ] *** 2.554 [0.627 ] ***
I_O : other industries 0.748 [0.749 ] 0.729 [0.747 ] 0.927 [0.755 ]
Constant -6.814 [18.96 ] -9.840 [19.08 ] -6.492 [19.01 ]
F value 5.890 *** 5.390 *** 5.220 ***
Adj. R2 0.095 0.101 0.112
N 470 470 470
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tive effect of PP indicates that the CER is determined on the labour 
supply side; we examine this in the next section. 
The relationship between the wage system and the application rate 
for continued employment 
Contrary to the prediction in Table 4 (p. 17), wage reductions reduce 
the CER. This may be because wage falls and the use of corporate 
pension benefits affect the labour supply side rather than the labour 
demand side. To examine this, we separately model the application 
rate of older employees for continuing employment contracts (ARCE) 
and the adoption rate of applicants by enterprises (DRCE). Recall that 
the product of these two rates is equal to the CER. Table 11 reports 
our OLS estimates for ARCE. 
Table 11: OLS estimates of the determinants of the application rate for continued 
employment 
 
Note: Subsample B is used for estimation. *** implies 1% significance, **implies 5% 
significance, and * implies 10% significance. The manufacturing industry is the base 
for the industry dummies. 
Dependent Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
ARCE : Applicant rate Coef. [Std. Err.] Coef. [Std. Err.] Coef. [Std. Err.]
Independent variables
W : average wage schedule (ln) -0.152 [1.508 ] 0.195 [1.513 ] -0.036 [1.509 ]
WI : wage increase rate 25.533 [17.43 ] 28.810 [17.47 ] * 30.259 [17.44 ] *
WD : wage redeuction rate -5.398 [1.100 ] *** -4.472 [1.266 ] *** -4.012 [1.277 ] ***
PB : public benefits (10,000 yen) 0.028 [0.047 ] 0.016 [0.047 ]
PP : corporate pension benefits (10,000 yen) -0.143 [0.059 ] ** -0.140 [0.058 ] **
RE : growth rate of regular employment 4.445 [1.633 ] ***
NG : hiring rate of young recruits -5.955 [7.254 ]
S : Firm size 0.000 [0.000 ] 0.000 [0.000 ] 0.000 [0.000 ]
I_C : construction industries -0.085 [0.792 ] -0.119 [0.789 ] 0.038 [0.787 ]
I_T : transportation industries 0.557 [0.768 ] 0.560 [0.764 ] 0.572 [0.767 ]
I_W : wholesale and retail trade industries 1.232 [0.548 ] ** 1.207 [0.546 ] ** 1.363 [0.546 ] **
I_F : finance, insurance and real estate industries -0.169 [1.177 ] -0.232 [1.180 ] 0.154 [1.182 ]
I_S : services industries 2.915 [0.619 ] *** 2.912 [0.620 ] *** 2.803 [0.618 ] ***
I_O : other industries 0.715 [0.739 ] 0.698 [0.735 ] 0.960 [0.744 ]
Constant 5.418 [18.70 ] 0.560 [18.80 ] 3.411 [18.73 ]
F value 6.160 *** 5.720 *** 5.490 ***
Adj. R2 0.099 0.108 0.118
N 470 470 470
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We use the same set of independent variables as that used for CER. 
The wage fall (WD) in the preferred model (3) is statistically signifi-
cant; a one percentage point wage fall after the mandatory retirement 
age reduces the application rate for continued employment (ARCE) by 
four percentage points. This indicates that wage reductions affect la-
bour supply behaviour. The amount of corporation pension benefits 
(PP) paid to compensate for wage reductions is statistically significant 
at the 5 per cent level and its coefficient is negative. As we discussed 
in the previous section, older workers may consider corporate pension 
benefits as deferred wages; therefore, older workers may see these 
benefits as reducing their lifetime wages. Our results support this 
view. Based on the F-values, the overall significance of the models for 
DRCE is much lower than for the ARCE models. This is shown by the 
preferred model (3) in Table 12. 
Table 12: OLS estimates of the determinants of the adoption rate of applicants 
 
Note: Subsample B is used for estimation. *** implies 1% significance, **implies 5% 
significance, and * implies 10% significance. The manufacturing industry is the base 
for the industry dummies. 
Dependent Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
DRCE : Adoption rate of applicants Coef. [Std. Err.] Coef. [Std. Err.] Coef. [Std. Err.]
Independent variables
W : average wage schedule (ln) 2.007 [2.181 ] 1.803 [2.197 ] 1.416 [2.194 ]
WI : wage increase rate 4.786 [25.21 ] 1.994 [25.37 ] 5.510 [25.36 ]
WD : wage redeuction rate -3.640 [1.591 ] ** -4.579 [1.838 ] ** -3.846 [1.857 ] **
PB : public benefits (10,000 yen) 0.112 [0.068 ] * 0.098 [0.068 ]
PP : corporate pension benefits (10,000 yen) -0.007 [0.085 ] -0.007 [0.085 ]
RE : growth rate of regular employment 5.761 [2.375 ] **
NG : hiring rate of young recruits 0.580 [10.55 ]
S : Firm size 0.000 [0.000 ] ** 0.000 [0.000 ] ** 0.000 [0.000 ] **
I_C : construction industries -1.283 [1.145 ] -1.229 [1.145 ] -0.983 [1.145 ]
I_T : transportation industries -0.321 [1.111 ] -0.347 [1.110 ] -0.211 [1.115 ]
I_W : wholesale and retail trade industries 0.253 [0.793 ] 0.312 [0.793 ] 0.490 [0.794 ]
I_F : finance, insurance and real estate industries 1.643 [1.702 ] 1.953 [1.714 ] 2.453 [1.718 ]
I_S : services industries 1.159 [0.895 ] 1.005 [0.900 ] 0.901 [0.898 ]
I_O : other industries 1.700 [1.069 ] 1.682 [1.068 ] 1.894 [1.082 ] *
Constant -14.614 [27.05 ] -11.925 [27.29 ] -7.466 [27.23 ]
F value 1.620 * 1.580 * 1.810 **
Adj. R2 0.013 0.015 0.024
N 470 470 470
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Interestingly, wage falls (WD) significantly lower DRCE. How-
ever, PP is not significant in these models. Given the ARCE results, 
there may be reverse causality between WD and DRCE. Enterprises 
that do not want to continuously employ their older workers would cut 
wages substantially after they reach the mandatory retirement age to 
deter them from applying for continuous employment. Unfortunately, 
our data set is cross sectional, and panel data is needed to investigate 
this possible causality; however, the descriptive results shown in the 
next section seem to support our argument. 
Labor cost is not a challenge for continued employment in most 
enterprises 
The SCEOE asks about challenges to promoting continued employ-
ment after the mandatory retirement age. Descriptive results for the 
responses to this question are shown in Table 13. 
Table 13: Challenges to continued employment (multiple responses) 
 
The main challenges are the difficulty of setting tasks for older 
workers in the enterprise (41 per cent) and managing administrative 
positions after the mandatory retirement age (41 per cent). It is note-
Challenges　（multiple responses） (%) Challenges　（multiple responses） (%)
It is difficult to set tasks for older workers in
the enterprise 40.9
The labor union or employee representation
opposes continued employment. 1.8
It is difficult to find out jobs for older workers
in the affiliated companies. 12.6
The work ethic of younger and prime-aged
employees will deteriorate 16.2
It is difficult to arrange facilities or equipments
for the older workers. 8.7 Labor costs will increase. 13.1
The lack of know-how for managing older
workers. 20.1 The productivuty of the enterprise will decline. 9.7
It is difficult to arrange administrative
positions. 41.2 Other reasons. 2.2
It is difficult to arrange compensation and
benefits packages for continuing employees. 26.4 There is no barrier to continued employment. 16.6
(N=712) 100.0 (N=712) 100.0
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worthy that only 13 per cent of enterprises consider the increased la-
bour costs generated by continued employment to be a challenge. This 
is presumably because most enterprises introduced reemployment 
systems and can substantially reduce wage levels after the mandatory 
retirement age. In fact, 70 per cent of enterprises say that wage reduc-
tions will offset increased labour costs. These wage reductions will 
decrease the application rate for continued employment. In this re-
spect, the amended LSEOP is not a panacea for strengthening the job 
security of older workers after they reach the mandatory retirement 
age. This is because enterprises retain a free hand in controlling wage 
levels and can thereby lower the application rate for continuing em-
ployment contracts. 
Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we examined the effect of the Law for the Stabilization 
of Employment of Older Persons (LSEOP), which was enforced in 
2006 and obliges enterprises to take one of the following three job 
security measures for their employees, in line with an upward revision 
of the pensionable age: a) any increase in the mandatory retirement 
age that exceeds the current pensionable age; b) the introduction of 
continuing employment systems; or c) the complete abolition of man-
datory retirement systems. By using a new data set constructed by the 
Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, we identified the de-
terminants of continued employment and increases in the mandatory 
retirement age. To summarize, our findings are as follows: 
• The less steeply the wage schedule rises, the less likely is an enter-
prise to set the mandatory retirement beyond age 60; a one percent 
decrease in the steepness of the wage schedule induces a two per-
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centage point increase in the probability that an enterprise sets its 
mandatory retirement beyond age 60. However, there is no signifi-
cant effect on the continued employment rate. 
• The more the enterprise recruits young people who have just left 
education, the less likely is the enterprise to set the mandatory re-
tirement beyond age 60; a one percentage point increase in young 
recruits lowers the probability of an increase in the mandatory re-
tirement to beyond age 60 by six percentage points; however there 
is no significant effect on the continued employment rate. 
• The more an enterprise reduces wages after the mandatory retire-
ment age, the less likely are older workers to stay; a one percentage 
point fall in the rate of wage reduction for workers who have 
reached the mandatory retirement age reduces the application rate 
for continuing employment contracts by four percentage points. 
• The more an enterprise utilizes corporation pension benefits to 
compensate for wage reductions after the mandatory retirement 
age, the less likely are older workers stay; a 10,000 yen increase in 
corporate pensions to compensate workers beyond the mandatory 
retirement age for wage reductions lowers the application rate for 
continued employment by 14 percentage points. 
• The higher the number of regular worker employed by an enter-
prise, the more likely are older workers to stay; a one percentage 
point increase in the growth rate of regular employment raises the 
continued employment rate by five percentage points, but there is 
no significant effect on the mandatory retirement age. 
The most important of the above findings is that enterprises can use 
wage reductions to discourage continued employment. Moreover, the 
amended LSEOP allows enterprises with continuing employment sys-
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tems to select workers for continued employment under the explicit 
rules agreed to with labour unions or employee representatives. 
This means that, in practice, the amended LSEOP has a limited ef-
fect on the job security of older workers. However, strengthening job 
security by further amending the LSEOP may have side effects. Job 
security could be strengthened by raising the mandatory retirement 
age or by abolishing mandatory retirement for all enterprises. This 
would be more effective to increase job security for older employees 
relative to the introduction of the continued employment system. This 
is because raising the mandatory retirement age or abolishing manda-
tory retirement would ensure that all workers would be employed up 
to the mandatory retirement age under Japan’s lifetime employment 
system for regular employees. However, had the LSEOP imposed one 
of these two options on all enterprises, enterprises would have em-
ployed fewer young recruits, which would have distorted the labour 
market, as our first finding above suggests. 
In this sense, the limited effect of LSEOP is desirable, even if it is 
not a panacea for the job security of older employees. Nevertheless, if 
there is steady economic growth and population ageing generates a 
serious shortage of labour supply, wage reductions will be suppressed; 
therefore, the continued employment rate will increase. Our results 
suggest a positive relationship between the continued employment rate 
and regular employment. In such circumstances, the LSEOP would 
effectively enhance the job security of older workers. 
The Effectiveness of New Job Security Measure 
 
189 
List of abbreviations  
 
LSEOP Law for the Stabilisation of Employment of Older Per-
sons 
LFR Labour Force Participation 
JILPT Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training 
SCEOE Survey of the Continued Employment of Older Employ-
ees 
CER Continued Employment Rate 
EP Employees Pension 
ECB the Employment Continuation Benefit for the Aged 
EPAE Old-aged EP for Active Employees 
VMP Value of the Marginal Productivity 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
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CHRISTIAN TAGSOLD 
Comparing Social Policies:  
The Long-term Care Insurance as a Case 
Abstract 
In the field of long-term care insurance looking at both Germany’s 
and Japan’s approach means not only to compare policies but to ana-
lyze processes of translation between political fields as Germany’s 
system has obviously influenced Japan’s decisions. On a regional 
level, the introduction of the long-term care insurance has led to 
anxieties as well as euphoria in Japan. While the insurance was wel-
comed as a step towards more regional political independence, local 
politics and specialists did not feel ready for some of the changes. One 
way to gain a better understanding of the new system was to learn 
more about the German system. As the example Fukuoka shows, bu-
reaucratics and specialists with different backgrounds of knowledge 
did discuss the German example on different levels, which stipulated 
various processes of contextual translation that helped to develop ap-
proaches to specific problems. Gregory Kasza’s concept of diffusion, 
which seeks to explain the similarities between different welfare states, 
including Japan, can therefore be extended to include the notion of 
translation. 
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Introduction 
Since the second half of the last century, Japan has rapidly expanded 
economically. Today, despite two financial crises within two decades, 
the country remains one of the world’s three most powerful economic 
powerhouses. This remarkable level of success has raised questions 
about the conditions that preceded it. Especially because Japan is an 
Asian country, making its classification as a “Western” nation seem 
odd, the country has been studied thoroughly. But as an outsider, Ja-
pan was always seen either as a blueprint for the modernization of 
non-Western countries or as an exception to be explained. Over the 
last two decades, a changing world has cooled discussion of Japan’s 
special character, and other countries have entered the picture. China 
or India are now considered likely replacements for the struggling 
Japanese, but even as the phenomenon of Non-Western modernization 
has spread, the questions surrounding the conditions that lead to it 
remain. 
Given this background, it is no surprise that scrutiny of Japan’s 
success has long been built around a core of comparisons between that 
country and the West. After all, modernity has been seen as a realm of 
the West, and the success of Japan in achieving modernity as defined 
by economic growth, political integration and lifestyle changes did not 
lead to this idea being rethought but to Japan being classified as part 
of the Western world. Despite this inclusion, Japan’s status has re-
mained that of the “other”, a situation that allowed for comparisons 
and a better understanding of the conditions preceding modernity. 
Other states, such as third world countries, could not have served as 
such interesting objects of comparison, as the extent to which they lag 
behind the West precludes their serving as alter-others. 
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The notion of “development” or “progress” invoked here is another 
part of the problem. Economic comparisons arguing in these terms 
have been formulated within the paradigm of modernity. One common 
topic of comparison has been Japanese social policy, which was often 
seen as lagging behind the western standard.1 By keeping standards of 
social welfare deliberately low, it was argued, Japan was able to cut 
costs and gain an unfair market advantage. On the other hand, the 
strong involvement of companies in providing welfare was acknowl-
edged and raised again questions as to whether the concept of “Japan 
Inc.” as a big family was the ideal model for success. 
Comparisons of Japan’s and western social policies thus have some 
tradition, albeit to a limited extent. But this tradition has been riddled 
with theoretical problems and blind spots. Since the main objective 
was to point out the differences in systems and explain the conse-
quences, a methodological nationalism was introduced to produce 
results.2 Japan, and in reversal Western countries, were conceptualized 
as entities closed off from each other. Mutual learning or influence 
was considered only for limited historical time periods. For the Meiji 
Era as well as for US occupation after WWII, learning effects on the 
Japanese side were conceded, but often enough, culturalist arguments 
eradicated even these allusions to entanglements3 of knowledge. 
                                                 
1 Terms such as “development”, “progress” or “lagging behind” are often used to 
imply a temporal lag between the West and Non-Western countries. Johannes Fabian 
(1983) has deconstructed this dichotomization along spatial and temporal categories 
in his book Time and the other. How anthropology makes its object. 
2 Cf. Beck, Ulrich and Edgar Grande (2006): Cosmopolitan Europe, 174. 
3 Entanglement is a term introduced by Conrad and Shalini which expresses very well 
interdependences on political, social and semantical levels (Conrad, Sebastian and 
Randeria Shalini (2002): Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in 
den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften [Beyond eurocentrism. Postcolonoial 
perspectives in historical and cultural studies]). 
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However, comparisons of welfare systems that fail to acknowledge 
that systems learn from each other and are deeply entangled are no 
longer sustainable, especially in cases such as that of long-term care 
insurance in Japan. Introduced in 2000, it was strongly influenced by 
the German example, which was in turn derived partly from the ex-
ample of the Dutch. Welfare systems are not stand-alone projects ow-
ing their shape only to the culture they are placed in. This entangle-
ment of systems has to be described and analyzed theoretically. In the 
following I therefore want to employ data gathered in a fieldwork 
project during the first two years after the introduction of long-term 
care insurance to formulate ideas about how knowledge crossing the 
borders between welfare systems circulated in Japan. To do this, I will 
consider methodological nationalism in more detail, first concentrat-
ing mainly on Gøsta Esping-Andersen and his book about the “three 
worlds of welfare.”4 While this book is now nearly two decades old, it 
is still inspiring new culturalist theories related to the comparison of 
welfare systems in Japan. Gregory Kasza has written an excellent 
study of the development of Japanese welfare, which is based on the 
ideas presented by Esping-Anderson and refutes many culturalist ar-
guments. But Kasza offers no convincing theory of how knowledge 
moves between systems.5 At this point, the observations of the previ-
ously mentioned fieldwork will be introduced to form a clear picture 
of translation as a major factor. Knowledge and its translation during 
the process of introducing the new insurance will be analyzed on mul-
tiple levels. Firstly, the insurance itself is a product of translational 
and relational processes. Additionally, the formation of regional and 
                                                 
4 See Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1991): The three worlds of welfare capitalism. 
5 Cf. Kasza, Gregory James (2006): One world of welfare: Japan in comparative 
perspective. Cornell studies in political economy. 
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local knowledge about the new system depended on translation. Yet, 
as I will try to show in the end, translations can fail and cause distur-
bance and ambiguities, which ultimately can be seen to be productive 
in forming knowledge, as well, and should not be seen as simple cases 
of misunderstanding. 
Theories of Comparing Social Welfare 
Comparing social policies has been a fruitful field of analysis in recent 
decades, but in my eyes it has some serious shortcomings. Especially 
in area studies such as East Asian Studies, or Japanologie, the even 
more limited German terminology, this sort of approach has often led 
to a kind of double self-exotification. Japan has so often been pre-
sented as a special case with special rules – even Esping-Andersen 
made this point6 – that it has led East-Asian Studies to use this special 
case as self-legitimatory repository for academic auto-exotification. In 
the end, container-like images of a closed culture with a depending 
social-system have been created. 
This only mirrors the situation of the much broader stream of com-
parative analysis in Japan, which has shown the same strong tendency 
to define its case as special. Since Gøsta Esping-Andersen has been 
widely read the last decades in Japanese welfare studies, this tendency 
has gained even more ground. While many Japanese researchers have 
realized the problematic stance of nihonjinron (Japanese discourse) as 
a genre of auto-orientalism, the Scandinavian capacity gave new 
credibility for setting Japan’s case apart. 
                                                 
6 Cf. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1997): Hybrid or unique? The Japanese welfare state 
between Europe and America, 180f. 
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Esping-Andersen’s groundbreaking works 7  have certainly deep-
ened the tendency toward Japanese auto-orientalism in welfare studies, 
not so much because he himself set up a theoretical framework fur-
thering the container view, but because his theories can be easily mis-
read. His book The three worlds of welfare capitalism, published first 
in 1990, which can surely be called the bible of comparative welfare-
state analysis, treats the national welfare regimes that are its objects as 
distinct entities not connected to each other for analytical reasons. To 
allow cross-sectional quantitative analysis, 18 countries are modelled 
as auto-genetic welfare regimes which can be clustered but do not 
relate to each other beyond that. Though three types of welfare-
regimes – liberal, conservative and social-democratic – are analyzed 
in their genetic development since the mid-19th century, Esping-
Andersen nowhere explains how countries within these regimes ex-
change information and come to resemble each other. Because the 
regimes cluster geographically or connect historically, the liberal cen-
tred in the Anglo-American sphere, the conservative in Central Europe 
and the social-democratic in Scandinavian countries, it seems implic-
itly obvious that there has been a regional consensus based on ex-
change of information. But this only deepens the danger of misinter-
preting Esping-Andersen’s comparison of welfare regimes. A geo-
graphically based categorization reminiscent of Huntington’s8 right-
fully much-criticized The clash of civilizations and the remaking of 
world order comes to mind. 
                                                 
7 Cf. Esping-Andersen (1991), Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (Ed.) (1996): Welfare states 
in transition. National adaptations in global economies and Esping-Andersen (1997). 
8 Cf. Huntington, Samuel P. (1996): The clash of civilizations and the remaking of 
world order. 
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Japan is treated in passing by Esping-Andersen in the “Three 
worlds”. But the analysis is highly superficial even keeping in mind 
Esping-Andersen’s warning that he has to work with oversimplifica-
tion in order to get the big picture.9 In the first part of The three 
worlds of welfare capitalism, Japan is clustered mostly with countries 
like Germany, Italy, France or Finland, which are categorized as con-
servative and etaist.10 As a historical explanation, Catholicism is cited 
along with the fascist past of some of these countries.11 While Japan’s 
case might be explained by the fascist argument, Catholicism is surely 
no reason for its welfare regime. In other words, Esping-Andersen 
ignores Japan to make a point for the rest of the cluster. Other parts of 
the book cut out Japan completely though it might have been an inter-
esting case for comparison. When discussing full employment, which 
was only maintained in Scandinavian countries following the 1970s 
oil shocks, Japan would have been the obvious exception. Seven years 
after his initial treatment, Esping-Andersen took up the case of Japan 
more thoroughly in a paper claiming that the country should not be 
classified at all yet because “it is arguably the case that the Japanese 
welfare system is still in the process of evolution”.12  
This conclusion was not very convincing and the lacuna in argu-
mentation has thus incited Japanese researches to develop their own 
category for Japan and/or Asia generally within Esping-Andersen’s 
framework, an effort which in a sense resembles similar undertakings 
by their western colleagues.13 In applying geographical logic and us-
                                                 
9  Cf. Esping-Anderson (1991), 2. 
10 See for example Esping-Anderson (1991), 52. 
11 Ibid., 53. 
12 Cf. Esping-Andersen (1997), 187. 
13 Cf. Goodman, Roger and Ito Peng (1996): The East Asian welfare states. Peripatetic 
learning, adaptive change and nation-building. 
Christian Tagsold 
 
200 
ing Esping-Andersen’s strong leaning toward historical-genetic analy-
sis, Japan and/or Asia is constructed as its own, fourth world of wel-
fare. The undertaking is lavishly funded by state agencies, which have 
long been on the side of auto-orientalism with regard to welfare. Fur-
thermore, the Asian world of welfare is not only constructed around 
Esping-Andersen’s logic but also built on Weberian theses. Popular 
readings of Weber have long used the nexus of religion and economy 
to claim that Japan constitutes a case of its own with a strong tradition 
of indigenous development of modern capitalism.14 In their analysis of 
welfare states, these readings ultimately arrive at conclusions stressing 
the Confucian or Buddhist influence in the east.15 Mixed with Esping-
Andersen’s worlds of welfare capitalism, the auto-orientalist cocktail 
tends to get theoretically poisonous as it nears itself to short-sighted 
categorizations of the world in Huntington-like style. 
Of course, political decisions in the field of welfare are often made 
at a national level, and political discourses tend to legitimize them-
selves by means of culturalistic arguments. Therefore, political analy-
sis and comparison have to deal with politicians’ culturalistic argu-
ments. The idea of a Japanese welfare society based on traditional 
family values, coined in the late 1970s, is but one example of this, and 
has been criticized and deconstructed quite convincingly a number of 
times.16 But one has to go further than that. As Gregory Kasza has 
                                                 
14  Cf. Bellah, Robert N. (1957): Tokugawa religion. The values of pre-industrial 
Japan. 
15 Cf. Esping-Andersen (1997), 181 and Rieger, Elmar and Stephan Leibfried (2004): 
Kultur versus Globalisierung. Sozialpolitische Theologie in Konfuzianismus und 
Christentum [Culture versus globalisation. Socio-political theology in Confucianism 
and Christianity]. 
16 Cf. Campbell, John Creighton (1992): How policies change. The Japanese govern-
ment and the ageing society, 220, and Takahashi, Mutsuko (1997): The emergence of 
welfare society in Japan, 142−166. 
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shown in 2006 in his excellent book One world of welfare: Japan in 
comparative perspectives, Japan is not an extraordinary case when 
compared to other nations of the so-called Western world. Hence, all 
claims that Japan’s welfare is exceptional can ultimately be disre-
garded. Roger Goodman, Gordon White and Huck-ju Kwon have 
termed such theories “welfare-orientalism”17, linking them to Edward 
Said’s description of orientalism18. In most areas where welfare states 
normally provide insurance, such as occupational accidents, health, or 
unemployment, Japan is average or has introduced some of the central 
elements of welfare rather earlier than later, considering its general 
economical development. Kasza refutes popular prejudices which 
present Japan as a late-comer in terms of developing a welfare state. 
He concludes: 
We have established that Japan was early or average in the timing of all its 
first welfare policies […] and that its welfare spending has not differed 
sharply from that of other countries at comparable levels of economical de-
velopment and population age.19 
He also discards culturalistic approaches as misleading when looking 
at the contents and semantics of Japanese welfare. Kasza thus strongly 
questions Esping-Andersen’s models, leading to the question of why 
Japan has followed typical lines of development for its welfare-state. 
Esping-Andersen’s answer comes down to pointing out structural 
similarities which have shaped overall spending for welfare, while 
political peculiarities account for differences resulting in the three (or 
four) worlds. 
                                                 
17 Cf. Goodman, Roger, Gordon White and Huck-ju Kwon (1998): The East Asian 
welfare model. Welfare orientalism and the state. Vol. ESRC Pacific Asia programme. 
18 Cf. Said, Edward W. (1978): Orientalism. 
19 Kasza (2006), 80. 
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Kasza is on the right track in his search for a different answer. As 
an explanation he offers the diffusion of ideas, by which countries 
learn from each other when developing welfare.20 This is quite appar-
ent when considering the history of Japan since the 1868 Meiji Resto-
ration. At that time, foreign experts were called to help rebuild the 
country and local experts were sent into the West to study. But while 
the level of Kasza’s analysis is highly impressive and hits the mark 
consistently, the concept of diffusion seems an oversimplification in 
explaining how notions of welfare were introduced in Japan, or how 
Japan has shared its own experiences with the rest of the world. 
Instead of diffusion, translation is a more appropriate term for de-
scribing how ideas of welfare cross the borders of nation-states and 
influence each other. Translation is not only important on the level of 
national politics, but equally if not more significant at the level of 
bringing politics to life on the spot, that is in the case of care for old-
aged people, care-homes, group-homes etc. In the following I would 
like to introduce some ethnographical examples, which serve to dem-
onstrate how such processes of translation look on the ground, and 
how they influence both the implementation of political decisions and 
the understanding of such politics. We thereby leave the field of na-
tional politics, and the arguments will not directly refute Kasza but 
will hopefully convey an idea of how translational processes work in 
practice. 
  
                                                 
20 Cf. Kasza (2006), 156−182. 
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Introducing Care for the Elderly and Political Translations 
Long-term care insurance in Japan was introduced in 2000. It was and 
is seen as an important step in adapting to Japan’s rapidly ageing soci-
ety. Since other articles in this volume deal more in depth with these 
demographic changes, it will suffice here to point out only the most 
important indicators for this change. In 2000, elderly persons, those 65 
or older, compromised 24.2 per cent of the Japanese population.21 
Though this number is already impressive, the proportion of the eld-
erly within the population will rise still further in coming decades. 
Demographic studies estimate that around 2050, numbers will rise to 
about 40 per cent.22 This rapid change demands political solutions. 
Easing the situation by increasing immigration seems an unlikely so-
lution for various reasons. The UN report on replacement migration 
has calculated that Japan would be able to stabilize its age distribution 
of 2005 with 600.000 immigrants yearly.23 But neither the general 
attitude towards migration nor the consequences for overall numbers 
of population make this approach likely. At the moment immigration 
is only promoted in order to bring staff for long-term care into the 
country.24 
                                                 
21 Cf. MHW – Ministry of Health and Welfare (Ed.) (2000): Kōseihakusho. Atarashii 
kōrei shazō o motomete – 21 seiki no kōreishakai o mukaeru [Ministry of Health and 
Welfare. Searching for a new image of the elderly – welcoming the elderly society in 
the 21 century], 7. http://www.wam.go.jp/wamappl/bb16GS70.nsf/0/49256fe9001adf 
9249256923000f6feb/$FILE/hakusyo12.pdf (accessed 22 June 2010). 
22 Cf. Atoh, Makoto (2008): Japan’s population growth during the past 100 years, 19. 
23 Cf. UN – United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2000): Replacement migration: is it a solution to declining and ageing 
populations. 
24 Cf. Vogt, Gabriele (2006): Doors wide shut? The current discourse on labor migra-
tion to Japan. 
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In the context of long-term care insurance, one more point within 
the scenario of the ageing society is of interest. The regional distribu-
tion of elderly is highly distorted in Japan. While in absolute numbers, 
most elderly live in large cities in percentage the picture changes dra-
matically. Cities like Tokyo at the moment have roughly about 15 per 
cent elderly citizens. In contrast in small villages and towns in the 
countryside this number can be up to more than 40 per cent but rarely 
falls below 20–25 per cent. Due to the migration within the country 
during the decades following WWII, when young people were drawn 
to the vibrant cities for good jobs, regional patterns of ageing in Japan 
have been distorted strongly. The trend will reverse in the upcoming 
decades when major cities will catch up with the countryside. Until 
then the problems of the ageing society are mostly felt in places, 
which have been literally left behind in the years of the economical 
catch-up and which are now struggling with the sluggish economy 
more than anywhere else.25 
With no easy solutions at hand to change these demographic trends, 
Japanese politics began expanding care systems for the elderly in the 
early 1990s. As three-generation households, once celebrated as a 
Japanese solution for questions of welfare, were decreasing in num-
bers,26 and many women resented the burden of caring for their par-
ents or in-laws, professional care was to be expanded to fill the gap. 
But the so-called “golden plan” set up in 1989 proved insufficient.27 
Women were not substantially relieved, and continued to carry the 
main burden in caring for the elderly. Kaigo-tsukare (exhaustion 
through care) remained a widespread disease among caring women. 
                                                 
25 Cf. Lützeler, Ralph (2008): Regional demographics, 70. 
26 Cf. MHW (2000), 20.  
27 Cf. Peng, Ito (2008): Ageing and the social security system, 1038. 
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Kaigo-tsukare was even officially acknowledged as a disease. The 
only remedy Japanese families found was to hospitalize their elderly 
in high numbers. This avoided the social stigma of abandoning one’s 
elders, but caused severe problems for the social system since these 
hospitals were an expensive and, at the same time, inefficient institu-
tion for providing such care. For example, Japan became the country 
with the highest per capita diaper consumption worldwide, as hospi-
tals did not care to help the bedridden to the toilet.28 Japanese politics 
started to look abroad for other solutions. 
In the second half of the 1990s, Germany’s model for  long-term 
care insurance was discussed as a solution suitable to Japan. In 2000, 
Japanese long-term care insurance was instituted, with strong echoes 
of the German model. Though the insurance systems resembled each 
other strongly, the model had not simply diffused from Europe to Asia 
but had been translated on various levels and thereby recontextualized. 
This was necessary not least because the discourse surrounding the 
introduction of long-term care insurance in Germany followed specific 
patterns which did not match the situation in Japan and stressed con-
cepts which hitherto had played no role there. The two main rationales 
invoked in the political arena to introduce long-term care insurance in 
Germany were Würde (dignity) and Gerechtigkeit (justice).29 Neither 
of these two terms is easily translated into Japanese, and the finer se-
mantic nuances of the words are even not even easily translatable into 
                                                 
28 Cf. Shimada, Shingo and Christian Tagsold (2006): Alternde Gesellschaften im 
Vergleich. Solidarität und Pflege in Deutschland und Japan [Ageing societies in 
comparison. Solidarity and care in Germany and Japan], 103f. 
29  Cf. Shimada, Shingo, Stefan Blüher, Manfred Stosberg and Christian Tagsold 
(2001): Öffentlichkeit im Wandel. Die Einführung der Pflegeversicherung in Japan 
und in Deutschland [Public sphere in transition. The introduction of the long-term 
care insurance in Germany and Japan], 145−148. 
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English, which seems much closer to German. Political uses of terms 
can lead to complex meanings. It is therefore not surprising that even 
though equivalents of both terms exist in Japanese, they have not been 
used as frequently as in Germany, and with different connotations. 
The technical application of long-term care insurance following the 
German model thus had to be recontextualized through semantically 
shifting translations. 
Translations were not only necessary at the level of abstract con-
cepts. Changes were made to adapt to the Japanese context at the level 
of concrete measures, as well. An example is the denial of cash bene-
fits for caring family members in Japan, a key practice in Germany. In 
the German case, these transfers have often been used to organize 
additional care services at low cost by hiring Eastern European nurses 
at low wages. It was feared, by Japanese feminists in any case, that 
moral pressure would have caused this to simply prolong the “hell of 
caring,” as it was often called by overburdened female relatives in the 
1990s.30 At the same time, conservative politicians were opposed on 
the basis that it was seen as commoditizing family relations, as Esp-
ing-Andersen would have put it.31 
There are many more examples of alterations in the general and 
special conditions of the long-term care insurance as it was adopted in 
Japan, and some will be treated in the following since they take us to 
different levels of translation. If these translations cannot be subsumed 
under the notion of diffusion, would it be possible to talk of adaption? 
Adaption covers only the more conscious alteration of concepts to the 
Japanese context. But many underlying German principles were not 
easy to understand from the Japanese perspective. Interpretation was 
                                                 
30 Cf. Shimada, Tagsold (2006), 147ff. 
31 Cf. Esping-Andersen (1991). 
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needed, constituting the basis for translation. Some meanings of the 
German long-term insurance passed more easily into the Japanese 
discourse than others. 
Institutional Translations on the Regional Level 
Following translations of long-term care insurance, we now move to 
the actual field of research. This field was situated in Fukuoka, the 
centre of the southern island Kyūshū. In a sense, Fukuoka was not the 
best spot to start research on long-term care insurance, as the city is 
relatively young. Because of that, Fukuoka has been the test case for 
new products or chain stores to Japan, and it emphasizes the dispro-
portionate demographics of the city that Toys“R”Us was among the 
chains to open their first stores there. Nevertheless, Fukuoka proved to 
be an interesting field. As the capital of its prefecture, it is a hub for 
northern Kyūshū, making urban and rural comparisons easy.32 
As in most municipalities, the new insurance system was simulta-
neously the source of great euphoria and great anxiety. This was due 
to the fact that the insurance, in order to strengthen regionalization, 
made municipalities responsible for insuring their citizens, leading to 
the creation of new insurers. This was broadly welcomed, though it 
meant that rural villages with a much higher percentage of elderly 
people have to charge higher insurance fees from their citizens than 
demographically younger urban centres. Because regulations require 
identical benefits regardless of where one lives, charging higher fees 
and stipulating volunteerism are the only ways for rural municipalities 
to comply with the regulations without running deficits. Notwithstand-
ing such budgetary problems, discourses of regionalization in the 
                                                 
32 Cf. Shimada, Tagsold (2006), 118ff. 
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1990s had prepared the ground for such a political move.33 The obvi-
ous incompetence with which the central government had reacted to 
the great earthquake in Kōbe in 1995, is an excellent example of the 
sort of phenomenon that had given this discussion momentum.34 
Despite the general approval the new policy met with, most mu-
nicipalities were only halfway prepared to accept their new responsi-
bilities and use their newly gained freedom to enhance civil society. 
As one of the biggest cities in Japan with a well functioning municipal 
bureaucracy, Fukuoka was surely better off than many of the smaller 
cities and villages in the same prefecture in northern Kyūshū. Many of 
these smaller municipalities formed a common association comprising 
nearly all potential insurers in this area. The mayor of one of the small 
villages that opted out of this association explained in an interview 
that the association, in his opinion, was formed out of unwillingness to 
tackle problems at the local level using one’s own creativity and 
power. Indeed, the staff of the association admitted that distribution of 
information about the new situation was one of the major problems. 
All in all, along with the opportunities of self-responsibility, uncer-
tainty was widespread. The association somehow contradicted the aim 
of regionalization, since it elevated the problem again to a more gen-
eral level. It was only in northern Kyūshū that an association of such a 
size was formed. Nevertheless it was seen as a possible model for 
other small municipalities in Japan.35 
Owners of retirement homes and nursing homes also made great 
efforts to bring more sense into the new rules. Though the new insur-
                                                 
33 Cf. Shimada, Tagsold (2006), 118ff. 
34 Cf. Matsushita, Takeshi (1996): Nihon no jiji bunken [Japans current decentralisa-
tion], 19f. 
35 Cf. Shimada, Tagsold (2006), 125ff. 
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ance was set up to foster caring for the elderly at home by bringing in 
help from outside, it had the adverse effect of pushing more elderly 
into nursing homes. Under the old system, nursing homes had a bad 
reputation for caring only for those elderly who had been virtually 
abandoned by their families. Now the status of nursing homes was to 
change, and along with this the expectations to the owners. With the 
stress on efficiency and cost-cutting through the implementation of a 
market for care, the rules of the game also changed dramatically for 
owners. New companies and non-profit organizations also started to 
push into this market. Just like the region’s municipalities, care pro-
viders in homes felt that they needed more information on how to 
provide the best possible care within the bounds of a market.36 
One way to successfully cope with the new situation was to look at 
foreign examples. Germany was the obvious example in this case, as it 
had served as the role model for the new Japanese system. In doing so, 
however, the different actors trying to make sense of the new situation 
used their own understanding of the underlying problems and also 
their own ideas of welfare in general to interpret the German example. 
As there was an urgent need for information, it is not surprising that 
translation took place not only at the national but also at the regional 
level. Local policy makers had often been sent to Germany for a few 
days to question their counterparts, but this approach was marred by 
serious shortcomings. Not trained in German and as interested in 
sightseeing as in gathering information, Fukuoka’s bureaucrats some-
how seem always to have taken their fact finding missions to Baden-
Baden. The city must have been a rather influential hub for informa-
tion about long-term care insurance at that time. Surely it could not 
                                                 
36 Cf. Shimada, Tagsold (2006), 132ff.  
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have been the case that all the tours were heading for this town be-
cause of its status as a famous hot springs for the well-off. Even if 
conducted most thoroughly, such tours could offer only very superfi-
cial information and at the same time were a tool for team-building 
and recreation of the bureaucrats involved. 
So other means had to be found to gather information from the out-
side. A circle of influential owners of homes for senior citizens and 
nursing homes organized monthly meetings for themselves and invited 
politicians and decision-makers as well, though these surely were a 
minority. One reason could have been the entrance fees for those 
meetings, about 20,000 Yen for a scientific presentation at a central 
hotel in Fukuoka with a dinner afterwards at a restaurant for informal 
exchange. A head of a private university from Kansai spoke twice 
within a few months at those meetings on long-term care insurance in 
Europe as a sociologist. His analysis of the situation, which mostly 
emphasized the fact that the first such insurance system was set up in 
the Netherlands and not in Germany, was warmly welcomed in Fu-
kuoka’s circles. I interviewed this professor later and told him about 
my own research and that I wanted to compare the German and Japa-
nese long-term care insurance systems. He very self-confidently as-
sured me that I should not bother too much, as he had already done all 
this exhaustingly. Additionally he gave me a copy of his paper dealing 
with long-term care insurance in Germany and Japan. It turned out 
that he had gone twice to Europe for about one week to assemble ma-
terial and interview specialists in the field. The technical details of his 
interpretations were all in all correct, but his conclusions regarding the 
reasons for Germany’s introduction of such policies sounded more 
like an answer to the riddles of Japan’s opaque and irrational politics 
than a fair and well-founded account of higher and lesser aims. Since 
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it was based on a single interview with a local bureaucrat somewhere 
in the north of Germany, one could not expect much more. 
One should not be misguided at this point. This example is only 
partly a critique of the practice of writing scientific articles and giving 
presentations based on a rather shallow foundation of data. Much 
more important is the fact that the German model influenced not only 
decision-makers at the top level, but also helped local agents to under-
stand the new situation. It is true that some misunderstanding and 
superficial interpretation was involved, but we all know that not all 
our work is based as much on data at times as we would like it to be. 
This case rather shows that scientific authority, an undefined situation 
and the translational process together help to form new knowledge. 
Speaking simply of the diffusion of ideas, as Kasza does, would be 
somewhat misleading. The processes of knowledge formation are 
much more complicated. 
Broken Chains of Translation 
Knowledge of Western models was also discussed by experts in the 
field themselves on different occasions. As the experts search actively 
for information, they not only rely on others but sometimes visit 
Europe themselves too. The information gathered there, or more indi-
rectly through books, the internet and by listening to presentations, is 
redistributed. But this knowledge serves not only to discuss better 
service. It is also important in terms of status and distinction. One 
example was a congress of grassroots elderly-care homes in Kuma-
moto involving hundreds of specialists from all over the North of 
Kyūshū. This congress took place on a weekend in summer and lasted 
a whole day. Since most of the attendants were very actively involved 
in their own grassroots projects, discussions were quite lively and 
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sometimes heated. Some of the presentations and arguments brought 
forth at this congress help to understand how knowledge is used stra-
tegically. At the same time, we change levels of knowledge produc-
tion. This time, it was not so much knowledge of systems to be traded, 
but rather principal matters and to a certain degree stereotypes, which 
help to define unclear situations by means of simplification. 
The first speaker of the congress introduced himself with a telling 
line: “While most here champion the Swedish model, I am very much 
in favour of the Danish model of welfare. But we can discuss this 
later.” Sweden has often been cited in Japanese discourses of wel-
fare,37 and most of the time quite outside of a general political context, 
as an example for welfare policy. Esping-Andersen’s (1991) markedly 
political discussions of the Swedish welfare model as the paradigmatic 
example of a system driven by social democracy have not been ab-
sorbed in general discussion. Despite the fact that Sweden has under-
gone major changes and has mostly discarded the model it stood for in 
the second half of the 20th century in favour of a more neo-liberalist 
strategy, most discussions in Japan would still assume that the Scan-
dinavian welfare is heaven.38 At the congress all listeners had an idea 
of what Sweden stood for, although this might have been highly 
stereotypical. Most of the listeners would also favour the Swedish 
model as a best-practice example which should be adhered to as 
closely as possible in Japan, as well. In contrast to Sweden, the Danish 
welfare system is nearly unknown in Japan and even if it had been, it 
would still have been questionable what Japan could learn from it. But 
the remark made by this speaker was not so much about the pros and 
cons of specific welfare systems but seemed to be made for reasons of 
                                                 
37 Cf. Shimada, Tagsold (2006), 91. 
38 Ibid. 
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personal distinction. By invoking a rather exotic welfare model, at 
least from the Japanese point of view, the speaker made clear that he 
was a real expert with insights not shared by the majority. His self-
positioning was not questioned since his offer to compare Sweden vs. 
Denmark later did not lead into a discussion. The topic was dropped 
after the initial statement by the congress. 
The Swedish example was later used by another speaker in a rather 
peculiar way and caused much discussion. This ardent supporter and 
operator of small care units showed a short video to the audience, 
which he had shot himself. A Swedish and a Japanese nurse cared for 
an elderly male, who had more or less lost awareness. The Japanese 
nurse cared for him using child-talk, explaining most of her acts di-
rectly but getting no reaction. The man underwent all provisions 
deemed necessary by the nurse without betraying any feeling. For the 
audience, the scene was well-known from their own experience. In 
stark contrast, the Swedish nurse sang to the man and tried to stimu-
late his awareness by hugging him. And indeed, he reacted to her al-
though he had mostly ignored her Japanese colleague, prompting the 
speaker to praise Swedish techniques of nursing. He stressed that 
Sweden was not only a role model for the general governance of wel-
fare but succeeded in detail, as well. Japanese nurses, he argued, 
should be trained in the techniques of her Swedish colleagues shown 
in the video. 
Nevertheless the general reaction in the audience was disapproving. 
Too obviously the elderly had reacted to the Swedish nurse and her 
care not because of her technique, but because the she was blonde and 
foreign, while the Japanese nurse was simply the same person he saw 
every day. Change of daily care routines coupled with sensations on a 
different level made the man react. His facial expression showed sur-
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prise but it was not easy to guess whether he liked the way the Swed-
ish nurse cared for him or not. In other words, the speaker’s attempt to 
translate knowledge from a European context failed as it seemed ill-
conceived for the audience. The problems were not touched upon in 
detail in the following discussion. But the reaction of the audience had 
been clear when the speaker presented his theories. Non-verbal and 
verbal reactions showed astonishment and all of the members of audi-
ence I interviewed later disapproved openly. Clearly not all transla-
tional processes help to define the situation and some are rejected. 
This example shows that chains of translation, as Bruno Latour 
would call them, can be broken if some link of the chain is not con-
vincing. In complex translations, it is normally not one simple term, 
phrase or technique that is to be translated. Rather facts, meanings and 
words are linked to each other in a chain. One referent is the next 
one’s reference. Chains of translation can be surprisingly long and 
remain convincing. The start of the chain and its outcome make sense, 
because every single relation of reference to referent forming the links 
of the chain seems to be logical and inevitable.39 In the example of the 
Swedish nurse, a sense of human dignity was involved as elderly per-
sons should not be treated like children but instead should feel human 
affection when taken care of. Human dignity was translated into forms 
of behaviour by the Swedish caring nurse. This was understood by her 
patient. Further, this had to be re-translated into an understanding of 
human dignity by the Japanese audience. However, some of the inter-
vening steps of translation did not seem to make sense. The old man’s 
understanding was not based on the special form of human warmth he 
was offered. Rather, it was the novelty of the whole situation that im-
                                                 
39 Cf. Latour, Bruno (1999): Pandora’s hope. Essays on the reality of science studies. 
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pressed him so deeply. A young blonde Swedish nurse took care of 
him instead of a middle aged Japanese one. Additionally, his daily 
routine was interrupted. By invoking the Swedish model using a 
Swedish nurse, the presenter had hoped to back up his general point 
easily, because Sweden has mostly been thought of as a kind of wel-
fare paradise in Japan, but Sweden could not cover up his weak chain 
of translation. 
This is only a very simple example of a chain of translation. 
Clearly enough, when much more complex terms like Würde (dignity), 
Solidarität (solidarity), and other concepts that were often invoked in 
the German context of long term care insurance were to be translated 
into Japanese, the concepts transformed within the chain of translation. 
They did not simply diffuse to Japan but got interpreted and twisted. 
The Japanese discourse did not take up many of these basic concepts. 
Nevertheless, the impression of a successful translation prevailed. 
While the Japanese system of long-term care insurance had different 
aims, it was conceived as quite similar to the German one.40 Diffusion 
took place only at the surface, yet looking closer at the introduction of 
the long-term care insurance in Germany and Japan, we can see why it 
is more accurate to talk of translation. 
It is important to stress that this not a critique of misunderstandings 
on the Japanese side and problematic translations. The point to be 
made with such an analysis is that processes of translation have to 
involve interpretations. Even in the German discourse, dignity and 
solidarity are not terms with fixed meanings. In discussions, politi-
cians, experts and citizens use these terms differently and have their 
own interpretations of what is meant.41 When translated, the picture 
                                                 
40 Cf. Shimada, Tagsold (2006), 27f. 
41 Cf. Shimada et. al (2001), 145. 
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gets more complicated, as terms, meanings and context are recontex-
tualized. By talking of diffusion we would easily tend to ignore this. 
Just comparing national social politics would be even worse, as it 
would cut out the ongoing exchange of knowledge by translation, 
bringing us back to simple exotification. 
Translation, Interpretation, Understanding 
In the age of globalization, welfare systems are still mostly structured 
nationally. Moving from Japan to Germany or vice versa for work 
involves uncertainties about welfare entitlements. Entitlements ac-
quired in one country are not transferred to another, even within po-
litical contexts such as the European Union. Public political discus-
sions also often revolve around cultural traits or national specifics as 
reasons for reshaping welfare systems. Finally, welfare systems have 
often been described as evolving on paths. Decisions once made heav-
ily influence future developments of the system. Because of all these 
reasons, a methodological nationalism in welfare research seems to be 
well founded. Systems are best explained by their own logic when 
adhering to methodological nationalism. 
While this is surely not completely wrong and can help to explain 
partly why Germany’s long-term care insurance is structured as it is, 
methodological nationalism has its blind spots and weaknesses. Ex-
plaining welfare systems as completely autonomous entities not re-
lated to each other is especially misleading. It is a first step to ac-
knowledge that the development of a welfare system such as Japan’s 
is not completely atypical. Gregory Kasza has convincingly shown 
that Japan is rather a textbook case for introducing different branches 
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of social insurance.42 But this point could still be supported in line 
with methodological nationalism. Esping-Andersen discusses the 
structuralist argument of welfare development. The structuralists as-
sume that necessities of emerging capitalism drive the development of 
welfare and that because of this, modern welfare states resemble each 
other.43 Kasza proves that structuralist assumptions are valid for Japan 
but goes beyond this argument when introducing diffusion of knowl-
edge as another factor.44 
Welfare systems do learn from each other. This learning is often 
difficult to discern. Experts travelling to other countries or meeting 
each other at congresses and forums do not take part often in public 
discussions. Their views inform politicians and media but the source 
of expertise is often opaque to the outside. But the examples from 
fieldwork have shown that knowledge about other welfare systems is 
used on all levels. Laws are read, systems analyzed and practice dis-
cussed in order to understand better how long-term care in Japan can 
be improved. These processes of knowledge transfer rely on transla-
tion and interpretation. Sometimes these translations seem to be prob-
lematic or even wrong. But instead of insisting on philological equiva-
lence, something never to be achieved fully anyway, the relevance for 
actors is much more interesting in our context. 
Understanding these processes of translation and interpretation 
helps to understand why methodological nationalism is wrong. Even if 
welfare systems are governed at a national level, they are interdepend-
ent with regard to their information. Welfare evolves in accordance 
with structural necessities, with national paths but also with shared 
                                                 
42 Cf. Kasza (2006).  
43 Cf. Esping-Andersen (1991), 13f. 
44 Cf. Kasza (2006), 197f.  
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knowledge about solutions. The Japanese long-term care insurance is 
an excellent example to prove this. It cannot be understood on the 
basis of Japanese cultural traits or the development of the Japanese 
welfare-system alone but only when taking into account that there is a 
constant flow of information to and from Japan. 
  
Comparing Social Policies 
 
219 
References 
ATOH, Makoto (2008). Japan’s population growth during the past 100 years. 
In: Florian COULMAS, Harald CONRAD, Annette SCHAD-SEIFERT and 
Gabriele VOGT (Eds.). The demographic challenge. A handbook about 
Japan. Leiden: Brill, 5–24. 
BECK, Ulrich and Edgar GRANDE (2006). Cosmopolitan Europe. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
BELLAH, Robert N. (1957). Tokugawa religion. The values of pre-industrial 
Japan. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press. 
CAMPBELL, John Creighton (1992). How policies change. The Japanese 
government and the ageing society. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press. 
CONRAD, Sebastian and Randeria SHALINI (2002). Jenseits des Eurozentris-
mus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissen-
schaften [Beyond eurocentrism. Postcolonial perspectives in historical 
and cultural studies]. Frankfurt o. M., New York: Campus. 
ESPING-ANDERSEN, Gøsta (1991). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
ESPING-ANDERSEN, Gøsta (Ed.) (1996). Welfare states in transition. National 
adaptations in global economies. London: Sage. 
ESPING-ANDERSEN, Gøsta (1997). Hybrid or unique? The Japanese welfare 
state between Europe and America. Journal of European Social Policy 
7:3, 179–189. 
FABIAN, Johannes (1983). Time and the other. How anthropology makes its 
object. New York: Columbia University Press. 
GOODMAN, Roger, Gordon WHITE and Huck-ju KWON (1998). The East 
Asian welfare model. Welfare orientalism and the state. Vol. ESRC Pa-
cific Asia programme. London, New York: Routledge. 
GOODMAN, Roger and Ito PENG (1996). The East Asian welfare states. Peri-
patetic learning, adaptive change and nation-building. In: Gøsta ESPING-
ANDERSEN (Ed.). Welfare states in transition. National adaptations in 
global economies. London: Sage, 192–224. 
HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking 
of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Christian Tagsold 
 
220 
KASZA, Gregory James (2006). One world of welfare. Japan in comparative 
perspective. Cornell studies in political economy. Ithaca, New York, 
London: Cornell University Press. 
LATOUR, Bruno (1999). Pandora’s hope. Essays on the reality of science 
studies. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
LÜTZELER, Ralph (2008). Regional demographics. In: Florian COULMAS, 
Harald CONRAD, Annette SCHAD-SEIFERT and Gabriele VOGT (Eds.). The 
demographic challenge. A handbook about Japan. Leiden: Brill, 62–79. 
MATSUSHITA, Takeshi (1996). Nihon no jiji bunken [Japan’s current decen-
tralisation]. Tokyo: Iwanami. 
MHW – MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND WELFARE (Ed.) (2000). Kōseihakusho: 
atarashii kōrei shazō o motomete – 21 seiki no kōreishakai o mukaeru 
[Ministry of Health and Welfare: searching for a new image of elderly – 
welcoming the elderly society in the 21 century]. http://www.wa 
m.go.jp/wamappl/bb16GS70.nsf/0/49256fe9001adf9249256923000f6feb/
$FILE/hakusyo12.pdf (accessed 22 June 2010). 
PENG, Ito (2008). Ageing and the social security system. In: Florian COUL-
MAS, Harald CONRAD, Annette SCHAD-SEIFERT and Gabriele VOGT (Eds.). 
The demographic challenge. A handbook about Japan. Leiden: Brill, 
1033–1047. 
RIEGER, Elmar and Stephan LEIBFRIED (2004). Kultur versus Globalisierung. 
Sozialpolitische Theologie in Konfuzianismus und Christentum [Culture 
versus globalisation. Socio-political theology in Confucianism and 
Christianity]. Frankfurt o. M.: Suhrkamp. 
SAID, Edward W. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books. 
SHIMADA, Shingo, Stefan BLÜHER, Manfred STOSBERG and Christian TAG-
SOLD (2001). Öffentlichkeit im Wandel. Die Einführung der Pflegeversi-
cherung in Japan und in Deutschland [Public sphere in transition. The in-
troduction of the long-term care insurance in Germany and Japan]. In: 
Gertrud BACKES and Wolfgang CLEMENS (Eds.). Zur Konstruktion sozia-
ler Ordnungen des Alter(n)s [The construction of the social order of age 
and ageing]. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 143−168. 
SHIMADA, Shingo and Christian TAGSOLD (2006). Alternde Gesellschaften im 
Vergleich. Solidarität und Pflege in Deutschland und Japan [Ageing 
societies in comparison. Solidarity and care in Germany and Japan]. 
Bielefeld: Transcript.  
TAKAHASHI, Mutsuko (1997). The emergence of welfare society in Japan. 
Aldershot: Avebury. 
Comparing Social Policies 
 
221 
UN – UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 
POPULATION DIVISION (2000). Replacement migration. Is it a solution to 
declining and ageing populations. New York: United Nations. 
VOGT, Gabriele (2006). Doors wide shut? The current discourse on labor 
migration to Japan. Tokyo: German Institute for Japanese Studies. 

Contributing Authors 
 
223 
FLORIAN COULMAS 
Florian Coulmas is Director of the German 
Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo and Pro-
fessor of Japanese Studies at the Institute of 
East Asian Studies, University Duisburg-Essen, 
on a leave of absence. He has taught and done 
research in various environments, including The National Language 
Research Institute, Tokyo, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 
USA, and Chuo University, Tokyo. His numerous publications in-
clude more than a dozen monographs. He has been a regular contribu-
tor to a number of newspapers including the Japan Times, Neue Zür-
cher Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung. His most recent books are 
Population decline and ageing in Japan. The social consequences, 
Die Gesellschaft Japans. Arbeit, Familie und demographische Krise 
(Japans society. Work, family and the demographic crisis), and with 
Harald Conrad, Annette Schad-Seifert and Gabriele Vogt (Eds.): The 
demographic challenge. A handbook about Japan. 
For further information and a full list of publications see: 
www.dijtokyo.org 
 
Contact: 
German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ)  
Jochi Kioizaka Bldg., 7-1 Kioicho,  
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0094, Japan 
dijtokyo@dijtokyo.org 
Contributing Authors 
 
224 
 
MAREN GODZIK 
Maren Godzik is a senior research fellow at the 
German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo 
(DIJ). She received her PhD from the Univer-
sity of Bonn in 2005 with a thesis on avant-
garde women in Japan of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Her research interest include housing and living arrangements of el-
derly people (especially alternative housing); elderly migration; de-
velopment of floor plans and family structure; and sociology of mod-
ern and contemporary art. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact: 
German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ)  
Jochi Kioizaka Bldg., 7-1 Kioicho,  
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0094, Japan 
godzik@dijtokyo.org 
 
Contributing Authors 
 
225 
 
AKIKO ODA 
Akiko Oda gained her doctorate in 2010 from 
the University of Surrey, England, following 
her research on the social dynamics of older 
spouse couples living in the community in East 
Honshu, Japan. Her interest in older people 
relationships was kindled during her bachelor studies at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science, from where she gained an 
honours degree in Social Policy and Administration. She also has a 
Master’s degree in Ageing and Social Research, which incorporated a 
short research project into care relationships of older Japanese women. 
Akiko Oda has published a paper in the peer review journal Japanstu-
dien (now re-titled Contemporary Japan), and other articles, and will 
submit further papers from her research for journal publication in 
2010. 
 
 
 
Contact: 
Department of Sociology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, England  
moonroad@hotmail.com 
  
Contributing Authors 
 
226 
 
RICHARD RONALD 
Richard Ronald is Associate Professor in Ur-
ban Studies at the Department of Geography, 
Planning and International Development Stud-
ies, University of Amsterdam. He is also affili-
ated with the OTB Institute at Delft University 
of Technology, the Department of Japanese and Korean Studies at the 
University of Leiden (the Netherlands) as well as the Department of 
Housing & Interior Design, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Ko-
rea. He has numerous publications on housing, urban and social 
change in Europe and Asia-Pacific. His most recent books include a 
monograph, The Ideology of Home Ownership and a number of co-
edited volumes including Housing and Social Transition in Japan and 
Home and Family in Japan. Richard is a former recipient of the Japan 
Foundation Doctoral Research Fellowship and the Japan Society for 
the Promotion of Science Postdoctoral Fellowship. He is currently 
review editor for the International Journal of Housing Policy and 
section editor of the forthcoming Encyclopaedia of Home and Hous-
ing.  
Contact: 
Department of Geography, Planning and IDS 
University of Amsterdam 
Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130 
1018 VZ Amsterdam, Netherlands 
r.ronald@uva.nl 
  
Contributing Authors 
 
227 
 
CHRISTIAN TAGSOLD 
Christian Tagsold is a lecturer at the Institute of 
Modern Japan at Heinrich-Heine-University 
Düsseldorf. He has conducted research on Ja-
pan’s ageing society and the long-term care 
insurance during a DFG-project in Fukuoka in 
2000/2002 in cooperation with the Prefectural University of Fukuoka. 
Together with Shingo Shimada he published the book Alternde Ge-
sellschaften im Vergleich. Solidarität und Pflege in Deutschland und 
Japan (Ageing societies in comparison. Solidarity and care in Germa-
ny and Japan). Besides age and ageing in Japan his main research 
focus are sport in Japan, Japanese gardens worldwide and the transla-
tional turn.  
 
 
 
Contact: 
Modern Japanese Studies 
Heinrich-Heine-University Duesseldorf 
Universitaetstrasse 1 
40225 Duesseldorf, Germany 
tagsold@phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de 
  
Contributing Authors 
 
228 
 
COSIMA WAGNER 
Cosima Wagner has a Master’s degree in 
Japanese Studies and History and gained her 
PhD degree 2008 in Japanese Studies with a 
dissertation on Robotopia Nipponica – re-
search on the acceptance of robots in Japan 
(to be published in German in autumn 2010). 
Since 2003 she is Research Fellow at the department of Japanese 
Studies at Goethe-University Frankfurt. Research topics include a 
cultural sciences perspective on the development of technology in 
modern Japan, history of objects and the history of everyday life in 
modern Japan, cultural globalization and the example of Japanese 
popular culture in Asia and the “West”. 
For further information and a full list of publications refer to 
http://www.japanologie.uni-frankfurt.de/japlehre/wag.html.  
 
 
Contact: 
Department of Japanology 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University Frankfurt 
Senckenberganlage 31 
60325 Frankfurt on the Main, Germany 
c.wagner@em.uni-frankfurt.de 
  
Contributing Authors 
 
229 
 
ATSUHIRO YAMADA 
Atsuhiro Yamada is a labour economist and is currently Associate 
Professor of Social Policy at Keio University (Tokyo, Japan). He is 
one of the authors of The Economics of Older Workers in Japan. He 
has written on the effect of various public policies related to the older 
workers. Atsuhiro Yamada also conducts research on the income dis-
tribution of older people in Japan from an international comparative 
perspective as a national expert for the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (Paris, France). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact: 
Economics Department 
Keio University 
Mita 2-15-45 
Minato-ku, Tokyo 108-8345, Japan 
atsuhiro@econ.keio.ac.jp 
 

  
GERMAN ASSOCIATION FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE  
RESEARCH ON JAPAN (VSJF) 
PROGRAMME 
Annual Meeting of the VSJF 
Demographic Change in Japan and the EU 
Comparative Perspectives 
Friday, November 28 – Sunday, November 30, 2008 
Mutterhaus Tagungszentrum 
Geschwister-Aufricht-Straße 1, 40489 Düsseldorf 
 
 
 
Friday, November 28 
13.30 h Registration 
14.00 h Opening Remarks, Greetings 
14.15 h Introduction to the Conference Topics 
 Annette SCHAD-SEIFERT 
  
Program of the Annual VSJF Meeting 2008 
 
232 
Opening Session 1: Demographic Trends and  
Social Analysis – Observations from Japan  
and the EU 
 Chair: Annette SCHAD-SEIFERT 
14.30 h Why do we need a Paradigm Change in Family 
Policy? 
 Uta MEIER-GRÄWE (Justus-Liebig-University Gießen) 
 Socio-economic Inequality in a Rapidly Ageing 
Society – Japan in Cross-cultural Comparison 
with Europe 
 Sawako SHIRAHASE (Tokyo University) 
16.00 h Coffee Break 
16.30 h Population Decline and Ageing in Japan – the 
Bitter Fruits of Success 
 Keynote Speech: Florian COULMAS (German Institute 
for Japanese Studies) 
19.00−21.00 h Dinner 
 
Saturday, November 29 
Session 2: Family and Welfare Policies in Japan 
and the EU 
 Chair: Celia SPODEN 
09.00 h Social Policy in Comparison – Germany and 
Japan 
 Christian TAGSOLD (Heinrich-Heine-University Dues-
seldorf) 
Program of the annual VSJF Meeting 2008 
 
233 
 
 Political Responses to Low Fertility in Japan 
 Axel KLEIN (German Institute for Japanese Studies) 
 Japanese Single Mothers in an Era of Welfare 
Restructuring 
 Aya EZAWA (Leiden University) 
10.30 h Coffee Break 
 
Session 3: Aging Society and the Organizations of 
Households 
 Chair: Shingo SHIMADA 
11.00 h Elderly Housing in Contemporary Japan – Ex-
ploring Alternative Forms of Living 
 Maren GODZIK (German Institute for Japanese Studies) 
 Generational Divides in Housing Pathways and 
Life Courses in Japan 
 Richard RONALD (Delft University of Technology) 
 Care Dynamics Focussed on Disabled Older Men 
 Akiko ODA (University of Surrey, UK) 
12.30−13.30 h Lunch 
14.00 h Parallel Working Group Sessions 
15.30 h Coffee Break 
16.00 h Parallel VSJF Section Sessions 
18.00 h Dinner 
19.30−21.00 h VSJF General Member Meeting 
  
Program of the Annual VSJF Meeting 2008 
 
234 
Sunday, November 30 
Session 4: Demographic Change and the Economy 
Panel 1: How Enterprises Cope with Demographic Chal-
lenges 
 Chair: Ruprecht VONDRAN 
9.30 h Japan’s 2007 Problem and the Challenge of an 
Ageing Workforce 
 Florian KOHLBACHER (German Institute for Japanese 
Studies) 
 The Effectiveness of New Job Security Measure 
for the Older Employees in Japan 
 Atsuhiro YAMADA (Keio University) 
11.00 h Coffee Break 
Panel 2: The Silver Market and Seniors as Consumers 
 Chair: Florian KOHLBACHER 
11.30 h “Silver Robots” and “Robotic Nurses”? Japanese 
Robot Culture and Elderly Care 
 Cosima WAGNER (Johann Wolfgang Goethe University 
Frankfurt) 
 How are Markets Created? The Case of Japan’s 
Silvermarket 
 Cornelia STORZ and Werner PASCHA (Universitys 
Frankfurt, Duisburg-Essen) 
12.30 h Closing Remarks 
13.00 h End of the Conference 
 
